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As the renewable energy sector matures, 
policies must be adapted to reflect changing 
market conditions, new technical and socio-
economic challenges, and the need for an 
inclusive, just transition well beyond the energy 
sector. Falling costs for new technologies, the 
growing prevalence of variable renewables 
(i.e., solar and wind) in the power system, and 
greater policy emphasis on economic, social 
and environmental objectives have altered the 
conditions for new market entrants and new 
power generation projects. One important 
trend has been the increasing use of auctions, 
as policy makers seek to procure electricity 
based on renewables at the lowest possible 
price, while simultaneously fulfilling other social 
or economic objectives. 
The International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA) produced its first study on auctions in 
2012. Renewable Energy Auctions in Developing 
Countries (IRENA, 2013) highlighted key lessons 
from countries that had implemented auctions 
by that point, namely Brazil, China, Morocco, 
Peru and South Africa. Renewable Energy 
Auctions: A Guide to Design (IRENA, 2015) 
advised policy makers on the implications of 
various approaches to designing auctions. It 
has subsequently served as a basis for auction 
guidelines issued by development banks and 
related organisations, such as the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the Energy Community Secretariat 
(EBRD and EnCS, 2018). 
Four years after IRENA’s first report on 
the topic, auctions were achieving record-
breaking low prices for solar and wind power. 
Renewable Energy Auctions: Analysing 2016 
(IRENA, 2017a) analysed the factors behind 
those new price lows, including aspects of 
auction design. Additionally, at the regional 
level, Renewable Energy Auctions: Cases from 
sub-Saharan Africa (IRENA, 2018a), analysed 
recent auctions in South Africa, Uganda and 
Zambia. Collectively, these studies can serve 
as a reference for renewable energy auction 
design around the world.
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ABOUT THIS STUDY 
The present report focuses on how to design auctions to achieve objectives beyond price 
discovery. Auctions designed in innovative ways can help to achieve specific national goals, 
beyond solely procuring electricity at the lowest price. Such goals might include ramping up 
solar and wind power; integrating higher shares of those sources into the grid; ensuring greater 
participation by communities, small companies or new market entrants; and maximising the 
socio-economic benefits of renewables, including job creation. Alongside such diverse aims, 
ensuring timely project completion remains a paramount objective.
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Renewable energy auctions are becoming 
increasingly popular, owing chiefly to 
their ability to reveal competitive prices. 
Moreover, flexibility in their design allows 
them to be tailored to country-specific 
conditions and objectives beyond price 
discovery. In 2017-2018, some 55 countries 
used auctions to procure renewables-based 
electricity, raising the number of countries 
that have held at least one auction for 
renewables to 106 by the end of 2018 
(REN21, 2004-2019; IRENA Database, n.d.). 
One-third of the 55 countries had no 
previous experience with auctions. The 
decision of these newcomers to adopt 
auctions was likely driven by the reported 
success of auctions in other markets 
in attaining low prices while achieving 
other goals.
This chapter begins with a global overview 
of auctions in terms of the total volumes 
auctioned, classified by technology, 
along with global average prices for solar 
photovoltaic (PV) and onshore wind 
(Section 1.1). 
Section 1.2 describes regional trends, while 
Section 1.3 analyses the factors behind 
trends in prices. 
Section 1.4 provides an updated framework 
for auction design and discusses trends in 
design elements of auctions conducted 
around the world between 2017 and 2018. 
When analysing the price results, an 
important factor to consider is the trade-
off between obtaining low prices and 
achieving other objectives. This is done 
in this chapter for both solar PV and 
onshore wind auctions held in 2017-2018. 
Subsequent chapters in this report analyse 
design elements that can be used to 
achieve objectives beyond price reduction. 
Those objectives include ensuring projects 
are delivered on time, integrating higher 
shares of variable renewable energy, and 
supporting a just and inclusive energy 
transition. 
Unless otherwise stated, the source of 
the figures in this chapter is a database 
consisting of information obtained from 
IRENA, Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
(BNEF) and PSR Energy Consulting 
and Analytics.
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Notes: PV = photovoltaic, CSP = concentrated solar power and solar thermal. Preliminary findings presented by IRENA in 
June 2019 reported a total volume auctioned of 97.5 GW through June 2018. This report also extends to the end of 2018.
Source: IRENA Database, n.d., based on BNEF, 2019a and PSR, n.d.
1.1 GLOBAL OVERVIEW AND PRICE TRENDS
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Most renewable energy auctions still focus on 
mature and cost-competitive power generation 
technologies. An estimated total volume of 
111 gigawatts (GW) of electricity was auctioned 
(or announced) in 2017-2018, with solar PV and 
onshore wind accounting, respectively, for more 
than one-half and more than one-third of the 
total volume (Figure 1.1). Offshore wind has seen 
a substantial increase in auctioned volume, and 
auctions for concentrated solar power (CSP) 
were held in three countries, two of which were 
new to the technology. 
The potential of auctions to achieve low prices 
has been a major motivation for their adoption 
worldwide. As Figure 1.2 illustrates, price results 
for solar and wind auctions have decreased 
overall in the past decade. In 2010, solar energy 
was contracted at a global average price of almost 
USD 250/MWh, compared with the average price 
of USD 83/MWh in 2016. Wind prices also fell 
during that period, albeit at a slower pace (since 
the technology was more mature in 2010). The 
average price in 2016 was USD 50/MWh, down 
from USD 75/MWh in 2010. 
Falling technology costs during the period 
led policy makers around the world to consider 
auctions as a way of determining the market 
price of renewables in their specific context and 
avoiding windfall profits for developers. This 
downward trend continued in 2017. In 2018, solar 
PV prices continued to fall, though at a slower 
pace, reaching USD 56/MWh in 2018. Onshore 
wind prices rose, reaching USD 48/MWh (up 
from USD 43/MWh in 2017). 
Figure 1.2 illustrates global average price results 
for solar PV and onshore wind auctions held 
between January 2010 and December 2018. 
These yearly weighted averages are obtained 
by averaging out the auction outcomes of 
countries with differences in terms of macro-
economic context, energy policy and auction 
design, among many other factors.1 The mix of 
countries that make up the sample each year 
is always changing, particularly as more and 
more newcomers adopt auctions. Moreover, 
in analysing trends, it is important to note that 
an outlier in the sample can potentially influence 
(weighted) average prices significantly. This is 
particularly true when the sample is small. 
¹  The global weighted averages are calculated by averaging each country’s auction prices, adjusted by the volumes (capacity) 
awarded. 
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Figure 1.2   Global weighted average prices resulting from auctions, 2010-2018, and capacity  
awarded each year
Source: IRENA Database, n.d., based on BNEF, 2019a and PSR, n.d.
Notes: This figure shows awarded volumes, while Figure 1.1 shows auctioned volumes. The graph depicts awarded 
weighted average global prices from auctions between January 2010 and December 2018, excluding feed-in-premium 
auctions. The latter are discussed throughout the report, but are not part of these calculations. The same is true of 
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2 When neither the exchange rate or the date are specified, the USD value is taken from the reference.
3 1 USD = 53.28 PHP in August 2018.
4 1 USD = 0.879995 EUR on average in 2017 and 2018.
In Brazil, for example, a remarkable price 
decrease for onshore wind from USD 28.96/
MWh in December 2017 to USD 18.58/MWh in 
April 2018 can be explained by one aggressive 
bidder being awarded the entire demand (114 
MW). In the subsequent auction (August 2018), 
with more capacity awarded (1,251 MW) and 
more firms participating, the average price 
increased (to USD 24.86/MWh), returning to 
the trend that previous auctions had followed. 
Hence, the April 2018 auction can be considered 
an outlier, which could have had a greater 
impact on the global trends had the awarded 
capacity been greater. Thus, the analysis and 
discussion on average prices provide valuable 
insights, but they are not perfectly comparable 
over time or across countries (IRENA, 2017a). 
Between 2017 and 2018, nearly half of all solar PV 
auctions were held in South and East Asia and 
the Pacific, with almost one-third occurring 
in Europe (Figure 1.3). 
India alone allocated 17 GW of solar PV 
capacity at an average price of USD 42.3/
MWh2 (BNEF, 2019a). Likewise, China awarded 
5 GW of solar PV at an average price of CNY 
427/MWh (USD 64.6/MWh) in a total of 10 
auctions (Climatescope, 2018). The Philippines 
received bids as low as PHP 2,339/MWh 
(USD 43.9/MWh)³  in a 50 MW auction (Bellini, 
2018a). Indeed, in South and East Asia and the 
Pacific, solar PV is becoming competitive with 
traditional energy sources owing to high levels 
of solar irradiance and the falling cost of the 
technology. 
Onshore wind auctions were most popular 
in Europe, followed by South and East Asia 
and the Pacific. Germany alone auctioned 
more than 5 GW in seven rounds over this 
period at an average price of EUR 51.65/MWh 
(USD 58.7 MWh).⁴ Offshore wind auctions saw 
considerable uptake in Europe, led by Germany 
and the United Kingdom. 
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Note: PV = photovoltaic, CSP = concentrated solar power and solar thermal.
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Figure 1.3  Volume auctioned between January 2017 and December 2018, by technology and region (GW)
5  The regions selected for this analysis are based purely on geographic distribution of countries. 
Biomass auctions were mainly concentrated in 
Europe and the Americas. Argentina awarded 
143 MW of biomass at an average price of 
USD 107.5/MWh under the second round of the 
RenovAr program. CSP was auctioned mainly 
in Central and Western Asia, specifically in the 
United Arab Emirates, where Dubai awarded 
700 MW at a price of USD 73/MWh (DEWA, 
2018). The contract was later amended to add 
250 MW of solar PV at a price of USD 24/MWh, 
increasing the total capacity to 950 MW.
1.2 REGIONAL TRENDS
A closer look at regional trends shows a 
concentration of newcomers in Africa and 
Asia, while other regions gain more experience 
in the use of auctions and experiment with 
innovative designs.5 
Most African countries that held renewable 
energy auctions in 2017-2018 did so for the 
first time. Their choice was driven by three 
characteristics of auctions: 
1)  their potential for price discovery, especially 
when there is uncertainty regarding how to 
price renewable-based generation (e.g., if 
they were to adopt a feed-in tariff (FiT));
2)  the ease with which they can be tailored to 
a particular context or policy purpose; and 
3)  their ability to attract private investment, 
domestic and foreign, through clear and 
transparent processes. 
Along these lines, the positive experience that 
pioneers such as Morocco and South Africa have 
had provides many lessons that can be shared 
(IRENA, 2018a, 2013). 
African auctions were dominated by solar PV in 
2017-2018 (Figure 1.4), with Algeria, Egypt and 
Morocco playing the major roles. In addition, 
the Scaling Solar Program was successful in 
attracting investments in Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Senegal and Zambia (see Box 3.1). 
Most of the countries in the Americas have 
considerable experience with auctions. In Latin 
America, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay were early 
adopters. More recently, Argentina, Chile and 
Mexico have joined the trend of innovating with 
auction designs: Argentina regarding guarantees 
backing up contracts and mitigating risks; 
Chile and Mexico regarding system integration. 
Colombia is the most recent adopter, driven 
by the success of auctions in neighbouring 
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Note: PV = photovoltaic, CSP = Concentrated solar power and solar thermal.
Source: IRENA Database, n.d., based on BNEF, 2019a and PSR, n.d.
Figure 1.4  Volume auctioned between January 2017 and December 2018, by region and technology (GW)
Several countries in Central America (e.g., 
Honduras and Belize) held auctions before 2010, 
but some have suspended their programmes 
in recent years. Canada and the United States 
continue using auctions at the subnational 
level with an increasing scope. In the United 
States, auctions are mainly conducted by public 
or private utilities. A variety of technologies 
beyond wind and solar appear in auctions 
in the Americas, thanks to the availability of 
biomass (Brazil), hydropower (Brazil) and biogas 
(Argentina) (Figure 1.4).  
Across the Asian continent, countries’ experience 
with auctions is varied. Most countries in Central 
and Western Asia are newcomers, but some 
countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, have 
had previous experience. In terms of technology, 
the focus was on onshore wind, dominated by 
Turkey, followed by solar PV (Figure 1.4). Solar 
auctions in the emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai are setting the pace for replication in 
the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
notably for CSP (IRENA, 2019a). The increased 
adoption of renewable energy auctions in a 
region with abundant fossil fuel resources 
demonstrates their potential to yield competitive 
prices when designed properly.
South and East Asia and the Pacific also 
contain dynamic and heterogeneous markets 
with a diverse mix of newcomers and countries 
with established auction experience. Growing 
demand for energy, abundant solar resources 
and cost-competitive PV technology have led 
many newcomers in South and East Asia to turn 
to auctions. Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand 
and Viet Nam are good examples (IRENA, 
2018b). Japan has switched to auctions from 
administratively set FiTs to reduce the cost 
of supporting solar PV. Meanwhile, China and 
India have been holding at least 10 renewable 
auctions per year. In terms of technology, the 
region has mainly focused on solar PV, followed 
by onshore wind and, recently, a boom in 
offshore wind (Figure 1.4).
In Europe, newcomers included contracting 
parties to the Energy Community Treaty (e.g., 
Albania and Montenegro). Contracting parties 
to the Energy Community, like the member 
states of the European Union, are required to 
follow the European Commission’s Guidelines 
on State Aid for Environmental Protection and 
Energy for 2014-2020, which establish market-
based mechanisms such as auctions as the main 
instrument of support for renewables.
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Figure 1.5  Factors that impact the price resulting from auctions
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Source: Adapted from IRENA, 2017a.
* The Open Solar Contracts by IRENA and Terawatt Initiative provide freely available standardised contract 
documentation designed to streamline project development and finance processes for solar PV projects (see Box 1.8).
The guidelines favour competition between 
renewable technologies but explicitly allow 
for technology-specific auctions. Countries 
with extensive experience also conducted 
auctions in that time period (e.g., Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). 
The next section provides a deeper look at 
price trends observed in the period 2017-2018. 
Section 1.4 focuses on trends in auction design.
1.3 PRICE TRENDS 
As analysed in IRENA’s Renewable Energy 
Auctions: Analysing 2016, many factors 
shape the prices that emerge from auctions. 
They can be grouped into four categories: 
1) country-specific conditions such as resource 
availability, power market design and the costs 
of finance, land and labour; 2) the degree of 
investor confidence related to, for example, the 
experience of the bidder and auctioneer, and 
credibility of the off-taker; 3) other policies 
related to renewable energy, including clear 
targets, grid policies, priority dispatch, and local 
content rules; and 4) the design of the auction 
itself, taking into consideration the trade-
offs between obtaining the lowest price and 
achieving other objectives (Figure 1.5).
Price trends for solar PV
As seen in Figure 1.2, global average prices for 
solar PV decreased sharply between 2010 and 
2017, followed by more stable prices afterwards. 
The steep decrease was driven mainly by a steady 
decline in the price of solar panels, which fell to 
a quarter of their initial price over the period 
(IRENA, 2018c). Increases in investor confidence, 
developers’ experience and competition in 
auctions also contributed to the decline. 
One possible reason for the stability of average 
global prices during 2017-2018 could be the 
overall maturity of the sector. In addition, 
experience with previous auctions, along with 
the adoption of strict compliance rules, may 
have led developers to bid less aggressively. 
14
6  Mexican auction prices are typically comprised of bundles of two products: energy and Clean Energy Certificates (CEC).  
For instance, one of the wind bids in the third auction can be broken down as following: USD 17.7/(MWh+CEC) = USD 11.8/MWh + 
USD 5.9/CEC (PwC, 2018).
BOX 1.1  PRICES FROM INDIA’S 2017-2018 SOLAR AUCTIONS
In 2018, auctions for solar PV (and wind) rose dramatically from prior years, accompanied 
by lower bid prices. In July 2018, a price of INR 2.44/kWh (USD 35.42/MWh)a was registered 
in the 600 MW solar auction held by the Solar Energy Corporation of India (MNRE, 2018), 
but subsequent auctions in 2018 yielded relatively higher prices for a few reasons. First, several were 
state auctions, which have higher off-take and project development risks as financially stressed 
distribution companies can delay or cancel payments to developers (Atal et al., 2018) (see Indian 
case study in IRENA, 2017a). Second, the imposition of a 25% safeguard duty that took effect on 31 
July 2018, coupled with volatility in the Indian rupee in 2018, deepened developers’ uncertainty. These 
factors largely offset the steep reduction in module prices (from USD 0.33/kW to USD 0.21/kW) over 
the course of 2018 (Singhvi, 2019).
Tender issuance remained strong through the second quarter of 2019, accounting for over 24 GW 
(Nandamuri, 2019). However, many recent tenders have been cancelled or undersubscribed (see Section 
2.1 for definition). High tariffs and wide tariff gaps between winning bids are the reasons for cancelling 
auctions. Meanwhile, the low tariff caps set for several auctions – together with land and transmission 
bottlenecks, payment delays by distribution companies, and steps by some state governments to 
renegotiate existing power purchase agreements – are all contributing to reduced participation in 
auction rounds.
Figure 1.6  Auctioned capacities and resulting prices from solar auctions in India, 2015-2019








































































































In some countries, once the most profitable 
projects have been awarded – i.e., those located 
in the most favourable sites – it is natural for 
prices to plateau. The plateau may also reflect 
a larger share of auctions resulting in higher 
prices in the overall volume of PV auctioned 
globally (see Figure 1.5 for factors affecting 
prices). Nevertheless, there are opportunities 
for further cost reduction, for example, 
through economies of scale and increased 
research and development. 
Between 2017 and 2018, China (5 GW) and 
India (17 GW) exerted a strong influence on 
global average prices, as they were responsible 
together for 39% of the solar PV capacity 
auctioned (Boxes 1.1 and 1.2).
In the rest of the world, auction price outcomes 
varied greatly over 2017-2018. On the one hand, 
record low prices continued to be undercut. 
Mexico awarded the equivalent of 3 TWh at 
USD 20.80/(MWh + Clean Energy Certificates) 
(BNEF, 2019a; PwC, 2018).6  
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BOX 1.2  ENABLING ENVIRONMENT DRIVING SOLAR PV PRICES DOWN IN CHINA’S AUCTIONS 
Under the Top Runner programme, China held a total of 10 auctions in 2018, awarding 5 GW 
in solar PV contracts at an average price of CNY 427/MWh (USD 64.6/MWh) (Climatescope, 
2018) – a 48% decrease from the average price in the 17 auctions conducted in 2016 
(USD 123.65/MWh). The main drivers for the decrease in price were 1) conducive land-use policies for 
renewables, 2) competitive interest rates on loans and 3) government commitments to low curtailment.
First, regarding land-use policies, some local governments have fixed the land rental price for 20 years 
in pre-determined areas for auctioned projects. The land rental costs are 80% to 90% cheaper than in 
other locations, particularly in and around cities in eastern China. Yet, demand for electricity is largely 
focused on those cities, requiring new transmission infrastructure, the cost of which is borne by the 
state-owned transmission system operator.
Second, loans at reduced interest rates have also helped to reduce auction prices. In 2017, the National 
Energy Administration (NEA) asked financial authorities for a 10% reduction in loan rates (from 
around 4.9% to 4.4%) for renewable energy projects. It also requested a reduction in some local taxes. 
Consequently, local governments exempted renewable projects from urban land-use taxes or expenses, 
which can account for up to 5% of the total investment cost of solar PV plants.
Third, the NEA addressed curtailment concerns, bolstering investors’ confidence and further reducing prices. 
In the wake of a national average curtailment rate of 10% for solar PV in 2016 (BNEF, 2019b), NEA required 
local authorities and system operators to commit to less than 5% curtailment for all auctioned projects.
7 1 USD = EUR 0.892 in August 2019.
Source: National Energy Administration, 2017.
Saudi Arabia (USD 23.4/MWh), Egypt (USD 
27.50/MWh) and Jordan (USD 28.00/MWh) 
achieved similarly competitive prices. Near the 
end of 2019, further reductions were recorded 
in Dubai’s 900 MW auction (USD 16.9/MWh). In 
Portugal’s 1.15 GW auction, more than half of the 
volume was awarded at around USD 16.54/MWh 
(EUR 14.76/MWh)7  (PV Magazine, 2019a, 2019b).
On the other hand, some newcomers to auctions 
started out with relatively high prices. Greece 
recently switched from a fixed feed-in tariff 
scheme to auctions. Three rounds have been 
carried out so far (in addition to the 2016 pilot 
auctions), and average prices dropped from 
EUR 77.95/MWh (USD 92/MWh) for 53 MW to 
EUR 62.78/MWh (USD 70.6/MWh) for 143 
MW within two years (Tsagas, 2019a). 
The experience from the initial auctions has 
helped increase the confidence of international 
project developers and financiers in further 
rounds, driving prices downward.
The novelty of auctions as an instrument for 
procuring renewable energy is not the only 
element shaping risk perception. Risk is an 
important element. The risks, real or perceived, 
attached to the institutional, economic and 
political framework of a country plays an 
important role. Linked to the perception of risk is 
also the readiness and maturity of the renewable 
energy sector itself, which is reflected in auction 
prices. The Scaling Solar Program is designed to 
mitigate these kinds of risk, by offering packages 
of technical support, document templates, 
preapproved financing, insurance products and 
guarantees (see Box 3.1).
Price trends for onshore wind
As seen in Figure 1.2, average global onshore 
wind prices have experienced a less regular 
trend. Following a spike in 2015, prices 
decreased between 2015 and 2017, followed by 
an increase in 2017-2018. Most of that increase 
reflects the fact that high-price countries 
constituted a larger share of the wind volume 
auctioned globally (see Figure 1.5 for factors 
affecting prices). 
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8  1 USD = 0.904 EUR on average in May 2017; 1 USD = 0.870 EUR on average in October 2018; 1 USD = 0.893 EUR on average in 
February and May 2019.
As with solar PV, the participating countries 
include some newcomers, for which prices 
typically start out higher than in markets with 
established auctions, as well as countries with 
generally higher perceived risks in addition to 
the factors described in Figure 1.5. 
In Germany, where 13% of the global onshore 
wind capacity was awarded, average prices 
rose from EUR 38/MWh (USD 42/MWh) in May 
2017 to EUR 62.6/MWh (USD 71.95/MWh) in 
October 2018, before stabilising at EUR 61/MWh 
(USD 68.32/MWh) in February and May 2019 
(see Figure 2.2).8 The price increase may be 
a result of changes in permitting procedures 
and suitability of sites related to, for instance, 
public opposition, radar issues and bird 
protection (Wehrmann, 2019). In addition, 
changes in auction design, particularly relating 
to the removal of preferential rules previously 
granted to community projects, may have led 
to undersubscription and reduced competition 
(see Box 4.3).
Despite the increase in average prices, onshore 
wind also chalked up some record-breaking 
low prices between 2017 and 2018. Mexico 
awarded the equivalent of 2.5 TWh at an average 
price of USD 18.62/(MWh + CEC) in the third 
round in late 2017 (BNEF, 2019a; PwC, 2018). 
This represented a decrease of 48% from the 
previous auction, held the year before (USD 
35.77/(MWh + CEC)). The first auction (2016) 
awarded bids at an average of USD 55.33/(MWh 
+ CEC) (IRENA, 2017a; Garcia and Pinzon, 2016). 
Nonetheless, the new administration decided 
not to stage a fourth round in 2018 (Box 1.3). 
This case demonstrates the importance of 
a stable policy framework backed by strong 
political commitment for ensuring the long-
term success of a chosen policy instrument.
1.4  IDENTIFYING TRENDS IN  
AUCTION DESIGN ELEMENTS:  
AN UPDATED FRAMEWORK
IRENA’s 2015 report, Renewable Energy 
Auctions: A Guide to Design, presented a 
framework for designing auctions that classified 
design elements into four main categories: 
auction demand, qualification requirements, 
winner selection process and sellers’ liabilities 
(IRENA and CEM, 2015). An updated framework 
reflecting developments and lessons learned 
since 2015 in the fast-changing renewable 
energy sector is presented in Figure 1.7 and 
explored in the following sections.
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BOX 1.3  UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING MEXICO’S ELECTRICITY MARKET 
The first three long-term auctions held in Mexico in 2016 and 2017 attracted over USD 8 billion 
in investments and contracted over 7.4 GW of mostly solar and wind projects. However, by 
late 2018, the momentum had slowed, as the new federal administration cancelled the fourth 
auction, which had already been announced, along with tenders for two transmission lines. In 2019, 
medium-term auctions for capacity, transmission rights, and clean energy certificates (CECs) were also 
cancelled. All had been pillars of a redesigned and liberalised wholesale electricity market.
The cancellation of these auctions aligns with the new National Electricity Plan, which aims for self-
sufficiency from non-privatised energy assets. The only renewable energy technology included in the 
budget for 2019 was hydropower, with funds allocated to increase the capacity of the state-owned 
Federal Electricity Commission’s (CFE) plants. Beyond hydropower, renewables played a negligible role 
in the government's plan. The 2019 budget mainly included investments in combined cycle thermal 
plants, coal-fired plants, conventional steam power stations and diesel power plants.
Private clean energy developers may now have less incentive to deploy new capacity. Initially, only 
new clean energy plants were entitled to receive and sell CECs. However, if the Secretariat of Energy’s 
proposal to change regulation of CECs is accepted,a existing clean energy plants would become eligible 
to receive them. This would allow CFE generation subsidiaries to obtain CECs for its current hydro, 
geothermal and nuclear plants. While clean energy generators that were awarded contracts in the first 
three long-term auctions have secured a price for CECs for 20 years, the increased supply of CECs 
would decrease their market value for other players. Retailers, particularly the CFE subsidiary that 
dominates the market, would find it easier to comply with the renewable portfolio standard, set at 
5% in 2018 (and set to increase in subsequent years). However, lower CEC prices would weaken the 
instrument’s effectiveness in attracting new generation investments. 
These decisions intensified uncertainty regarding the continuation of Mexico’s clean energy programme. 
In June 2019, a private-sector renewable energy auction was announced. It is expected to attract the 
same developers that expressed interest in the government’s cancelled auction. The products to be 
auctioned will be energy, capacity, energy balancing and CECs, for 5, 10 or 15 years. To address cpncerns 
about credit-worthiness, an administrator was appointed to manage payments and guarantees. Later 
in 2019, a second private-sector auction platform was launched, opening registration to potential 
participants. The private auctions rely on corporate power purchase agreements (PPAs) to allow direct 
contracting between energy generators and firms under the corporate sourcing model (IRENA, 2018d). 
This procurement model was available in Mexico before the 2013-2014 structural reforms that mandated 
centralised renewable energy auctions. 
a The proposal was still under review by the time of publication.
Sources: BNEF, 2019c; CENACE, 2019; CONAMER, 2019; Mirec, 2019.
1.4.1 Auction demand
Decisions made in the auction demand 
category determine what is to be procured 
and under what conditions. Crucial demand-
side considerations include: 
1)  which product is to be auctioned (e.g., 
energy, capacity, green certificates, ancillary 
services or a mix); 
2)  whether and how the total demand is to be 
split among different bands (technologies, 
zones, sites or generation profiles); 
3)  the volume of product to be auctioned and 
the lower and upper limits on project size; 
4)  whether a pre-set auction schedule will be 
adopted and, if so, the schedule of future 
auctions; and 
5)  responsibility for demand-side commitments, 
including the selection of the contract off-
taker. 
IRENA and CEM (2015) provides details on 
each design element. 
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Figure 1.7  Updated framework of auction design
Source: Updated from IRENA and CEM, 2015. 
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Areas where new trends in auction design have 
been observed are discussed below. Those trends 
are in how the demand can be split (demand 
bands) and the product to be auctioned. 
Technology specificity 
In deciding how to split products and volumes, 
auctioneers must choose between technology-
neutral or technology-specific auctions. The two 
strategies serve different deployment purposes. 
Technology-neutral auctions allow multiple 
technologies – including conventional sources – 
to compete, with the aim of identifying which will 
yield electricity at the lowest price. Technological 
neutrality has been especially popular in Latin 
America, but some countries have begun to shift 
towards technology-specific auctions to support 
the introduction of renewable energy into the 
mix. In Brazil, where technology-neutral auctions 
were meant to ensure capacity additions at 
competitive costs, sharper lines are now being 
drawn between renewable and conventional 
technologies (IRENA, 2017a). A variant of 
technology-neutral auctions that includes 
only renewable technologies is designed to 
identify the most cost-competitive among 
them. After many years of technology-neutral 
capacity auctions, Colombia conducted its first 
renewable-exclusive auction in February 2019, 
which was quickly followed by another round in 
the same year (Box 1.4). 
Auctions exclusively for renewable energy are 
common in Europe. They are motivated by 
EU guidelines on state aid for environmental 
protection and energy, which explicitly 
encourage competition between renewable 
technologies. Denmark, Finland, Germany 
and Spain, for example, have already adopted 
renewable-exclusive auctions, sometimes 
in parallel with technology-specific ones. 
Technology-specific auctions are a tool for 
introducing (or further deploying) a technology 
into a country’s energy mix, enabling (or 
enhancing) diversification and complementarity 
among technologies. An example is the 
complementarity between hydropower and 
other technologies in Latin America. 
Technology-specific auctions can also support 
the development of a local industry for a 
given technology and strengthen domestic 
supply chains. More than one technology 
can be introduced in a single auction, as in 
South Africa and Ukraine, where separate 
demand bands for each technology translate 
technology-specific targets into concrete 
projects. Project-specific auctions are more 
defined types of technology-specific auctions. 
They are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
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BOX 1.4  DRIVERS AND RESULTS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY AUCTIONS IN COLOMBIA
Colombia began implementing technology-neutral capacity auctions in 2006. Unlike 
neighbouring countries such as Brazil, Chile, Peru or, more recently, Argentina and even Mexico, 
Colombia did not adopt a centralised process for contracting energy over the long run until 2019. 
Several factors pushed Colombia toward a renewable energy auction. First, there was the significant 
drop in the cost of renewable technologies, as signalled by attractive auction prices in neighbouring 
countries. Second was the potential of auctions to bring new players into a market with a heavy 
concentration of dominant players. A third factor was the energy security attained by diversifying a 
hydro-based system vulnerable to droughts.
In this context, Colombia’s first renewable auction was held in February 2019. Because the minimum 
competition requirements were not met, no capacity was awarded (see Box 1.7). A second round, 
launched in August, awarded almost 1.3 GW of solar and wind in October at a weighted average price of 
COP 95.65/kWh (USD 28/MWh) (Djunisic, 2019).
Location specificity
Auctions are increasingly designed to specify 
zones and locations where projects can be 
developed. This is done for two reasons: First, 
to support the integration of variable renewable 
energy, as in Mexico, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and 
the planned fifth round in South Africa (see 
Chapter 3) and second, to promote the socio-
economic development of underserved regions 
(see Chapter 4). A potential downside of this 
design choice is the risk that the specified zone 
or region may not receive enough bids, leaving 
the auction undersubscribed. This risk is further 
increased in the case where a rule specifies a 
minimum number of bids or a minimum volume 
to go forward with the auction. This was the 
case in Kazakhstan’s 2018 auction (Box 1.5).
Products auctioned
Traditionally, renewable energy auctions have 
focused on procuring new capacity. However, in a 
fast-changing electricity sector with increasingly 
complex system needs, a trend of auctioning 
multiple products, including energy, system 
services and capacity, has emerged. In Mexico, in 
addition to energy, renewable operators may sell 
clean energy certificates (see Boxes 1.3 and 3.10) 
and/or capacity products. In Denmark and the 
United Kingdom, auctions for ancillary services 
have also been opened to generators of variable 
renewable energy. A more detailed discussion on 
this topic is found in Chapter 3.
Auctions are increasingly specifying the time of 
day when energy is procured. This is the case of 
Chile and Thailand (see Sections 3.3 and 3.6).
 1.4.2 Qualification requirements  
and documentation
Qualification requirements and documentation 
determine which suppliers will be eligible to 
participate in a given auction, including the 
conditions that participants must meet and 
the documentation they must provide before 
bidding. IRENA and CEM (2015) provides details 
on each design element. Such requirements 
commonly relate to: 
1 )  documentation supporting the bidder’s 
technical and financial capacity to develop 
the project; 
2)   project-related documentation pertaining, 
for example, to grid access or environmental 
and social impact assessments; 
3)   the project’s technical specifications; and 
4)   commitment to local socio-economic 
development, as more countries become 
aware of the potential benefits that 
a domestic renewable energy sector 
can bring. 
The last class of requirements are discussed 
at length in Chapter 4. Areas where new 
trends in qualification requirements have 
been observed are discussed below. 
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BOX 1.5  ZONE-SPECIFIC AUCTIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN 
After several efforts to introduce a feed-in tariff in Kazakhstan, two rounds of auctions were 
implemented in 2018 to help meet a target of 1.7 GW of installed renewable capacity by 2020 
(933 MW of wind, 467 MW of solar PV, 290 MW of hydro and 10 MW of biogas) and a 50% share 
of renewables in the electricity mix by 2050. The 2018 auctions were divided into tranches dedicated 
to individual renewable technologies, zones and plant sizes. Wind tranches, for example, were split 
among zones in the north, south, and west, and between small- and large-scale installations. 
In the first round in May 2018, ten demand tranches were auctioned almost simultaneously, two of 
which were not awarded due to insufficient competition. In October 2018, a second auction round of 10 
demand tranches took place, but only six projects were awarded. The Kazakh auctioning mechanism 
requires that at least three bids be received for each demand tranche before the capacity can be 
awarded. In addition, the total volume of bids received should amount to at least 150% of the total 
volume auctioned. Some tranches may not have met those criteria and thus were not awarded. 
Source: USAID, 2018.
Bidder-related documentation:  
experience requirements 
To ensure that projects are delivered as 
bid, auctions increasingly require proof of 
experience as a condition for bidding. This has 
been possible as more and more developers 
around the world have gained the requisite 
experience in a maturing sector. 
Experience requirements include proof of the 
bidder’s competence through similar projects 
successfully completed. In Saudi Arabia, the 
developer must own or hire an engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) company 
having at least 200 MW of capacity in 
operation (composed of projects of at least 10 
MW and at least one high-voltage project of 50 
MW or more and international experience with 
projects of the same type and technology). In 
Bangladesh, the requirements are more lenient, 
considering the smaller volumes auctioned. 
At least one previous project using the same 
technology is required. It must generate at 
least 5 MW and have been in operation for at 
least two years. 
Qualification requirements focused on previous 
experience work best in markets with a developed 
renewable energy sector or in cases where the 
auction is open to international developers. 
It should be noted that a trade-off exists 
between establishing experience requirements 
and limiting the pool of participants, thereby 
potentially reducing competition.
Project-related documentation:  
permits and grid access 
Another type of requirement increasingly 
being considered relates to site-specific 
documentation such as land permits, 
environmental and social impact assessments, 
and grid access. Requirements regarding grid 
access, for example, can take the following 
forms, starting with the most lenient: 
1)  no access permit is required to qualify, 
allowing auction winners to obtain 
needed permits only after the auction; 
2)  an access permit is required before the 
auction, but projects that necessitate 
grid expansion or grid enforcements are 
allowed to participate; and 
3)  an access permit must be obtained before 
the auction, and only projects that do not 
necessitate grid expansion or strengthening 
are allowed to participate. 
Many auctions have faced delays in project 
commissioning owing to delays in obtaining 
such documentation (see Chapter 2), which 
has prompted policymakers to include them as 
prerequisites. At the same time, some auctions, 
notably those designed to encourage the 
participation of community projects, have opted 
to relax the requirements for certain players, as in 
Germany (see Chapter 4). 
A balance must be struck between imposing 
overly harsh requirements that may limit the 
pool of potential bidders (thus excluding 
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      Enhancement of the resilience and adaptability  
      of the energy system through diversification of the energy mix
COMPLEMENTARITY  
(25 POINTS)
      Complementarity of project’s seasonal profiles  
      with historical flows in the main hydropower basin
EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS  
(25 POINTS)
      Contribution of the project to the reduction of CO2 emissions
REGIONAL ENERGY SECURITY 
(25 POINTS)
      Impact on the supply-demand balance and  
      reduction of operational restrictions
small and new players or increasing the risk of 
undersubscription) and relaxed requirements 
that may lead to underbuilding and delays. 
Additional project specifications
Other project-related requirements are being 
adopted to increase the reliability of the power 
system. In Colombia’s first renewable energy 
auction, qualification requirements included 
criteria relating to the system’s resilience, security, 
emissions reduction and complementarity. To 
qualify, bidders had to accumulate at least 50 
points out of a possible 100; each of the four 
reliability-related criteria was worth a maximum 
of 25 points (Table 1.1).
1.4.3  Winner selection  
and contract award process
In the winner-selection process, bidding and 
clearing rules are applied and contracts are 
awarded. Aspects of the process include: 
1)  the formal bidding procedures, which 
set forth how supply-side information is 
collected; 
2)  minimum competition requirements, 
including provisions to ensure participation 
by multiple, competing bidders;
3)  winner-selection criteria, dictating how bids 
will be ranked and winners selected; and 
4)  the clearing mechanism, which defines rules for 
allocating contracts based on accepted bids. 
IRENA and CEM (2015) provides details on each 
design element. Two aspects of the winner-
selection process where new trends have 
emerged are discussed below. 
Winner-selection criteria
An element of rising importance in numerous 
winner-selection processes is concern over 
transmission capacity limits (as further 
discussed in Chapter 3). Some countries have 
dealt with this issue as part of the auction 
demand, while others, such as Brazil, Germany 
and Mexico, consider it as part of the winner-
selection process (Box 1.6). Price is not the only 
criterion for the selection of winners. 
A project’s technical performance or its socio-
economic impacts are also considered in many 
cases through a variety of weighting systems. 
In Chinese Taipei, a construction criterion 
represents 25% of the score; engineering 
design, 20%; and operations and maintenance 
planning, 15%. All in all, technical capabilities 
represent 60% of the score, with the remaining 
40% weight accorded to price. In Uganda, a 
multi-criteria auction has been implemented, 
in which technical, financial, environmental, 
and social parameters account for 70% of the 
weight (IRENA, 2018a). 
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BOX 1.6   GERMANY’S NETWORK EXPANSION AREAS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION  
AND TRANSMISSION GRIDS
The north of Germany produces more wind power than it can consume, driven by resource 
endowments and attractive local policy instruments. The transmission infrastructure is not 
able to transport all this power to industrial centres in the south, causing congestion for both 
Germany and its neighbours. In 2017, the bottlenecks required grid-stabilisation efforts costing EUR 
1.4 billion and forced grid operators to shut down wind plants during periods of high wind in northern 
and eastern Germany. The new power grid plan includes, among other measures, new transmission 
infrastructure. 
So-called transmission network expansion areas have now been established for wind projects. The 
auctioneer defines a maximum quantity of power to be met by wind projects located in the north, 
even if the limit means turning away financially attractive projects. This measure is meant to align the 
capacity additions from renewable power auctions to Germany’s transmission grid development plans.
Furthermore, renewable energy projects are not evenly distributed within northern or southern districts 
and adding renewable capacity to the distribution grid in congested districts may increase distribution 
costs. The joint wind and solar technology-neutral auctions have been designed to address this issue 
by factoring the location of projects into the selection of winners. Districts in which an additional 
renewable energy plant is likely to require expansion of the distribution grid are determined prior to the 
auction. Wind and solar bids for projects located in one of those overloaded districts are penalised by 
adding a virtual premium to their bid prices. 
Sources: EEG, 2017; Bundesnetzagentur, 2018; Appunn, 2018.
Finally, there is the possibility of combining post-
qualification requirements with winner-selection 
criteria. In Colombia’s first round in February 
2019, if the auction did not yield a diversified 
pool of players (diversity in the electricity 
market being one of main drivers of adopting a 
renewable energy auction, as explained in Box 
1.4), no one would have won, and the auction 
would not move forward (Box 1.7).
Clearing mechanism: combinatorial auctions
The clearing mechanism sets rules for allocating 
contracts in cases where the volume offered 
by the winning projects does not exactly meet 
the auctioned demand (IRENA and CEM, 2015). 
Intuitively, one could expect a simple algorithm 
to yield the most optimal allocation: ordering the 
bids from the highest to the lowest score received 
and accepting them in descending order of score 
until the auction demand is met. However, if bids 
are “bulky” (that is, if the quantity bid must be 
accepted or rejected in full), this algorithm will 
not necessarily yield the optimal allocation. To 
deal with such cases, alternative winner-selection 
and clearing mechanisms may be implemented. 
For example, bids may be required to be of 
a certain size (a specific fraction of the total 
demanded quantity), or the marginal bidder 
may be required to accept a certain percentage 
reduction in the project size to better match 
auction demand. For example, in Japan’s third 
solar PV round, one bidder was awarded 1 MW 
that remained after the lower bids were accepted 
and ultimately did not proceed to sign the 
contract (Solar Journal, 2018) (see Figure 2.3).
Auction designs are becoming more 
sophisticated, with the possibility of awarding 
multiple contracts at the same time or 
considering various constraints and aspects 
of the demand-side preferences (see Chapter 
3). Under such circumstances, combinatorial 
auctions may become a more attractive 
solution. Offering many possible permutations 
for choosing the winning projects, typically 
through an optimisation program, combinatorial 
auctions mix winner selection with a clearing 
mechanism to determine the optimal selection 
(of one or more bids) that satisfies the criteria 
considered while also coming the closest to the 
volume needed. 
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Mexico is perhaps the most prominent example 
of their use, though countries such as Chile and 
Panama have adopted them in the past. Mexico 
uses an optimisation program to choose which set 
of bulky bids will best meet the system’s demand 
and buyer’s surplus for three separate products: 
energy, capacity and clean energy certificates. 
Unfortunately, although the clearing mechanism 
was published by the system operator, it was 
perceived as unclear by some participants (PwC, 
2017). Auctioneers and policymakers must 
consider the trade-off between the benefits of 
combinatorial auctions and their complexity, at 
least in the minds of bidders.
 1.4.4 Risk allocation  
and remuneration of sellers 
The category of risk allocation and remuneration 
of sellers defines how risks (financial, 
production and other) are allocated among 
stakeholders (bidders, auctioneers, off-takers, 
financial institutions, consumers). These risks, 
responsibilities and obligations should be 
spelled out in auction documents. These critical 
design elements involve: 
1) payment to the winner; 
2)  commitment bonds (typically a bid bond 
and a completion bond) and a schedule for 
contract signature and commencement of 
commercial operations; 
3)  production and financial risks (associated 
with inflation, currency fluctuations, 
market prices and production hazards); 
4)  quantity-based liabilities, including 
settlement rules and penalties for 
underperformance; and 
5)  penalties for delays and underbuilding. 
Details on each design element can be found 
in IRENA and CEM (2015).
BOX 1.7   COLOMBIA’S FEBRUARY 2019 POST-QUALIFICATION PHASE:  
ENSURING SUFFICIENT COMPETITION 
Colombia’s February 2019 auction introduced three quantitative indices to be analysed 
after provisional winners are identified. Minimum thresholds had to be met for a reasonably 
competitive auction, and if they were not met, the entire auction was to be called off. The 
selected metrics included: 1) a participation index to limit the share of players owning both generation 
and distribution companies and bidding on both sides; 2) a concentration index used to detect high 
concentrations of bids from a limited number of players; and 3) a dominance index establishing a 
market-share limit for a winning bid. 
The first round of the auction awarded no capacity, as the concentration and dominance indices were 
not met. In the second round, the criteria were relaxed: the only criterion was that one bidder could not 
win more than 40% of the awarded volume.
Source: UPME, 2019.
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BOX 1.8  THE OPEN SOLAR CONTRACTS INITIATIVE
Backed by several top-tier law firms, the Open Solar Contracts initiative provides standardised and 
simplified contract templates that are freely available and designed to be universally applicable. The 
following templates have been drafted in consultation with the global solar power community and made 
available on https://opensolarcontracts.org as a comprehensive legal documentation solution: 
1) Power Purchase Agreement, 2) Implementation Agreement, 3) Supply Agreement, 4) Installation 
Agreement, 5) Operation and Maintenance Agreement and 6) Financing Facility Term Sheet.
The initiative aims not only to decrease transaction costs and expedite project timelines, but also to 
achieve a balanced risk allocation among public and private parties. To this end, Open Solar Contracts 
systematically allocate risks to the parties that are best positioned to manage those risks in a cost-effective 
manner. The purpose is to avoid overpricing risk (i.e., pricing risks as if they were more probable or severe 
than they really are), which would lead to a higher cost of capital and hence higher power prices. More 
information on the initiative’s approach to risk allocation can be found in the “Guide to Open Solar 
Contracts” which is also available on the initiative’s website.
For the most part, auction documents, such as 
the power purchase agreement (PPA), have been 
inherited from predominantly conventional, large-
scale and technically complex power projects. 
Owing to their highly intricate transaction 
structures, these projects required customised 
and complex legal solutions, which have been 
passed on to renewables. This has resulted in 
high transaction costs and prolonged project 
timelines, hindering further capacity growth. 
Therefore, reforming the overly complicated 
contractual framework for renewables has 
emerged as a pressing need. In response, IRENA 
and the Terawatt Initiative (TWI) undertook 
a joint effort to simplify and streamline the 
contractual framework for solar power (Box 1.8).
Payment to the winner
The most common method of determining the 
payment to the winning bidder continues to be 
the pay-as-bid method based on a sealed-bid 
offer. This scheme entails less risk to both the 
developers and off-takers, as the remuneration 
is set before the contract is signed. 
However, some countries have opted for 
uniform pricing mechanisms, which can affect 
risk allocation differently. Germany adopted 
marginal pricing for citizen wind parks as part 
of their preferential rules, whereby winners are 
granted a price equal to the highest awarded bid 
(see Section 4.1), while regular bidders are paid 
as bid. In this case, a uniform price set by the 
highest bid encourages community projects to 
participate in the auction by offering a higher 
remuneration than what was bid. However, 
there is a risk that communities relying on 
this design scheme will submit overaggressive 
bids just to be selected. In India, by contrast, 
contracts can be re-negotiated with bidders 
after the auction to match the lowest bid. In 
this case, the auctioneers’ aggressive strategy 
to reach low prices may expose bidders to 
additional risks; some of those bidders may 
not be able to develop their projects for such 
a low payment (see Box 1.1 and Section 2.2 
on underperformance in the awarding and 
contracting stage).
Risks associated with production  
and curtailment 
The type of product auctioned (installed 
capacity or energy produced) strongly affects 
production risks. Typically, the product offered 
is some type of long-term energy contract – 
a PPA – that ties the developer to operating 
the power plant. When PPAs do not attract 
investors, alternative models such as EPC can 
be contemplated in auction design, where 
the developer’s responsibilities end with the 
construction of the project, as in Afghanistan 
(Box 1.9). Under a turnkey model, the developer 
delivers the project for a fixed price by a 
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guaranteed date. In reducing bidders’ risks, 
it shifts them to the plant operator, who then 
assumes the risks associated with quality, 
construction, energy production, etc. 
Regarding curtailment, risk allocation models vary, 
ranging from those where the generator takes full 
responsibility, to shared responsibility, or models 
where the off-taker is fully liable. In recent years, 
there has been a tendency away from take-or-
pay models towards remuneration mechanisms 
with higher risk allocation to the generators which 
are typically factored in the price. This topic is 
discussed at length in Chapter 3.
Risks associated with inflation  
and currency exchange
A key component in designing a contract’s 
remuneration profile is the risk allocation 
between buyers and producers. One important 
risk is inflation, especially in emerging and 
developing economies. As inflation increases, 
and in the absence of long-term hedging 
markets, project developers’ revenues may 
become insufficient to recover costs. 
Another concern for developers is the exchange 
rate risk that arises when project costs are 
largely denominated in a foreign currency, but 
auction contract revenues are denominated in 
the local currency. In this case, the generator 
is exposed to the currency risk, and exchange 
rate movements can have a strong impact on a 
project’s viability. 
To shield developers from inflation risks, 
contracts can be indexed to inflation, meaning 
that the contract remuneration escalates in 
nominal terms during the project’s lifetime. This 
is particularly relevant for countries such as 
Egypt and Turkey, where inflation reached 30% 
in 2017 and 16% in 2018, respectively (World 
Bank, 2019). In India and Zambia, contracts are 
not adjusted for inflation, and developers must 
factor in this risk into their bids. In India, the 
same applies to currency exchange risks when 
contracts are denominated in Indian rupees. 
BOX 1.9  AFGHANISTAN ENGINEERING, PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
Afghanistan had its first experience with renewable energy auctions in 2016, when a total 14 
project-specific auctions were held between March and May, accounting for 48 MW of solar 
power and 14 MW of wind power. These were part of a plan launched in January 2016 to develop 
100 MW grid-connected renewable energy projects. 
Whereas the 2016 auctions specified that bidders were to design, finance, build, own, commission, and 
operate the projects under a long-term power purchase agreement, the Ministry of Energy and Water 
recently shifted to tendering only the engineering, design, procurement, and construction (EPC) of 
renewable plants. The project developer’s liability ends once these functions have been completed. 
Under the EPC model, the winner’s remuneration is a lump-sum payment rather than a long-term 
contract based on the quantity of electricity produced. Between September 2017 and December 2018, 
seven project-specific auctions of this type were held and three projects were awarded: one 10 MW solar 
hybrid project to the WAAREE Energies, an Indian company, and two other similar projects totalling 45 
MW to the Chinese Shuangdeng group. All three projects included, besides the stated nominal capacity 
of solar PV, diesel-fired generators and/or batteries as backup. 
Source: DLA Piper, n.d.
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Currency exchange risks are spreading as 
growing numbers of countries move to 
auctions involving dependence on imported 
equipment and financing in hard currency 
(usually U.S. dollars). The auction design 
determines how those risks are allocated 
among players (developer, off-taker, financier 
or guarantor, etc.). 
In Brazil, contracts are not adjusted for foreign 
exchange risk, but most financing comes in 
reals from publicly owned Brazilian banks 
and at attractive interest rates. Brazil has also 
managed to develop a local wind industry. 
Consequently, the currency risk in Brazilian wind 
auctions is relatively low, as most of the project 
developers’ costs and revenues are in the same 
(local) currency. However, for solar auctions, the 
case is different. Solar panels are imported and 
paid for in foreign currency. 
In Namibia, contracts are also denominated 
in local currency, but a guarantee provided 
by PROPARCO, a subsidiary of the Agence 
Française de Développement that focuses on 
private sector development, has increased the 
attractiveness of the projects. 
In South Africa, the difference between the 
exchange rate at the date of bidding and the 
date of financial close is factored into the tariff 
– up to a maximum percentage commensurate 
with the level of local content required.
In Mexico, developers can select their level of 
exposure to foreign exchange. They can choose 
whether to index their offers to Mexican pesos or 
to U.S. dollars. Regardless of the option chosen, 
the bidder is (partially) shielded from inflation. 
While offers indexed to the U.S. dollar shield 
the generator from currency risk, developers 
who can find financing denominated in Mexican 
pesos obtain a small advantage, as the winner-
selection criteria apply a minor penalty on 
dollar-indexed offers. 
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Germany, India and Italy do not offer any 
indexing of prices, leaving sellers unprotected 
against inflation risks while the plant is being 
built. Neither do they offer any hedge against 
currency risk. Those economies have well-
developed local lending and wind-component 
markets, but the same cannot necessarily 
be said for PV components, where currency 
fluctuation may have stronger effects.
Risks associated with market price 
Market price risk, in liberalised markets, is 
related to how spot prices can affect developers’ 
remuneration over the life of the PPA. There 
are several ways to allocate this risk. The 
most common design is to award a fixed price 
specified in the bid per kilowatt hour produced 
(following a scheme resembling a FIT), and 
to apply the contractually defined price to 
the entire production, allowing nothing to be 
remunerated at spot-market prices. 
The generators incur some quantity risk 
associated with the aggregate amount of 
electricity they produce, but no market risk 
associated with spot-price movements. In 
contrast, the design that allocates the most risk 
to generators involves remuneration dependent 
on the electricity spot price, either directly, 
as in Chile, Denmark and Finland (Box 1.10), or 
indirectly, as in Mexico and Brazil (see Chapter 3).
Risks associated with contract duration
The duration of the contract also influences 
the allocation of risk. As a rule, offering shorter 
contracts (10 to 15 years’ duration) requires 
generators to assume some risk at the end of the 
contracts. In countries with liberalised markets, 
generators can continue selling electricity to the 
market after the contract expires. However, this is 
not guaranteed in non-liberalised market contexts. 
Thus, countries with a developed and mature 
renewable sector tend to adopt auction designs 
that assign a higher level of risk to the seller. 
BOX 1.10  SUPPORT SCHEME FOR RENEWABLES IN FINLAND 
In June 2018, Finland introduced a technology-neutral auction to support its target to 
source half of its electricity from renewables by 2020. The new scheme applies to wind, 
solar, wave, wood fuel and biogas power plants (hydropower is excluded), and only new 
projects are allowed to participate. Participants bid for a premium (capped at EUR 53.5/MWha 
(USD 62.5/MWh) ) on top of the market price, and the winning bidders are remunerated as bid, up to a 
maximum of EUR 83.5/MWh (USD 97.5/MWh), including both the premium and the market price 
(together known as the target price).
The premium-based scheme consists of a combination of a sliding premium and a fixed premium. The 
project developer bids a single premium in EUR/MWh and, if it wins the contract, its revenue streams 
are as follows:
•  If the market price is below the floor price (EUR 30/MWh or lower), the standard feed-in premium 
applies. The bidder receives the market price plus the awarded premium.
•  If the market price is above the floor price but below the target price, the reduced feed-in premium 
applies. The premium is calculated dynamically based on the market price in such a way that the 
bidder receives EUR 30/MWh (USD 35/MWh), plus the awarded premium (the target price).
•  If the market price is higher than the target price, no feed-in premium applies. The premium falls 
to zero and the generator seeks its profit in the spot market. 
In all cases, the market price is defined as the average Nordpool area price for the relevant calendar quarter.
a 1 USD = 0.856 EUR in June 2018. 
Source: HPP Attorneys, 2018.
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That said, contract duration has varied greatly 
among auctions, and a common strategy 
has been to calibrate the duration to match 
the plant’s likely useful life. In this case, the 
project developer can avoid the burden of 
estimating the plant’s residual value once the 
contract terminates – which would otherwise 
be an important component of the developer’s 
remuneration – and post-contract provisions 
become less important to consider.
Similarly, the typical duration of the financing 
maturity given by banks must be considered 
in setting the contract duration to ensure the 
projects’ bankability. Latin American countries, 
such as Brazil and Peru, follow this rule when 
setting the contract duration. 
In Uruguay, the contract length, which should be 
between 10 and 20 years, is proposed by bidders 
and included in the bidding documents. In the 
end, and given the financial market, developers 
tend to submit proposals for a 20-year PPA.
Compliance rules and penalties
A common concern of auctions is the extent 
to which the developer’s bid is a binding 
commitment, given that most liabilities are not 
enforced until after the auction is complete 
and the winners are announced. Requiring 
commitment bonds, in the form of bid or 
completion bonds, typically offers greater 
assurance that the contracts will be signed and 
the projects built. Chapter 2 discusses bid and 
completion bonds in detail.
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS ON RECENT TRENDS
Dynamic developments have marked 
the last few years of auctions, in terms 
of prices, geographical coverage and 
design elements. As the renewable market 
matures and stakeholders gain experience, 
auctions are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated to address the evolving 
needs of the electricity sector, economy 
and society. 
Notably, a total of 55 countries conducted 
renewable energy auctions in 2017-2018 
to support the deployment of renewable-
based power at competitive prices. 
From 2010 to 2018, the auctions’ solar 
PV global average prices decreased by 
77% and onshore wind prices by 36%. 
Yet beyond their potential to achieve 
low prices, renewable energy auctions 
are increasingly used to achieve broader 
development and socio-economic aims. 
In any case, for either price or wider 
objectives to materialise, the awarded 
renewable energy projects need to 
start operations in the first place. Sound 
auction design elements can provide 




ENSURING TIMELY PROJECT COMPLETION2While auctions are recognised for their potential for price discovery and their ability to achieve objectives beyond decreasing prices, they are 
also associated with the risk that projects may 
be delayed or never come to fruition. When a 
project committed in an auction is delayed, 
cancelled or fails to produce (or install) the 
quantities of energy (or capacity) promised in 
the bid, the energy transition and ultimately 
the reliable supply of electricity in the country 
concerned may be compromised. At the same 
time, an awarded project that does not deliver 
in accordance with the bid may be blocking the 
deployment of other projects that could have 
delivered, but were not awarded.
In fact, negative experiences with pioneer 
auctions delayed the global adoption of the 
scheme by several years. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, only 391 MW of the 2,659 MW 
awarded in the 1989 onshore wind auctions was 
built (Azuela, et al., 2014; Pollitt, 2010). 
Following such failures, other mechanisms 
came to be regarded as more effective 
instruments to foster the development of the 
renewable energy sector. 
As markets developed, a gradual move from 
administratively to competitively set tariffs took 
place, generally enabling price discovery and 
capturing the falling cost of technology. As the 
understanding of auction design has matured, 
experiences with auction performance have 
improved accordingly. Three of the key lessons 
are 1) the importance of compliance rules to 
ensure that awarded projects are completed 
on time and delivered as bid (IRENA and CEM, 
2015), 2) an auction design that accounts for 
the limitations of the sector, and 3) the need for 
an enabling environment capable of supporting 
project development (IRENA, IEA and REN21, 
2018). 
This chapter analyses the performance of 
projects awarded through auctions in selected 
countries and explores the factors that have 
contributed to the timely completion or delay of 
those projects. The analysis covers the stages of 
an auction during which underperformance can 
occur, starting with the announcement of the 
auction and extending through the processes of 
bidding, awarding and contracting, constructing 
and operating the assets specified in the power 
purchase agreement (Figure 2.1). 
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1  Chapter 4 describes the previous rounds’ preferential rules for community projects that pushed their permit requirements to the 
contracting phase.
Figure 2.1  Risks of underperformance at each stage of the auction process
2.1 BIDDING STAGE 
Well before any contracts are signed, 
underperformance can begin in the form of 
undersubscription, which occurs when the 
auction does not receive enough bids to meet 
the demanded volume. Possible reasons for 
a failure to attract enough bidders include 
low investor confidence in the market, an 
insufficient pool of eligible projects, the lack 
of an enabling environment (e.g., permitting 
procedures that are lengthy and burdensome, 
or targets that are unclear, not binding or not 
ambitious) or unfavourable auction design (e.g., 
overly strict compliance rules and requirements, 
unattractive disclosed ceiling price, or too large 
a volume auctioned at once). 
Enabling environment for attracting bids 
Although falling costs, increasing sector 
maturity, and successful auctions worldwide 
have significantly boosted the attractiveness 
of renewable energy investments, perceived 
risks still constitute a major barrier in many 
parts of the world. They include political and 
regulatory; counterparty, grid and transmission; 
and currency, liquidity and refinancing risks. 
In this context, risk perception reduces the 
participation of bidders in the auction. Measures 
to mitigate such risks and attract bidders have 
been explored in previous work (IRENA, 2016). 
In addition, some of the risks can be accounted 
for in the auction design (Section 1.4.4). The 
enabling environment for inducing bidders 
to participate in an auction also encompasses 
land-use policies, permitting procedures and 
licencing provisions, especially when project 
documentation is a prerequisite to participate 
in the auction. 
Qualification requirements 
As discussed in Section 1.4.2, overly harsh 
requirements for participation, whether bidder-
related (e.g., technical or financial experience) or 
project-related (e.g., required documentation), 
may limit the pool of potential bidders, and 
exclude small and new players. 
Germany’s  wind auctions since 2018  are an 
example where compliance rules, in an 
environment not conducive to obtaining permits 
for wind projects, have resulted in undersubscribed 
auctions. First, the auction required all projects 
to obtain permits prior to the bidding stage.1 
Second, the permitting process became more 
complicated and lengthy, increasing from 300 
days in 2016 to 700 days in 2018 (WindEurope, 
2018); several permitting procedures were put 
on hold because of legal disputes about the 
underlying regional siting plans. 
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By 2019, at least 750 MW of wind-farm projects 
were mired in legal proceedings (WindEurope, 
2019). Third, public opposition and local barriers, 
such as Bavaria’s minimum-distance rules, also 
increased. Consequently, and fearing penalties 
for non-delivery, developers have become 
reluctant to bid. Bids received in May 2019, for 
example, amounted to just 45% of the volume 
up for auction (295 MW out of a demanded 650 
MW) (Figure 2.2). 
Undersubscription can affect prices, as an 
auction that fails to attract enough competition 
does not fulfil its potential for price discovery. 
The average prices resulting from wind auctions 
in Germany rose from EUR 38/MWh (USD 42/
MWh)2 in May 2017 to EUR 62.6/MWh (USD 
71.9/MWh)3 in October 2018 (+65%), before 
stabilising at EUR 61/MWh (USD 69/MWh)4 in 
February and (USD 68.3/MWh)5 May 2019, close 
to the ceiling price (Figure 2.2). 
In the South African Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producers Procurement 
Programme, bidding requirements included 
contributions to socio-economic development 
(see Chapter 4); securing land, including for 
transmission lines; obtaining all needed permits; 
gathering at least 12 months of wind monitoring 
data, as well as 12 months of bird and bat 
monitoring data; and ensuring that projects 
reached financial closure by the time of bidding.
As a result of the challenging requirements, 
especially for foreign developers, and the short 
bid timelines (three months), many proposals 
were not ready for the first round. Moreover, of 
the 53 bids received, only 28 were accepted. 
Disclosed ceiling price
A ceiling price that is disclosed at the time of the 
launch of the auction, if perceived as low, could 
deter the participation of bidders. In the first 
auction round in Mexico, the disclosed capacity 
ceiling price of MXN 10,000 (USD 567.37/MW)6 
proved to be unattractive for developers and 
no bids were submitted for the 500 MW of firm 
capacity auctioned. In the subsequent round, a 
significant increase in the ceiling price – to MXN 
1,723,992 (almost USD 90 000/MW)7 - proved 
more effective, yielding 102 firm capacity bids. 
Out of those, 20 were accepted, resulting in the 
award of 80% of the auctioned volume (Garcia 
and Pinzon, 2016; CENACE, 2018).
Commitment bonds
Compliance rules that include commitment 
bonds may also dissuade some participants 
from participating in the bid, although such 
bonds may be crucial to ensuring timely 
completion of projects. 
Japan’s solar PV auctions were undersubscribed 
as a result of strict compliance rules, coupled 
with difficulties in securing land and grid access.
² 1 USD = EUR 0.904 in May 2017.  3 1 USD = EUR 0.870 in October 2018.  4 1 USD = EUR 0.880 in February 2019.  
5 1 USD =  EUR 0.893 in May 2019.  6 1 USD = 17.65 MXN in March 2016.  7 1 USD = 19.2 MXN in September 2016.
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A total volume of almost 1 GW of solar PV 
capacity was planned in 2017-18 through three 
auctions, and a fourth round was held in 2019. 
All four rounds attracted a large number of 
participants, with 29, 19, 38 and 146 bids 
registered, respectively, with corresponding 
capacities mostly meeting or exceeding the 
volume auctioned. As shown in Figure 2.3, 
the majority of those bids were qualified. In 
the first round, qualified bids corresponded 
to almost 80% of auctioned volume; in the 
second, third and fourth rounds, capacities of 
qualified bids exceeded the volumes auctioned 
(corresponding to 23, 15, 32 and 107 bids for 
each round). However, the challenge was in 
retaining bidders beyond that point because, 
once qualified, many bidders dropped out and 
did not place bids. As shown in Figure 2.3, only 
9, 9, 16 and 71 bids were placed after qualifying. 
As a result, the first, second and fourth rounds 
were undersubscribed (participating capacity 
below auctioned capacity). Less than 30% of 
the volume bid in the first round elicited interest 
from participants.  
In a survey conducted after the first round, 
developers indicated that the main reasons for 
not participating in the auction were difficulties 
in securing land; limited system capacity 
and the associated hard capacity limits; and 
strict compliance rules, specifically related to 
commitment bonds (Kageyama, 2017a). 
In fact, difficulties in procuring land and grid 
connection rights are recurring issues in the 
Japanese solar PV sector and may explain the 
diminished role of economies of scale in the 
country (BNEF, 2019d). Completion bonds 
may also have affected participation (see Box 
2.2 for the steps taken after the first round to 
increase participation). Decreasing project 
size requirements in the fourth round further 
increased participation, mainly from small and 
new players (see Box 4.2).
Pool of bidders
Participation can be boosted by opening the 
auction to bidders from another country. 
Cross-border auctions also typically result in 
cross-border flows of support payments and 
renewable energy certificates, which are crucial 
for target accounting. In addition, cross-border 
auctions can improve the cost-effectiveness of 
support for renewables through, for example, 
access to sites with better resource potential 
and the potential to benefit from higher 
market prices and lower costs of capital. In 
the European Union, regulatory and market 
developments may trigger the implementation 
of cross-border auctions in the near and mid-
term future. The first experiences with cross-
border renewables auctions in Europe occurred 
in late 2016 (Box 2.1).
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Source: Bellini, 2019a; 2019b; Publicover, 2018; 2017.
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2.2  AWARDING AND  
CONTRACTING STAGE
Undercontracting is another form of 
underperformance. It occurs when, after the 
bidding process is complete and winners 
selected, the contracted amount is lower than 
the quantity demanded. The implications are 
that volumes of capacity are not contracted 
and renewable energy targets may not be met. 
Undercontracting can take several forms: 
1)  undersubscription contributing to 
undercontracting, when the total of the 
bids received is lower than the auction 
demand, as in the German wind auctions in 
2018 and 2019;
 2)  bids not meeting the criteria for minimum 
competition, such as undisclosed ceiling price 
or rules to avoid market concentration, and 
3)  selected bidders choosing to opt out, 
especially as a result of speculative bidding 
(underbidding). 
This section focuses on the second and third 
cases, using several country examples. 
Undisclosed ceiling price and volume 
auctioned
Depending on the design of the auction, pre-
qualified bids may go through an additional 
screening that can lead to undercontracting, even 
with high participation from bidders. One example 
is undisclosed ceiling prices. 
BOX 2.1  THE CROSS-BORDER SOLAR AUCTION HELD BY GERMANY AND DENMARK 
In late 2016, Germany and Denmark each launched a solar photovoltaic auction open to 
bidders from the other country. In the German auction, the volume of bids received (297 MW) 
exceeded the volume auctioned (50 MW) by almost six-fold. Bids from Denmark were more 
competitive, resulting in Danish projects being awarded at EUR 53.8/MWh (USD 48.63/MWh)a as a 
sliding premium, well below the EUR 69/MWh (USD 62.38/MWh) awarded in German national 
auctions at around the same time. All the awarded PV plants have now been installed. Support 
payments to the Danish projects that won in the German auction have been marginal or zero, owing to 
high market prices in Denmark. The cross-border auction has therefore resulted in savings in support 
costs for Germany. By contrast, no German project participated in the Danish open auction, in which 
only 2.4 MW of the total auctioned volume of 20 MW were open to the participation of German bidders.
It should be noted that cross-border auctions could bring additional complexity by combining the 
political preferences and market environments of two or more countries. The optimal auction design 
for a cross-border auction may therefore be different from the optimal auction design in a single 
national market. The following principles for setting up cross-border auctions have been identified in 
the EU's Horizon 2020 project, AURES II (Auctions for Renewable Energy Support):
•  Bids need to be comparable. Auction and remuneration design should be the same for all 
participants to allow for comparison of bids and effective bid selection.
•  The design should be adapted to the cross-border context. The auction design must consider the 
political goals and market situation of all countries involved. Some requirements put forward in 
national auctions may not be applicable in cross-border auctions – notably permitting processes and 
prequalification requirements (with varying costs and timelines).
•  The auction should be kept simple. Design choices and administrative procedures that increase 
complexity should be avoided. This is even more important in cross-border auctions where 
market participants are not familiar with the auction structure. Moreover, reducing administrative 
complexity can minimise transaction costs and increase bidder participation.
•  Sufficient time must be allotted for consultation and bid preparation. To attract a large number    
of bidders, market players should be given sufficient time to become familiar with and adapt to a  
new auction design and procedure. 
a 1 USD = 0.904 EUR in December 2016.
Source: AURES II, 2019.
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In the second round in Japan, the auctioned 
volume of 250 MW was met with much interest, 
with almost 400 MW registered, out of which 
more than 330 MW were qualified. Almost 
200 MW proceeded to participate, but no 
awards were made (Figure 2.3), as the bids 
were above the undisclosed ceiling price of 
JPY 15.5/kWh (USD 138.3/MWh).8 In the first 
round, the ceiling price of JPY 21/kWh (USD 
186.2/MWh) was disclosed to bidders. There is a 
trade-off to consider when deciding whether to 
disclose a ceiling price. Disclosing ceiling prices, 
especially in markets with limited competition, 
can limit price reduction. Indeed, two of the 
10 awarded bids in the first round were at the 
ceiling price; the average of the 10 bids was only 
slightly below JPY 19.5/kWh (USD 172.9/MWh)9 
(Kageyama, 2017b). 
In South Africa’s first round, a volume of 
3,626 MW was auctioned all at once, which 
may have been too large for the market. 
Participants bid right below the disclosed ceiling 
price. The circumstances led to significant 
undercontracting, with only 1,425 MW 
contracted (IRENA, 2018a). Although this may 
be considered a sizable volume for a first round, 
it was less than 40% of the volume offered 
(IRENA, 2013).
8 1 USD = 112 JPY in September 2018. 
9 1 USD = 115.4 JPY in November 2017.
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investment units (UDI); an exchange rate of 3 UDI/USD can be assumed







Sources: GIO, 2019b; CENACE, 2018; IRENA, 2018a; Bundesministeriums fuer Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 
2017; AURES, 2016; IRENA, 2013.
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Compliance rules 
Bidders selected after the auction is conducted 
may choose to opt out before signing a contract. 
Compliance rules, specifically commitment 
bonds, can be introduced to minimise the 
incidence of undercontracting and underbidding. 
They include bid bonds and project completion 
bonds (also called performance bonds). The 
trade-off to consider when setting commitment 
bonds is that they may discourage possible 
bidders, mostly small and new players (see 
Chapter 4) and thus limit competition. Table 2.1 
presents some of the commitment bonds that 
have figured in solar and wind auctions in some 
of the countries analysed in this chapter. 
The bid bond is a deposit or similar guarantee 
required from the developer as a condition for 
participating in the auction. It is usually returned 
to losing bidders. The bid bond is forfeited if a 
winning bidder fails to sign the contract or to 
submit the completion bond in a timely fashion.
The project completion bond is typically 
required of winning bidders before they 
can sign a contract. It serves as a guarantee 
against issues that may be encountered in 
project implementation. Most auctions impose 
partial confiscation of the completion bond 
if the project is delayed. It is forfeited if the 
bidder does not build the project or live up to 
contractual commitments. Completion bonds 
range from security deposits to actual bonds 
issued by a guarantor (bank or insurance 
company). The amount of the bond (lump 
sum, percentage of the contract remuneration, 
or other formula) is generally calibrated to 
constitute sufficient disincentive for delay 
or failure to complete, without being so high 
that it imposes barriers to entry on too many 
potential players. In Africa, the completion 
bond is usually two to three times the bid bond. 
In Japan, it was 10 times higher in the most 
recent auction, which led to a high incidence 
of undercontracting. Winning bidders had 
only two weeks to submit the bond and the 
conditions and deadlines related to forfeiture 
were strict (Box 2.2). As a result, five awarded 
developers in the first round, accounting for 100 
MW, chose not to present the completion bond 
owing to uncertainty about the deadlines. Only 
41 MW out of the 141 MW that were awarded 
signed the contract (Kageyama, 2018).
BOX 2.2  COMMITMENT BONDS IN JAPANESE SOLAR PV AUCTIONS 
After being selected in the first round of the solar auction, developers were given only two weeks 
to secure completion bonds, and failure to meet this deadline would result in forfeiting the 
bid. Moreover, if a developer failed to obtain certification from the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) within three months of award, and then to settle the grid connection agreement a 
month later, the contract would also be void and the bond confiscated. Such strict provisions meant that 
generators could be penalised for events not within their control, increasing their risk perception. The 
completion bond was relatively high (JPY 5,000/kW; USD 45.3/kW) – 10 times higher than the bid bond. 
Taking into account the feedback received from developers, the government relaxed the confiscation 
rules for subsequent rounds. If METI’s certification could not be procured within the deadline, the 
completion bond could be carried forward to the next auction.a Furthermore, the deposit would not 
be confiscated if the developer failed to deliver owing to external factors. Japan also enforced long-
term planning and systematic auctions to increase investors’ confidence and tackle the problem of 
undersubscription. Two solar auctions and one biomass auction are scheduled each year until the solar 
PV targets are met. 
Looking ahead, future auctions could ease the task of developers in securing land and grid connection. 
Section 3.2 describes project-based strategies to reduce those risks and costs to bidders. 
a As long as the project capacity and location did not change and the bid price in the later auction was lower.
Sources: GIO, 2019a and 2019b; BNET, 2019d; Kageyama, 2018; Matsuda et al., 2018.
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Payment to the winner
India has seen several cases of undercontracting 
in recent years, sometimes resulting from 
negotiations after the auction. In some instances, 
when the auctioneer has not been satisfied 
with the outcomes, in terms of the lowest tariffs 
obtained and the tariff spread, it has chosen 
to cancel the auction altogether or to request 
bidders to match the lowest tariff (see Box 1.1). 
In 2018, nearly 5 GW of solar auctions were 
cancelled (Kabeer, 2019). Where bidders have 
been asked to match the lowest bid, often only 
a few developers agree. In the case of the 1 GW 
wind auction conducted by Gujarat Urja Vikas 
Nigam Limited (GUVNL), the difference between 
the lowest bid (L1) and that of the last winner 
(L8) was INR 0.15 (USD 0.002) per kWh, which 
GUVNL deemed inconsistent with industry norms. 
It then invited all bidders to match the lowest 
bid. Only two of the eight developers did so, 
leaving over 500 MW to be contracted through 
a future auction (Ranganath, 2019). The same 
approach has been followed several times since 
2010 and has discouraged various winners from 
signing a contract because their projects would 
not be economically feasible at the lowest price 
(Azuela et al., 2014). This issue arises in India’s 
solar auctions particularly, as policymakers have 
pursued ever-more-competitive solar power 
contracts, seeking prices incommensurate with 
developers’ costs and the risks assumed.
2.3 CONSTRUCTION STAGE
Underperformance during construction, referred 
to as underbuilding, can be associated with 
delays in project completion, installation of less 
capacity than committed or project cancellation. 
The most common occasion for underbuilding 
is when awarded projects encounter obstacles 
during construction, but issues with grid 
connection can also have an impact. 
Lead times 
Typically, the auctioneer sets a lead time, 
which is the period from contract award to the 
date of entry into operation (see IRENA and 
CEM, 2015 for more details). If the lead time 
is too short, the probability of project delay 
increases. If the lead time is too long, bidders 
may underbid, speculating that costs may fall 
and more advanced components may be on 
the market by the date commercial operation 
is to begin. Long lead times may also expose 
developers to inflation and currency risks, 
depending on how the contract prices are 
indexed and denominated (see Section 1.4.4). 
Box 2.3 discusses the implications of lead times 
and currency exchange on the performance of 
wind and solar auctions in Brazil. 
Lead times are not comparable, as they are 
generally set according to the auction objectives 
and specific conditions. The lead time of an 
auction designed to supply additional capacity 
BOX 2.3  LEAD TIMES AND CURRENCY EXCHANGE RISKS IN BRAZIL 
Brazil typically conducts two types of auctions: one for delivery in three years (A-3) and the 
second for delivery in five (A-5) (IRENA, 2013). The five-year lead time allows more flexibility 
for planning construction and commissioning the project, while also minimising the likelihood of 
delays and the attendant penalties. It also gives project developers the opportunity to profit from falling 
costs of components. The A-5 auctions, therefore, should be expected to yield lower prices. For example, 
the December 2013 A-5 auction yielded a price 6% lower than the A-3 price of the November 2013 auction 
carried out just a month earlier. A similar price difference was observed between the November 2014 A-5 
and the October 2014 A-3 auctions (IRENA, 2017a). The choice of the lead time therefore can impact the 
performance of the auction when it comes to resulting price. 
As for the risks of currency exchange, solar developers that import technology won contracts to sell 
power in 2014 at an average price of BRL 215.12/MWh (about USD 87/MWh at the time). The exchange 
rate by the time the projects had to be delivered put the value of that power at about USD 68/MWh. At 
the same time, Brazil’s economic downturn limited the growth of electricity, a decline of 0.9 percent in 
2016. The auction was then cancelled, which was a win-win result for for investors and the government 
alike (IRENA, 2017a). 
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on an urgent basis, for example, is generally 
shorter than that of an auction designed to 
support the development of a local industry, 
which should allow more time for domestic 
businesses to seize the opportunity presented. 
Specific conditions to consider include the level 
of development of the sector, technological 
maturity, and the complexity of project pre-
development requirements (e.g., permits). 
In the case of technology-specific auctions, 
lead times are generally shorter in solar PV than 
in wind auctions. For example, in their solar 
auctions, India and Germany adopted 13- and 
18-month lead times, respectively, although 
the exact target varies for each individual 
auction. For wind, Italy’s auctions involved 28- 
and 31-month lead times in 2012 and 2016. In 
some cases, lead times are the same for both 
technologies. In Brazil, 36- or 60-month lead 
times apply to solar and wind, depending on 
the category (A3 or A5, see IRENA, 2013). In 
Mexico and South Africa, project developers 
may suggest their own commercial operation 
date up to a maximum of 30 and 24 months, 
respectively. In Japan, the first solar auction 
allowed project developers to set their lead 
time. Less than half of the bidders set it to less 
than 36 months – equivalent to the lead time in 
the feed-in tariff scheme. In fact, 13.8% of the 
projects even had a lead time between eight 
and ten years (Kageyama, 2018).
Most auction designs also include a maximum 
permissible construction time (or delay) beyond 
which the contract is written off and another 
project selected. In cases where the asset is 
partly developed by the time the deadline is 
reached, the contract may be written off, but 
provisions are made for the asset. IRENA’s 
Open Solar Contracts provides options for the 
partially completed asset (see Box 1.8).  
Compliance rules
Penalties can minimise the risk of project delays 
and completion failures during construction. 
Three types of penalty are commonly applied 
in the event of delay: 
1)  confiscation of a fraction of the project’s 
completion bond in proportion to the 
delay observed, or charging a pre-defined 
penalty for each unit of time the project is 
delayed (a one-time cost); 
2)  reduction of the project’s contractual 
remuneration (a recurring cost) or 
duration; and 
3) cancellation of the contract, if the delay 
extends beyond a defined deadline. 
Beyond those penalties, it is crucial to 
establish whether the project developer retains 
contractual obligations during the delay period. 
If that is the case, the developer is typically 
required to purchase compensatory products 
(in the spot market, when applicable) in lieu 
of the electricity not delivered. In Brazil and 
Mexico, the developer retains this responsibility 
during delays. This can put a significant strain 
on the company’s cash flow during the delay, 
as it must meet financial obligations without 
receiving contract income. In Germany, India 
and Italy, there is no such obligation during 
the delay period. But whereas generators in 
these countries have less exposure to market 
risk, the delay penalties affecting contract 
remuneration tend to be harsher. These apply 
not only during the delay but during the 
entirety of the project’s remaining useful life. 
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BOX 2.4  PERFORMANCE OF EARLY SOLAR AUCTIONS IN GERMANY 
An analysis of solar auctions in Germany conducted in 2015-2016 covered six auctions that 
awarded 174 solar projects with a total of 963 MW of installed capacity. The analysis showed high 
rates of timely completion. More than 65% of the capacity awarded was built on time, and only 
around 23% was delayed. At the time of publication, data was still missing for around 11% of the capacity 
awarded. Among the countries analysed, Germany has one of the highest rates of timely completion for 
solar PV. As commitment bonds in Germany are not much higher than in the other countries analysed 
(see Table 2.1), the success may be due to strict compliance rules related to penalties for delays, and 
most importantly, to an enabling environment that supports timely completion. This includes the ease 
of obtaining permits and licenses, in addition to the availability of a developed domestic PV sector. 
Source: Bundesnetzagentur, n.d
In Germany, when the solar project fails to 
meet the target commercial operation date, 
normally 18 months from the time the project 
is awarded, penalties are pro-rated to the 
absent capacity. In addition, for solar PV, the 
contract is reduced by EUR 3/MWh for the 
entirety of the plant’s useful life if operation 
begins more than 18 months late or if the 
installation deviates from the specifications 
in the bidding documents. Considering a 
typical contract price of EUR 60/MWh for solar 
auctions in Germany, this penalty represents 
a loss of 5% of the contract value over a 
20-year period (Bundesnetzagentur, n.d.). 
Box 2.4 presents the results of the performance 
of early solar auctions in Germany.  For onshore 
wind, commercial operation must begin no later 
than 24 months from the public announcement 
of winning bids (except for citizen wind parks, 
which are given the benefit of two additional 
years; see Box 4.3). Thereafter, penalties must 
be paid to the grid operator for shortfalls in 
capacity exceeding 5%, with the bid bond 
standing as guarantee in case of non-payment. 
The penalty increases with time: EUR 10/kW 
if operation begins between months 24 and 
26; EUR 20/kW between months 26 and 28; 
and EUR 30/kW after month 28. The contract 
is terminated if operation does not begin by 
month 30, unless an extension is granted (e.g., 
by court order) (Bundesnetzagentur, n.d.).
Likewise, in Italy, if the developer fails to meet 
the deadline, its contract price is reduced by 
0.5% for each month of delay (for a maximum 
of 24 months). This translates to a 3% reduction 
in value for a six-month delay. Box 2.5 discusses 
the performance of the wind projects awarded 
through the 2012 and 2016 auctions in Italy. 
In Japan and South Africa, rather than 
penalising the contract price, the contract is 
shortened commensurate with the delay. In 
Japan, the procurement period is shortened 
by one month for each month of delay: given 
a six-month delay, the contract will only be 
valid for 19.5 years instead of 20. Moreover, 
the completion bond is forfeited in its entirety 
if the project does not meet the deadline for 
commencement of commercial operations.. 
In South Africa, for every delayed day, the 
contract is reduced by an additional day: one 
day of delay results in two days of lost revenue. 
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Thus, a delay of six months in the scheduled 
commissioning date would shorten a typical 
20-year contract by a year, or 5% of its term. 
The performance of projects awarded through 
the different rounds of the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producers Procurement 
Programme (REIPPPP) is described in Box 2.6.
In India, if the project is delayed for more than 
three months, the contract price is reduced 
by INR 0.005/kWh for each additional day of 
delay. For a six-month delay and an average 
contract price of INR 3/kWh, the contract 
would lose 30% of its value. Particularly in 
India, a six-month delay is not implausible, 
given India’s shorter target construction 
times and possible delays in permitting. 
Enabling and integrating measures 
Delays in project completion can pertain to 
issues that are not related to auction design, 
or even the choice of the auction as a policy 
instrument. In the initial stages of development 
of the Brazilian wind industry in 2002, the 
sector was driven by a feed-in tariff (PROINFA) 
that contracted a total capacity of 1.4 GW by 
2004. The awarded projects were subject to 
years of delay and the last wind power plants 
commenced commercial operation toward the 
end of 2011. The total capacity built amounted 
to 1.3 GW, indicating that some projects were 
cancelled. Delays and cancellations at the time 
were due to factors unrelated to the policy 
instrument chosen to support deployment; 
most were related to the level of development 
of the sector (Bayer et al., 2018).  
BOX 2.5   PERFORMANCE OF WIND PROJECTS AWARDED  
THROUGH THE 2012 AND 2016 AUCTIONS IN ITALY 
Almost 90% of the wind capacity awarded in Italy’s first auction round in 2012 has been 
built (corresponding to 47 out of 49 projects) (Figure 2.4). One project was withdrawn, 
while the other is still pending (corresponding to 6% and 4% of total capacity awarded, 
respectively). The system for monitoring projects does not account for delays but some 
assumptions can be made regarding the second round in 2016. Considering a lead time of 28 
months, two-thirds of the projects awarded were already delayed by the time this report went 
to publication and one project of 1 MW capacity had withdrawn. Delays may be related to grid 





































Figure 2.4  Status of projects resulting from wind auctions in Italy
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BOX 2.6  PERFORMANCE OF AUCTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Of the 90 projects awarded in the five rounds (BW1, 2, 3, 3.5 and 4) that have started construction, 
64 had been successfully completed by March 2019a with an average completion time of 702 
days (a bit less than 2 years). Based on scheduled commissioning dates and progress to date, it 
is projected that all 90 projects will be operational by 29 October 2021.  Figure 2.5 illustrates the status of 
projects awarded as of March 2019. 
For most of the projects built, only 1% encountered underperformance related to delays or underbuilding, 
peaking at 350 MW capacity in June 2014. The majority of this capacity was delayed, with only 23 
MW shortfall of capacity built. The average delay period for all 64 projects that have reached their 
commercial operation date (COD) was 64 days. Those were mostly focused in BW1 projects, followed by 
BW2, with average delays of 89 and 79 days respectively. Those delays were mainly attributed to grid 
connection issues and to extended industrial action in the metals and mining industries in early 2014, 
particularly impactful given the shares of local content in South Africa. The average delay dropped to 7 
days by BW3, indicating that the learning curve and experience gained contributed greatly to reducing 
delays. In addition, cross-cutting issues such as grid connection delays were addressed with priority. 
Projects that reach COD but are not able to connect to the grid due to network unavailability are paid 
for deemed energy. Payments reached ZAR 325 million by March 2019 (approximately USD 22 million) 
which may have incentivised action from the government to address the issue.b 
Figure 2.5  Status of projects awarded in South African auctions as of March 2019
Source: Republic of South Africa, 2019 
a  The operational capacity of 3,976 MW consists of solar PV (1,474 MW), onshore wind (1, 980 MW), concentrated 
solar power (500 MW), hydropower (14 MW) and landfill (8 MW). 
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Delays and underbuilding can be caused 
by factors that lie outside the developer’s 
control. In particular, the processes of 
obtaining environmental and social permits 
and securing grid access are significant causes 
of underperformance in the construction 
phase. It is therefore essential to allocate those 
responsibilities fairly between the bidder and 
auctioneer. Alternatively, permits may be 
included as a qualification requirement, but this 
may limit the pool of participants in the auction 
(as discussed in Chapter 3). In any case, in 
many jurisdictions, permitting processes can 
and should be made more transparent and 
streamlined. 
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BOX 2.7  CONSTRUCTION DELAYS IN MEXICAN AUCTIONS 
As of September 2019, only 16 of the 42 awarded projects in the first two rounds had started 
their power purchase agreements (PPAs), although they were all past their commercial operation 
date (Figure 2.6). Of the 15 projects resulting from the first auction in March 2016 (11 solar PV and 
4 wind) that committed to begin operation between March and September 2018, only five were on time. 
Two additional projects came online in 2019, but eight projects totalling 715 MW were still delayed as of 
September 2019, representing 37% of the planned capacity from the first round. Of the eight projects 
delayed, six are located in the state of Yucatan, one of the locations favoured in the winner selection 
criteria (see Box 3.10). These outcomes suggest that broader challenges beyond system integration 
must be considered when adopting an adjustment-based strategy (see Section 3.4) in auction design. 
Obtaining permits in Yucatan is difficult, given that it is a hurricane zone, has complex topography, and is 
home to many Mayan archaeological sites (Guadarrama, 2018).
The second auction awarded 28 projects: 17 solar, 6 wind, 2 hydropower plants built in the early 1900s 
(existing plants seeking a PPA may participate in the auction), a geothermal plant built in 2006 and 
2 combined cycle gas turbine plants (CCGT) one built in 2018 (and one under construction in Texas, 
U.S.).a Solar PV and wind plants had to be built after the auction, in most cases. and they committed 
to start operation between July 2018 and June 2019. Among, the 22 solar and wind plants awarded, 
only five (three wind and two solar), were in operation by September 2019. Sixty-two percent of the 
second auction’s plants’ capacity is delayed.
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a One wind plant, that was also awarded in the first round, and the CCGT plant in Texas are not depicted. 
In Mexico, administrative burdens and 
bureaucracy in obtaining documentation 
and construction permits were among the 
main causes of underperformance in the 
construction stage, especially in the second 
round (Box 2.7). In the state of Sonora, 
for instance, a developer had to request 16 
construction permits from 13 different agencies 
at the federal, state and municipal levels, and 
most of those permits were duplicated. For 
example, an environmental permit had to be 
obtained at the federal level and then again 
from the municipality. Other permits that 
were duplicated across government levels 
related to urban development and land use, 
civil protection, and road-impact studies. The 
permitting process took more than a year to 
complete, half of the two-year project lead time. 
Project developers in other regions face similar 
challenges, with even more permits required 
in some cases, resulting in even longer waits 
(Guadarrama, 2018). 
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BOX 2.8  PERFORMANCE OF WIND PROJECTS RESULTING FROM AUCTIONS IN BRAZIL 
The first wind power plant was awarded in 2009. Of the 16 auction rounds auctioned by 2017 
(contracting a total 14.6 GW), ten rounds (with a total awarded capacity of 10 GW) had achieved 
the implementation deadline (Brazilian Power Trade Chamber, 2017a): 77% of the capacity 
awarded had reached commercial operation, 7% were under construction, 4% were in the planning phase, 
and 12% were either cancelled or had very low likelihood to be implemented (Bayer et al., 2018).
Projects awarded in new energy auctions are subject to significant penalties for delays and 
underproduction. Developers must purchase firm energy certificates in the market to meet their 
contractual obligations if they are not connected to the grid by the time set for project completion. 
But in the reserve auctions, settlement rules are more relaxed and generators do not have the 
financial obligation to provide the contracted quantity as these auctions aim to provide surplus 
energy to guarantee system reliability. Projects awarded in reserve auctions are also protected against 
transmission delays that are beyond the control of the developer.
In Brazil, of all the projects resulting from 
the first ten rounds of wind auctions that had 
reached their implementation deadline in 2017, 
only 17% were completed on time, and some 
projects took up to four additional years to be 
implemented. Grid connection was stated as the 
principal reason for the delays in early rounds, 
with little coordination between the expansion 
of renewable energy and that of transmission 
grids. Until 2013, delays in extending the 
transmission grid was not the responsibility 
of the project developer, but as of round LEN 
11/2013, the auction design changed. 
Even when project delays were due to the 
extension of the transmission grid, the generators 
had to fulfill their contractual obligation to 
supply energy. Following this change, the 
timely completion rate of the LEN 11/2013 and 
LEN 06/2014 auctions improved considerably, 
with 46% and 69% of capacity delivered on 
time, respectively. However, the additional risk 
allocated to the developer was factored in the 
price bid, which increased by 9% in LEN 11/2013. 
Another reason for the delay in early projects 
was the nascent domestic wind industry that 
was not yet capable of supplying the equipment 
needed for developers to fulfil their local content 
quota of 60% —and so benefit from concessional 
finance from the national development bank, 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico 
e Social (BNDES). For some components, there 
was only one supplier, compared to ten for the 
same components in Europe (Bayer et al, 2018). 
Requests for a deadline extension to postpone 
obligations and avoid penalties are common in 
Brazil. The regulator, Brazil Agência Nacional 
de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) has recognised 
cases where delays are not the responsibility 
of developers: delays in processing licenses 
(project, environmental, etc.) caused by public 
authorities, and delays in the transmission grid 
extension. 
A deadline extension request can also be 
approved if it is in the public interest (Bayer et al, 
2018). The performance of wind projects awarded 
through the different rounds of the Brazilian 
auction is described in Box 2.8. Project delay or 
cancellation in Brazil can have three main legal 
consequences for developers: 1) reimbursement 
of the energy that was not delivered, 2) 
execution of financial guarantees, and 3) other 
penalties such as contract termination, a ban 
from auctions, or administrative fines as high as 
10% of the investment (Bayer et al, 2018).
Contract termination 
Most PPAs include a provision to terminate the 
contract that may be invoked once the maximum 
allowable construction time is reached. 
India, Italy and Germany set a 24-month 
maximum construction time (counted from 
the announcement of auction winners) after 
which the contract can be terminated. Brazil 
and South Africa may cancel the contract after 
a delay of 18 months (with some exceptions). 
Mexico sets a 12-month limit.
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Even though cancelling a project may seem like 
an extreme penalty, it may be preferable for a 
developer facing significant cost overruns. This 
scenario is more plausible in the models adopted 
by Brazil and Mexico, where the developer retains 
market liabilities during the delay period.
Incentives for early project completion 
Beyond penalising projects for delays or setting 
thresholds for cancellation, auction design can 
encourage developers to implement faster 
and more efficient construction processes. For 
instance, projects that are completed earlier 
than scheduled may be allowed to sell their 
energy into the market until the specified 
start date of their PPA. Providing an incentive 
for early completion can shorten average 
construction time. 
Such a policy is in place in Brazil, Italy and Mexico, 
which allow agents to sell their electricity (and 
other energy products) in the wholesale market 
until the scheduled commercial operation date. 
This feature tends to be particularly attractive for 
developers in Brazil, who have a lead time of up 
to five years and where spot prices have been 
high compared to auction prices, partly because 
of recent hydropower trends. In Italy, almost all 
projects that were not delayed were operational 
more than a year before the target date. 
In Germany and South Africa, the remuneration 
begins earlier and at the awarded contract price 
if projects are completed early. However, in 
Germany, this shift automatically also changes 
the contract’s end date, while in South Africa 
the end date remains fixed. India, in contrast, has 
adopted a fixed tariff of INR 3/kWh to be paid 
during the early-completion period. The tariff is 
then revised upon the commercial operation date.
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Source: PSR, n.d.
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Delays aside, failures to deliver in accordance 
with the bid can occur at other levels, including 
the quantities delivered in terms of energy, and 
the socio-economic goals achieved.
Quantities of energy
Owing to the uncertainties implicit in generating 
variable renewable energy, underperformance 
during the operational stage is hard to measure. 
Several years of monitored output are typically 
needed to assess whether underdelivery is 
systematic or simply attributable to variable 
production cycles. On the technical level, the 
generation load may be predetermined (e.g., in 
Mexico), and actual production from the generators 
may deviate from the required generation profile. 
In Brazil, underdelivery was twice as common as 
overdelivery from wind auctions between 2009 
and 2012. Underdelivery relates to the explicit 
commitment made by developers at the time of 
the auction to a given quantity to be delivered. 
In Figure 2.7, the diagonal dotted line represents 
a match between the awarded and delivered 
capacity factors. Many points lie far from the 
line, and more than half are below it. 
Underdelivery can be addressed through 
by clearly defining the auction’s quantity-
related liabilities (see IRENA and CEM, 2015) 
between 1) capacity-oriented agreements, 2) 
energy-oriented agreements and 3) financial 
agreements, accompanied by provisions on 
how to handle delivery deviations. Settlement 
rules can vary from case to case, but the general 
rule is to implement strict penalties for obvious 
underperformance (and in some cases for 
overperformance), exercising leniency where 
doubt exists. 
IRENA and CEM (2015) provides a more 
detailed analysis on the various options for 
temporal aggregation, provisions for over- and 




Failure to deliver as bid may also entail a failure 
to meet promised socio-economic objectives. 
Projects awarded in Morocco and South Africa 
have been reporting on the benefits achieved.
In Morocco, the inclusion of local labour and 
materials was encouraged in the four rounds 
of the Noor-Ouarzazate complex. Remarkably, 
commitments presented in bids for each of 
the phases were higher than the thresholds 
specified in the auction. In the fourth phase, the 
commitments doubled the threshold (Table 2.2).
Early results have matched, if not exceeded, 
expectations. Noor I indeed sourced 30-35% of 
the project costs in local components and services 
(ESMAP, 2018). Throughout the four phases, 6,430 
Moroccans have been employed (70% of the total) 
and a third of the jobs were sourced locally from 
the region of Ouarzazate (Table 2.3).
These outcomes can be attributed to L’Agence 
Marocaine pour l’Energie Durable (MASEN) 
assuming an active role in promoting education, 
training, and research and development. For 
the Noor complex, MASEN partnered with the 
Agence nationale de promotion de l’emploi 
et des compétences (ANAPEC) to ease local 
recruitment for developers and to provide 
the needed training to a young workforce in 
the region. For example, for Noor II and III, 96 
students were trained to become electrical and 
mechanical technicians, solar field operators 
or mirror cleaning operators, among other 
fields. Ultimately, 50 candidates were recruited 
through this programme for operation and 
maintenance activities (Stitou, 2019).
Table 2.2  Share of local content commitments in Noor-Ouarzazate, Morocco
Noor I Noor II Noor III Noor IV
Committed share 34.7% 40.5% 42% 24%
Threshold share 30% 35% 35% 11.7%
Source: Stitou, 2019.
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In South Africa, the seven rounds conducted 
so far have attracted significant investment, 
reaching ZAR 209.7 billion (USD 14.64 billion) 
by March 2019, including ZAR 41.8 billion (USD 
2.92 billion) foreign investment and financing. 
The capital expenditure incurred on the design, 
construction, development, installation and/or 
commissioning of projects, has created many 
opportunities for local value at each segment of 
the value chain. By March 2019, ZAR 63.1 billion 
(USD 4.44 billion) was spent on construction 
and operation of projects, and the total spending 
planned is ZAR 149.9 billion (USD 10.54 billion). 
The share of procurement from Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowered (BBBEE) suppliers, 
Qualifying Small Enterprises (QSE), Exempted 
Micro Enterprises (EME) and women-owned 
vendors are tracked against committed and 
targeted shares. While shares of procurement 
from BBBEE, QSE and EME suppliers as of 
March 2019 has exceeded commitments, the 
involvement of women-owned businesses is still 
lagging, especially in construction (Republic of 
South Africa, 2019). The performance of projects 
awarded through the REIPPP as of March 2019 
are presented in Table 2.4.
When it comes to local content, ZAR 46.5 
billion, billion (USD 3.27 billion) has been 
spent locally, out of a total spending of ZAR 
90.3 billion, (USD 6.35 billion). However, for 
the projects already completed, local spending 
was 0.4% below planned. 
In terms of job creation, the REIPPP has created 
a total of 40,134 job-years (equivalent of a full-
time employment for one year) for South African 
citizens, of which 33,019 were in construction 
(101% above planned) and 7,115 in operations. 
The 64 projects that were completed by March 
2019 created 31,633job-years, 53% higher than 
the committed to 20,689 job-years. 
Employment thresholds for South African 
citizen employment were exceeded, with 
89% for construction (BW1 – BW4) and 95% 
for operation (BW1 – BW3) respectively.  The 
procurement conditions required at least 40% 
of each project to be owned by South African 
entities. This was surpassed with local equity 
shareholding across all rounds reaching 52%. 
The REIPPPP contributes to Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment and the creation of 
black industrialists. Black South Africans own, 
on average, 33% of projects that have reached 
financial close, 3% higher than the 30% target. 
This includes black people in local communities 
that have ownership in the IPP projects that 
operate in or nearby their vicinities. On average, 
black local communities own 9% of projects that 
have reached financial close. This is well above the 
5% target. Shareholding by black South Africans 
has also been secured across the value chain. 











Noor I 35 1 906 1 471 77 659 35
Noor II 40 4 063 2 723 67 927 23
Noor III 40 2 524 1 695 67 797 32
Noor IV 24 656 541 82 386 59
Combined - 9 149 6 430 70 2769 30
Source: Stitou, 2019.
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Notes: RSA = Republic of South Africa; BBBEE = Broad based black economic empowerment (BBBEE);  
QSE = qualifying small enterprises; EME = Exempted micro enterprises; SED = socio-economic development.
a Depending on technology; 45% for solar PV, 40% for all other technologies.
b As percentage of total procurement spend.
c  The reported procurement numbers do not represent the final procurement spend and the data has not been verified 
by the IPPPP Office. Therefore, this achievement is reported with caution.
d 32% of total procurement for construction and 23% for operation. 
e As a percentage of revenue.
Element 
(weighting) Description Threshold Target
Achievement 






89% in construction 
and 95% in operation
RSA-based employees 
who are black people
30% 50%
79% in construction 
and 83% in operation
Skilled employees 
who are black people
18% 30%
67% in construction 
and 79% in operation
RSA-based employees 
who are citizens 
and from local 
communities
12% 20%
67% in construction 
and 83% in operation
Local content 
(25%)
Value of local 
content spending
40-45% a 65% 52%
Ownership 
(15%)
Shareholding by black 
people in the seller
12% 30% 33%







BBBEE procurement b - 60%
86% for construction 
and operations 
combined c
QSE and SME 
Procurement b
- 10%
31% of total 
procurement as 




3% of construction 








Table 2.4   The performance of projects awarded in South Africa in terms of socio-economic 
development, as of March 2019
Source: Republic of South Africa, 2019.
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Although the countries analysed in this chapter 
are quite heterogeneous in their auction design 
and other respects, underperformance was 
prevalent and frequent at different stages, 
especially during construction. This suggests 
that despite innovations in auction design 
over the past decade, there is still room for 
improvement when it comes to licences and 
permits, facilitating grid connection, and 
aligning project timelines with socio-economic 
development goals. 
Sound auction design elements, such as 
establishing a regular schedule for auction 
rounds, auctioning adequate volumes, defining 
clear off-taker commitments and setting 
reasonable ceiling prices (where applicable) 
can mitigate undersubscription by attracting 
sufficient competition (IRENA and CEM, 2015). 
Likewise, clear, transparent and technically 
sound criteria for selecting winners can minimise 
undercontracting.
In setting qualification requirements, a balance 
must be struck between imposing overly 
stringent requirements that may limit the pool 
of potential bidders (and thus increase the risk 
of undersubscription) and lax requirements that 
may lead to underperformance at later stages.
The same reasoning applies to compliance 
rules related to the allocation of risk and the 
remuneration of sellers. Stringent compliance 
rules are meant to ensure that, once winners 
are selected, contracts will be signed, projects 
will be completed on time and the risks of 
under- or overperformance will be reduced. 
However, overly strict rules may deter small and 
new players and may lead to undersubscribed 
auctions that could result in lower competition 
and higher prices.
Experience with auctions suggests that shielding 
investors from permitting risk – by centralising 
these procedures in a site-specific auction, 
for example – can have a positive impact 
on performance in the bidding, contracting 
and construction stages (see Section 3.2). 
Nonetheless, centralising responsibilities in this 
manner is not feasible in all contexts. Auctions 
should be tailored to each country’s technical, 
administrative and political capabilities. Smooth 
coordination between various institutions 
involved in approving renewable energy 
construction projects is critical. The lack of 
robust institutions and permitting processes 
frequently raises concerns among project 
developers and increases the likelihood of delays 
and underbuilding. Increasing the predictability 
of these processes may be the most efficient 
way of combatting underperformance. 
Finally, monitoring project performance related 
to socio-economic development objectives can 
be complicated. For instance, when reporting 
on local jobs created, one may encounter 
ambiguity in the definition of the sector, in 
what is considered a newly created job and in 
assessments of the quality of the jobs created. 
Moreover, monitoring the jobs created should 
consider qualitative dimensions such as the 
duration of the employment and its significance 
for individuals (see Chapter 4).
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 SUPPORTING THE INTEGRATION  
OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY
3
Solar PV and wind are the most commonly 
auctioned renewable energy technologies, 
accounting for 97% of auction volume in 2017-
2018 (see Figure 1.1). This is consistent with global 
trends in the last decade. Solar PV and wind are 
also the most widely deployed renewable energy 
technologies by a large margin, driven by their 
growing maturity and falling costs. Variable 
renewable energy (VRE) technologies, however, 
have characteristics that distinguish them from 
conventional and other generation sources. This 
chapter explores auction design elements that 
can support the deployment of VRE plants in 
a more appropriate system, one that considers 
their specific characteristics. As the transition 
progresses, it becomes increasingly important 
to update operational and market patterns that 
were originally designed for the fossil fuel era.
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VRE is limited in dispatchability (the ability to 
control its output). It exhibits variable hourly, 
daily and seasonal generation patterns and 
may not always be available at times of peak 
demand. This variability calls for additional 
system flexibility.1 
VRE generation can be predicted based on 
weather forecasts, but some uncertainty in 
projections always remains, with implications 
for system reliability. Strategies that can 
mitigate the adverse effects of variability and 
uncertainty include forming portfolios of various 
technologies or widening the geographic 
distribution of projects, adopting the most 
accurate forecasting systems and moving closer 
to real-time electricity markets and operations. 
VRE is location-constrained and may be 
concentrated in areas with abundant resources. 
This may lead to so-called hotspots (e.g., areas 
with higher concentration of solar PV or wind 
farms). Hotspots are usually far from centres 
of demand, which may require additional 
infrastructure to avoid transmission congestion 
and losses. Moreover, hotspots can increase 
system vulnerability to weather events.
VRE generators are also characterised by low 
operating costs and they can produce electricity 
at a short-run marginal cost that is close to 
zero. When generation is remunerated based 
on the marginal cost of the most expensive 
active generator, cheaper VRE generation can 
decrease wholesale market prices. 
This reduces the attractiveness of merchant 
(i.e., non-subsidised) investments in the power 
sector, for both renewable and conventional 
generation.2 The former, however, has high 
initial capital costs; in a system with potential 
low electricity prices, renewables deployment 
calls for long-term and certain payments. 
To that end, power purchase agreements 
provided through auctions can help in keeping 
finance costs low and in turn, minimising the cost 
of procuring renewable power. Indeed, sound 
auction design can find a balance between long-
term revenue certainty for renewable energy 
developers and the competitive procurement of 
renewable technologies that have higher value 
for the system (IRENA, forthcoming-a).
This chapter explores auction design elements 
that can help reduce some of the consequences 
of increased shares of VRE in power systems. 
The discussion is structured around five 
implementation strategies that have been 
adopted around the world (Figure 3.1). These 
strategies can be implemented separately 
or as a mix, as shown in Section 3.7. An in-
focus discussion on different approaches to 
curtailment risk in auction design can be found 
at the end of the chapter.
1 Defined as the ability of the power system to bring demand and supply into balance at any given time-scale.
2  Although this discussion mostly applies to the wholesale market, similar effects can also be observed in some regulated power 
systems, since the rules are designed to  maximise the economic efficiency of the power system.
3.1 VRE CHARACTERISTICS RELEVANT TO AUCTION DESIGN














The strategies are sorted according to the degree 
of central planning, from highest to lowest. For 
example, under the project-based strategy, 
developers have little flexibility in the design of 
their power plants, whereas the product-based 
strategy allows them the maximum degree 
of flexibility: they need only to guarantee the 
availability of a predetermined quantity of a given 
product (capacity, energy, system services, etc.).
Importantly, the choice regarding the strategy 
to adopt (and associated auction design 
elements) is context-specific and depends 
on the structure of the power market and 
the level of development of the sector. In any 
case, the structure of the power system needs 
to be redesigned such that it becomes more 
appropriate for a renewables-based system. 
Within it, long term procurement strategies 
(such as auctions) will be one of the pillars. 
Indeed, sound auction design can help to 
overcome the unsuitability of the current power 
system structures to accommodate renewable-
based power systems. The report “Power System 
Organisational Structures for the Renewable 
Energy Era” (IRENA, forthcoming-a) analyses this 
aspect and future IRENA work on auctions will 
provide strategies that can support this approach.
3.2 PROJECT-BASED STRATEGY 
A project-based strategy aims for a highly 
predictable outcome, as the auctioneer 
maintains tight control of the results through 
pre-determined parameters such as project 
size, technology, location and technological 
characteristics. A strategy built on such strict 
planning can be implemented through a project-
specific auction, typically in power systems 
based on the single-buyer model. 
BOX 3.1  PROJECT-SPECIFIC AUCTIONS UNDER THE SCALING SOLAR PROGRAM 
The Scaling Solar Program brings together several World Bank Group services under a single engagement. 
It includes a comprehensive package of technical support, document templates, pre-approved financing, 
insurance products and guarantees to enable the development of large-scale solar plants via project-
specific auctions and private financing. It has supported solar PV deployment in various countries in 
Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, including:
Zambia was the first African country to join Scaling Solar. In 2015, the country’s Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) signed an agreement with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) that resulted in awarding two solar projects with a total capacity of 88 MW 
in the Lusaka South Multi Facility Economic Zone. The 34 MW Ngonye plant was awarded to Enel 
Green Power at USD 78.4/MWh and was brought online in April 2019 (Enel Green Power, 2019), and 
the 54 MW Bangweulu plant was awarded to the Neoen-First Solar consortium at USD 60.2/MWh 
and brought online in March 2019 (Takouleu, 2019).
Senegal was the second African country to join Scaling Solar to develop 60 MW of solar PV. Two 
projects have been awarded. The partnership between ENGIE, investor Meridiam and Senegal’s 
sovereign wealth fund FONSIS can start construction at sites by the West Senegal towns of 
Kael and Kahone. The two 30 MW projects will sell electricity to Senegal’s power regulator (CRSE) at 
EUR 38/MWh (USD 42/MWh) and EUR 40/MWh (USD 44/MWh) (IFC, 2019; Martin, 2019).
Madagascar was the third country to join the programme. One year after the launch of the first 
auction in 2018, six bidders have been shortlisted to compete for a 25 MW project located near 
the capital, Antananarivo (Scaling Solar, 2018).
Beyond the African continent, Uzbekistan was the first country to join Scaling Solar to develop 
a 100 MW plant in the Navoi region. The project was awarded to the UAE developer Masdar 
Clean Energy at USD 27/MWh (Keating, 2019).
Togo was the latest country to join the programme in July 2019 to develop up to 90 MW of 
solar PV power. So far, a 30 MW project was approved on a selected site in Blitta, in the center 
of the country (Bellini, 2019 c).
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In such cases the design elements all pertain 
to auction demand.  Project-specific auctions 
can advantage both parties, the developer and 
system operator. 
Project-specific auctions  
benefits to the developer
Bidders for project-specific auctions bear 
the minimum level of risk. Project-specific 
auctions can minimise costs and risks related 
to assessing resources, securing permits, and 
gaining access to the needed infrastructure 
(e.g., grid connections and roads). As such, they 
are generally favoured by newcomers, including 
in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
some countries adopted project-based auctions 
as part of the Scaling Solar Program (Box 3.1).
Project-specific auctions benefits 
to the system operator 
Project-specific auctions can also be favourable 
for specific technologies such as offshore 
wind (see Chapter 5 in IRENA, 2017a) or 
Concentred Solar Power (CSP), for which 
dedicated infrastructure must be established. 
Project-specific auctions for CSP have brought 
record-low prices in Morocco and the United 
Arab Emirates (project-specific PV auctions also 
resulted in record-low prices on many occasions 
in the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai). Both 
the emirate of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates 
and Morocco have auctioned CSP and PV specific 
projects separately, to form hybrid solar complexes 
and benefit from the storage capabilities of CSP. 
In 2019, Morocco conducted a hybrid project-
specific auction, the 800 MW CSP-PV Noor 
Midelt. Results of the hybrid solar complexes 
in the United Arab Emirates and Morocco are 
presented in Box 3.2. 
Depending on permitting procedures, a utility-
scale PV system can be built typically in six to 
nine months; a wind farm can be commissioned 
in a year or two (IRENA, IEA and REN21, 2018; 
Lazard, 2018). A new transmission line, on 
the other hand, can take up to a decade from 
approval to construction. Aligning generation 
and transmission planning can help ensure 
that projects connect to transmission lines that 
are not congested and that they start feeding 
power the day they are commissioned. 
Project-based auctions can be used to 
synchronise the development of new generation 
assets with grid infrastructure, thereby reducing 
curtailment risks and other avoidable costs. They 
allow the system operator to ensure that newly 
installed renewable capacity does not impose 
too much stress on the system, minimising 
economic and environmental losses that could 
occur, if projects had to be curtailed, for instance 
(see in focus discussion). 
In project-based auctions, the cost related to 
the development of the needed infrastructure 
(e.g., roads and grid works) is normally borne 
by the auctioneer. 
BOX 3.2  HYBRID SOLAR COMPLEXES IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND MOROCCO 
The Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park auction in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) 
is planned to reach a total capacity of 5 GW. The fourth phase, a 700 MW concentrated 
solar power (CSP) project consisting of 600 MW from a parabolic basin complex and 100 
MW from a concentrated solar tower, with thermal storage capacity of 15 hours, was awarded at 
USD 73/MWh. The project was amended to add 250 MW of solar PV awarded at 24 USD/MWh, 
increasing the total capacity to 950 MW. 
In Morocco, the Noor Power Station in Ouarzazate was auctioned in four rounds: the first 
three rounds for CSP totalled 510 MW: The 160 MW Noor I and 200 MW Noor II projects use 
parabolic-through technology with storage capacity of three and seven hours respectively and 
Noor III, a 150 MW solar tower has seven hours of storage capacity. They were followed by a fourth round 
for PV of 72 MW. 
In May 2019, Morocco auctioned the world’s first advanced hybrid of CSP and PV. The 800 MW 
CSP-PV Noor Midelt is designed to provide dispatchable solar energy during the day and until five 
hours after sunset for a record-low tariff at peak hours of MAD 0.68/kWh (71 USD/MWh).
Sources: DEWA, 2019; Kraemer, 2019; Power-technology, n.d.
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BOX 3.3  INDIA’S SOLAR PARKS 
In India, Solar Parks have been established for the concentrated development of large-scale 
solar PV projects. The Solar Parks are primarily intended to address two critical elements: 
land and power evacuation infrastructure. The project-based strategy can support planning 
while enabling cost reductions by allowing project developers to benefit from economies of scale 
for the necessary infrastructure (procurement of land, road connectivity, communications network, 
water and other utilities) while also reducing the number of approvals required. 
BOX 3.4  AUCTIONS FOR STORAGE IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA
An auction was held for a 100 MW storage facility adjacent to a large wind farm in the state 
of South Australia. Tesla and Neoen won the contract for USD 50 million and deployed the 
Hornsdale Power Reserve (HPR), a 100 MW/129 MWh battery energy storage system. 
The HPR system, which came online in November 2018, has had a positive impact on the local network. 
Depending on system circumstances, it provides grid services such as frequency control and load 
management. It has proved that batteries reduce the need for network upgrades and additional capacity 
at a low price. The HPR system can also operate in the market with a share of its capacity (30 MW), 
arbitraging energy in VRE-rich South Australia.
Following the success of the project, two more battery storage plants came online in 2019 in Victoria. 
In one, a 25 MW/50 MWh battery is co-located and integrated with the 60 MW Gannawarra solar farm, 
near Kerang. The other involves a 30 MW/30 MWh grid-connected battery operating at a terminal 
station in Warrenheip, Ballarat.
Source: Wahlquist, 2018.
Bundling multiple projects into one site, or 
complex, as in the Mohammed bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum Solar Park or the Noor Power 
Station in Ouarzazate, could minimise those 
costs for the auctioneer. In India, specific solar 
projects are auctioned in one area to minimise 
connection costs and associated risks in so-
called Solar Parks (Box 3.3). 
Finally, project-specific strategies may entail 
the auctioning of a renewable energy project 
together with other technologies. Project-
specific auctions for solar PV and battery 
storage, for example, have taken place in India, 
Jordan, and Lebanon. It should be noted that 
auctions for storage may be tied to a specific 
VRE generation asset as part of a project-
specific strategy, as in South Australia (Box 3.4) 
or may be carried out separately as part of 
a product-specific strategy (see Section 3.6). 
3.3 QUANTITY-BASED STRATEGY
The quantity-based strategy for system 
integration of VRE is more flexible than the 
project-based one discussed in Section 3.2. 
Nevertheless, the auctioneer still maintains a 
significant degree of control over the auction 
results. 
Under this strategy, the most important 
system constraints are identified and applied 
as limits in the auction (e.g., location or 
technology) to ensure smooth system 
operation. For example, a shortage in the 
transmission capacity needed to evacuate 
generation from a resource-rich area toward 
consumption centres may call for limiting the 
volume that can be awarded in that area. 
Source: MNRE, 2019a.
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More sophisticated planning methodologies 
may consider several system characteristics, 
such as the amount of flexible reserves or 
inertia, to identify more specific constraints. 
The options for a quantity-based strategy 
are diverse, but various design elements are 
available to enforce the constraints identified 
by the system planner. They are mostly 
focused in the categories related to auction 
demand and qualification requirements.
Auction demand 
The auctioned volume can be determined 
based on the maximum capacity that the 
existing system can accommodate. Zone-
specific capacity limits, based on transmission 
constraints, have been implemented in many 
auctions, including in Germany, Mexico and 
Peru. Zone-specific capacity limits can even be 
set for each technology, as in Kazakhstan where 
solar and wind are distributed among regions 
(see Box 1.5). 
Another design element to consider is the 
demand band that defines what exactly is to 
be procured and under which conditions. Under 
competitive demand bands, bids can compete 
according to defined generation profiles, such 
as a contract that involves energy delivery 
obligations concentrated in defined hours, 
catered to periods of high demand (see IRENA 
and CEM, 2015). 
The auction demand specifications may also call 
for generation bound to a particular profile of 
production, as Thailand’s hybrid auction (Box 3.5).
System constraints may call for innovative 
solutions to guarantee smoother generation 
profiles. To that end, combining different 
technologies with different generation profiles 
in one installation can ensure a more balanced 
generation curve. Moreover, renewable energy 
hybrid projects have higher capacity utilisation 
factors and make fuller use of the grid, thereby 
reducing grid integration costs (USAID and 
MNRE, 2017). In 2018, India released guidelines 
for hybrid wind-solar auctions, with the 
possibility to include storage (Box 3.6).
BOX 3.5  AUCTION FOR DISPATCHABLE GENERATION IN THAILAND
Thailand’s 300 MW auction in 2017 was renewable-exclusive, but the power purchase agreements 
(PPA) required a continuous baseline level of production to ensure a fixed output at specific 
hours, due to system constraints. In particular, the PPAs required the power producer to deliver 
between 98% and 102% of the specified capacity during peak periods (between 9 am and 10 pm on 
weekdays) and limit power output at other times to 66.3% of the capacity.
Project sizes had to be between 10 and 50 MW. Two-thirds (65%) of the baseline requirements were 
expected to be achieved through biomass, biogas and waste-derived fuel, while solar, wind and small 
hydro combined with storage batteries could bring generation up to 100% during the peak daytime 
periods. 
The 300 MW were allocated by region, but unfulfilled capacity demand in one region could be transferred 
to another as long as bidding prices were lower and grid capacity remained available. Projects competed 
according to a percentage discount rate on the fixed portion of the feed-in tariff, with a ceiling price of 
USD 110.9/MWh. 
Such mechanisms generally favour dispatchable power plants, which can more easily deliver electricity 
at peak hours. Indeed, 14 of the 17 winning projects, totalling almost 260 MW, used biomass, with prices 
ranging from USD 60 to 110/MWh. The lowest bid prices were from biomass projects located inside sugar 
mills. The remaining three projects were hybrid solar power plants: one coupled with biogas, one with 
biomass, and one with backup batteries.
Source: Energy Storage, 2017.
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Qualification requirements
Qualification requirements are another design 
element used in quantity-based strategies. The 
bidding documents may require developers 
to obtain a statement from the grid operator 
to the effect that sufficient infrastructure 
exists to accommodate the proposed project. 
The case of South Africa (see Box 3.7) is 
one example of this type of requirement. 
Because documentation submitted during the 
qualification process cannot take into account 
the interactions between various potential 
winners, this approach is often supported by 
other strategies. 
Similar to project-based strategies, quantity-
based strategies are effective only if the 
information upon which the system planner 
relies when setting the constraints of the 
auction is accurate. However, quantity-based 
planning differs from project-based approaches 
in offering bidders greater flexibility on power 
plant design. It does this by presenting a 
range of possible choices of projects, sites 
and potentially even technologies. Although a 
variety of design elements can figure in such 
strategies, a common characteristic of those 
elements is the system limits set at the time 
of the auction. 
As the system ages and evolves, its characteristics 
and limits change, which may lead to sub-
optimal outcomes if auction parameters are not 
kept up to date. Quantity-based strategies do 
not allow for potential cost-benefit trade-offs, 
unlike the strategies described in the following 
sections, for which these considerations are key.
3.4 ADJUSTMENT-BASED STRATEGIES 
The chief difference between quantity-based 
and adjustment-based strategies is that the 
former imposes hard constraints (strict limits) 
on auction outcomes, whereas the latter 
imposes soft ones (penalties or incentives). 
They rely on the application of adjustments 
dictated by factors such as the project location 
or time of generation. This difference allows 
developers to anticipate how, where and when 
energy production will be most valuable to the 
system so they can shape their bids accordingly. 
Adjustment-based strategies, therefore, rely 
strongly on a system operator’s ability to 
forecast how system needs will evolve in order 
to yield the most desirable outcome. 
BOX 3.6  WIND-SOLAR HYBRIDS IN INDIA
In 2018, India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) issued a National Wind-Solar 
Hybrid Policy that sought to optimise the utilisation of infrastructure and better match the 
generation of variable renewable energy (VRE) with the demand profile.
At the end of 2018, the Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) introduced wind-solar hybrid 
auctions, requiring bidders to present co-located projects with a capacity factor of at least 30%. The 
nation-wide auction achieved prices as low as 2.69 INR/kWh (USD 38.7/MWh) for wind-solar hybrids 
in 2019. As resource potential and seasonal generation varies between regions, but the required 
capacity factor and ceiling prices did not differentiate between regions, wind-solar hybrids were 
predominantly awarded in resource-rich states that already had high shares of renewable energy 
generation (Prateek, 2018).
In 2019, SECI advanced its hybrid auctions further. It announced that in its hybrid auctions with 
an “assured peak power supply”, all projects would be remunerated with a fixed off-peak tariff of 
2.70 INR/kWh, but would have to bid the tariff they would require during peak hours (morning and 
evening) (SECI, 2019). Their capacity factor requirement has been set at 35% and can be achieved 
with any renewable energy combination with or without storage. This way SECI seeks to procure 
renewable energy hybrids that further contribute to its demand-supply match.
Source: USAID, 2019.
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BOX 3.7  RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ZONES IN SOUTH AFRICA
Beginning with round five of South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement 
Programme, which has not yet been launched, new rules will improve coordination between 
generation and transmission planning and environmental licensing in eight Renewable Energy 
Development Zones (REDZs) and five Power Corridors. The REDZs seek to concentrate wind and solar 
PV developments in specific geographical areas where investments to strengthen the transmission 
grid will be concentrated. Strategic environmental assessments will also be undertaken in these zones, 
simplifying environmental impact assessments for projects in those areas.
Developers bidding on wind or PV projects in one of the REDZs, or on grid expansion within the Power 
Corridors, must obtain the required documents prior to site selection and the auction. These include 
a confirmation from the grid operator regarding sufficient capacity in designated substations and in 
distribution and transmission lines. Failure to obtain this confirmation may result in disqualification.
Source: IRENA, 2018a.
Adjustment-based strategies allow the potential 
costs of different technological alternatives to 
be factored into an ex ante signal. Trade-offs 
involved in system planning are accounted 
for by penalising market agents who would 
provide services considered less valuable to the 
system. Conversely, services that are considered 
more valuable are incentivised. Whereas a 
price-based strategy (see Section 3.5) relies 
on market prices to incentivise power plant 
operators to provide services most valuable 
to the system, an adjustment-based strategy 
adopts predetermined penalties and incentives. 
Those are designed by the auctioneer to align 
the outcomes of selected projects with future 
system needs. A system used to predict such 
needs may be the so-called emulated markets 
(simulations of the future market based on an 
estimation of system evolution). Adjustment-
based strategies can be achieved through 
design elements that fall into the categories 
of winner selection and risk allocation and 
remuneration of sellers. 
Winner selection 
Grid integration could be made one of the criteria 
for selecting winners, for example, by assigning 
a weight to proximity to the grid or by awarding 
projects bonuses or penalties according to their 
technical characteristics and the stress they impose 
on the system. Projects in less favourable locations 
are thus penalised in the winner-selection process, 
as in Mexico. It is important to note that bonuses 
and penalties in Mexico are only considered for 
ranking projects as part of the winner-selection, 
but ultimately they are not factored into the price. 
Including grid integration in the selection process 
allows for the distribution of the volume auctioned 
across different zones, as long as the availability of 
resources makes up for the costs imposed on the 
system. One example is the Brazilian design, in 
which the expected value of electricity generated 
is incorporated into a cost-benefit index that allows 
for a comparison of generators with different 
seasonal and hourly production profiles. This helps 
select projects that are deemed most valuable to 
the system (see Box 3.8). 
Remuneration of sellers
Adjustment factors can also be applied during 
the operational phase of the power plants 
through risk allocation and remuneration of 
sellers. Before the auction, the auctioneer 
discloses some adjustment factors, which do 
not affect the selection of winners but rather 
the remuneration of the project once it begins 
operations. 
Payments are then subject to the adjustment, 
which may be positive or negative. For 
example, plants that have a generation 
profile matching system needs (according 
to expectations at the time of the auction)3 
may receive additional remuneration (see the 
Mexican case in Section 3.7). Power plants are 
incentivised to produce at times or in locations 
of higher demand (according to expectations 
at the time of the auction). 
3  The profile that must be matched in order to benefit from additional remuneration is the one anticipated when the auction was 
launched. It is not determined by demand in the system at the time the electricity is sold.
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BOX 3.8   INCORPORATING AN EMULATED MARKET CALCULATION INTO BRAZIL’S 
WINNER-SELECTION PROCESS 
For certain technologies in Brazilian energy auctions, winners are selected on the basis of a 
cost-benefit index and not on the basis of price alone. The reasoning behind the index is to 
incorporate, for bid comparison purposes, an expected value of the renewable electricity based 
on its geographical location, hourly profile and seasonal profile.
The second-most important item (after price) in determining the index ranking of a renewable power 
plant is its expected cost of net energy purchases, known as the CEC (custo esperado de compra). The 
CEC is defined as the expected value of spot-market settlements over the plant’s useful life, taking 
into account the difference between the plant’s production profile and the contract’s demand profile. 
It is determined through a simulation in which the system planner attempts to differentiate renewable 
generators at different locations and with different production profiles.
The CEC is calculated for each plant based on its certified production profile. Here, complementarity 
plays an important role. For instance, wind generators located in Brazil’s northeast region complement 
the country’s abundant hydropower, as their output typically increases during the dry season. As such, 
plants with more-pronounced complementarity receive a greater bonus. 
Since adjustments are set ex ante in adjustment-
based strategies, the system operator’s ability 
to forecast how system needs will evolve is 
central to their success. When this strategy 
is applied to technology-neutral auctions, 
comparing technologies with very different 
production profiles could become a concern 
as systems evolve. A system that already has 
high solar penetration, for example, may value 
an additional unit of solar power less than an 
additional unit of wind power and much less 
than an additional unit of hydropower with 
storage (Hirth, 2013). In this sense, the auction 
design should always allow room for correction 
between rounds, as the system evolves.
3.5 PRICE-BASED STRATEGIES
Under a price-based strategy, the auction is 
designed to rely on market prices to signal 
the best VRE production profile. Unlike 
adjustment-based strategies, in which 
adjustments are set ex ante by the system 
operator on the basis of an estimate of future 
system needs, price-based strategies assign 
the responsibility to developers of matching 
generation to system needs. 
This strategy leaves power plant operators 
exposed to market prices and risks, obliging 
them to rely on their own market knowledge 
to develop plants capable of meeting system 
needs while maximising their own revenues. 
Price-based strategies rely on the existence of 
a mature market capable of providing time- and 
location-based price signals, such that price 
formation is cost-reflective and non-distortive, 
and renewable energy producers bear low 
market access risk.  
This strategy draws most heavily on design 
elements related to risk allocation and sellers’ 
remuneration. 
A straightforward method to adopt the price-
based strategy into the auction design is the 
use of fixed and sliding feed-in premiums 
(FiP)4, whereby operators receive a premium 
determined by the auction on top of their 
market revenue. Many European countrieshave 
adopted this type of mechanism, following the 
European Commission’s Guidelines on State 
Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 
for 2014-2020. One such example is Finland 
(see Box 1.10). 
4  While sometimes grouped under the Feed in premium definition, contracts for difference (e.g., in the United Kingdom) are not 
considered in this publication. CfDs do not offer incentives to shift production to hours of higher demand or to do any activity 
toward system integration. The buyer pays the generator when the market price is below the strike price, and the generator 
refunds the difference when the market price exceeds the strike price. As a result, the generator always receives a fixed payment 
(as with a feed-in tariff), regardless of the time of production.
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For both the fixed and sliding feed-in premiums, 
the reference market price can be calculated 
following one of these methods:
•  As an average of wholesale market prices over 
a certain time period (e.g., hourly or monthly)
 • As a weighted market value representing the 
average wholesale market price over a certain 
time period, weighted by the total production 
of a given renewable technology. France and 
Germany adopted the market value price for 
their FiP scheme.
The main difference between the two methods 
is that, for the weighted market value, power 
plants are incentivised to produce in a more 
system-friendly manner than other producers 
from the same technology. As a result, auction 
outcomes can differ substantially, given the 
country’s specific conditions. 
3.6 PRODUCT-BASED STRATEGIES
Another strategy for auctioning system-friendly 
VRE involves focusing on power market products 
(energy, capacity, system services, etc.) rather 
than on the technologies used to produce them. 
The product-based strategy could in time allow 
renewables themselves to supply all the system 
needs. Ultimately, this approach can enable the 
treatment of renewables as any other generator, 
competing for the same products, potentially in 
combination with measures to support flexibility 
such as demand-side management.
Product-based strategies are mainly associated 
with the design category of auction demand, 
but they also involve risk allocation, since 
renewable generators will typically participate 
in ex post financial settlements for the products 
to which they commit.
Auction demand
The main decision pertaining to auction demand 
is to determine the product being auctioned. 
Energy products commit the generator to 
provide a defined quantity of electricity 
throughout the contract’s duration and over a 
certain timeframe (e.g., year, month, day/night). 
Remuneration is proportional to the total 
electricity generated and any positive or 
negative deviations from the agreed quantity 
must be settled within the scope of the contract 
itself (see Chapter 2 and the example of Brazil 
in IRENA and CEM, 2015). Financial agreements 
may force producers to deliver a certain 
amount of electricity during the contract’s 
duration. In this type of agreement, any 
deviations between actual plant generation 
and the quantity committed in the contract 
must be settled at the electricity spot price in 
real time. Chile is one country that has adopted 
this design (IRENA, 2017a).
Capacity products contribute to a power system’s 
security of supply. Suppliers are required to 
ensure that generation facilities meet minimum 
availability standards (e.g., number of operational 
hours per year, excluding failures and maintenance 
stops), and penalised in case of failure. Owing to 
their variability, VRE technologies have generally 
been overlooked as potential contributors to 
adequate capacity. However, depending on their 
characteristics and on the system’s needs, these 
technologies can in fact contribute to security 
of supply – especially when considered as a 
portfolio. Capacity products in Mexican auctions 
are open to VRE technologies. Plants must meet 
a minimum average generation during the 100 
most critical hours of the year.5
Other power sector-related products, such as 
clean energy certificates, can also be auctioned 
and they can mitigate production and price 
risks with increasing shares of VRE. This is 
only effective in the presence of a conducive 
legal framework and a market for certificates. 
In Mexico, Clean Energy Certificates could be 
bundled together with energy and capacity 
products. Auctions for certificates in such a 
context can guarantee long-term certainty 
concerning production and prices, mitigating 
risk for generators and obliged parties. 
Auctions for ancillary services are common and 
open usually only to conventional generators. They 
may be, however, designed to allow renewables 
to provide adequate supplies of services such 
as frequency response, voltage support, system 
reserves and fast response for ramping. 
5 The hours when the difference between available capacity and electricity demand is the smallest.
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Denmark, for example, has adopted this approach, 
and as a result, ancillary services are being 
supplied by wind turbines (Box 3.9). Although 
these ancillary service auctions are quite different 
from classic renewable energy auctions, they allow 
for a portfolio of renewables (potentially including 
flexible resources like storage) to be used to supply 
ancillary services. It should be noted that ancillary 
services provide renewable energy operators with 
an additional stream of revenues, while reducing 
the system’s need for fossil fuel generators. They 
usually do not cover the total cost of a VRE plant 
(nor of a conventional plant). 
3.7 BLENDED STRATEGIES 
An auction design may combine more 
than one implementation strategy, with 
design elements bundled to facilitate the 
accommodation of renewable resources and 
ensure particular system needs. For example, 
an offshore wind auction that is limited to 
selected sites (constraint-based strategy) 
may offer a premium on top of the market 
price (price-based strategy), as in Germany. 
Mexico’s auction design incorporates blended 
strategies described in Box 3.10.
BOX 3.9  AUCTION FOR ANCILLARY SERVICES IN DENMARK 
In Denmark, the system operator Energinet procures ancillary services through auctions to ensure 
stable and reliable system operation. The services, provided by generators, are divided into two 
groups, depending on whether they are supplied in Western Denmark (DK1 group) or Eastern 
Denmark (DK2 group).
•  DK1 group ancillary services include primary reserve, secondary reserve, manual reserves and     
properties required to maintain power system stability.
•  DK2 group ancillary services include frequency-controlled disturbance reserve, frequency-controlled  
normal operation reserve, secondary reserve, manual reserves and services required to maintain 
power system stability.
Wind power plants, which provide the bulk of ancillary services in Denmark, may participate in the 
auction along with another production technology that can guarantee supply if the wind turbines are 
unable to deliver the required amount.
Source: Energinet, 2017.
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BOX 3.10  BLENDED STRATEGIES IN MEXICO’S AUCTIONS 
Mexico’s auctions are among the most complex in the world. They have design elements 
linked to strategies based on products, quantities, adjustments and prices.  Starting in 2013, 
Mexico underwent a market reform. One of the reform’s main goals was to foster private sector 
investment in clean energy, while minimising the associated cost. Auctions were among the 
main instruments of choice to that end. The auction demand for energy, capacity and Clean Energy 
Certificates (CEC) is the main element of the product-based strategy. Energy and capacity products 
are part of the technology-neutral mid-term auctions under three-year contracts. Energy, capacity and 
CECs can be procured in the long-term as part of 15-year contracts for energy and capacity and 20-
year contracts for CECs.  Winners are selected based on geographic limits as part of a quantity-based 
strategy. The long-term auctions limit the capacity that may be contracted in defined zones. The limits 
are determined by the system operator according to transmission grid constraints. 
Winners are also selected based on geographic signals and are remunerated according to geographical 
and temporal signals as part of an adjustment-based strategy. This helps reflect the need for electricity 
at a given location and time (hourly): 
•  The geographical signals in the winner-selection criteria entail adjusted offers: the submitted 
bids are adjusted by a locational premium or penalty. These premiums or penalties serve only for 
bid comparison purposes, but once the project is awarded, the locational factor does not affect 
developers’ remuneration (see Mexico case study in IRENA, 2017a).
•  Regarding sellers’ remuneration, the auctioneer discloses a long-term set of hourly and locational 
adjustment factors prior to the auction. The adjustments are calculated based on an estimation 
of system needs and projected spot prices (up to 2030). When generators produce in line with 
system needs, they receive a surplus remuneration, while production at a less opportune time 
is penalised. For instance, an awarded 36.3 USD/(MWh+CEC) bid in Sonora state can bring the 
remuneration up to 43.8 USD/(MWh+CEC), if the generator produces electricity at 6 pm on a 
summer day. The same bid can reduce remuneration to USD 33.7/(MWh + CEC) if the generator 





















































Figure 3.2  Adjustment factors in Mexico’s first auction
Electricity generated when market prices are negative is not considered toward the amount that a 
generator is required to deliver, as part of the price-based strategy. Subjecting project developers to a 
spot-price risks, incentivises them to perform in line with system needs. 
Sources: CENACE, 2018; Guadarrama, 2018.
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IN FOCUS: CURTAILMENT OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY
A VRE-rich power system needs to be highly 
flexible. It must be able to match demand and 
supply on any timescale, both in periods of high 
and low VRE production. A prime indicator of 
insufficient system flexibility is the curtailment 
of VRE, a reduction of the output of a generator 
from what could otherwise have been produced 
given available resources. Curtailment may be 
imposed by the system operator to address an 
oversupply of generation during low load periods, 
but it may also result from congestion, lack of 
access to transmission lines, voltage conflicts or 
interconnection problems (Bird et al., 2014). 
While some low level of curtailment of 
renewables becomes inevitable when VRE 
accounts for a high share of the energy in the 
system, large scale curtailment has severe 
consequences owing to the reduction of the 
share of renewable-based electricity consumed 
and potentially discouraging further investment 
in renewables. For generators, curtailment 
represents a significant loss in economic value, 
and the risk of curtailment, a component of the 
volume risk faced by bidders, should be avoided 
when possible. 
Auction design may aim to minimise curtailment 
risks, pending a broader transformation of 
the power system, through the selection of 
system-friendly projects that can be easily 
accommodated by the power system. Models 
for the allocation of curtailment risks vary, 
ranging from those where the off-taker assumes 
full responsibility, to those where the generator 
is fully liable – with shared responsibility 
falling between these two extremes. In both 
cases, strategies targeted at minimising the 
risk of congestion or lack of infrastructure 
needed include prohibiting building new 
capacity in congested areas, through quantity-
based strategies, for example, or incentivising 
developers toward non-congested areas, 
through an adjustment-based strategy. 
Shielding generators from curtailment risks 
is especially relevant to developing markets 
where risk perception is already relatively 
high, or where information on power dispatch 
and grid quality is not complete enough for 
bidders to incorporate curtailment risk into 
the bid price. The off-taker can take on these 
risks by, for example, committing to paying for 
electricity generated even when it is curtailed, 
similar to a take-or-pay model. This is the case 
in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia, 
among many other countries. The take-or-pay 
model features in most project-based strategies, 
as the developer has no say in the selection of 
the project location or technology. In auctions 
that are not project-specific, the take-or-pay 
model may incentivise inefficient investments 
– for example, if bidders focus more on the 
theoretical potential than on supplying energy to 
the grid. The curtailment costs of the take-or-pay 
model may be passed on to the consumers in 
their electricity bills or they could be borne by 
the system operator. 
3.8 CONCLUSIONS ON VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT
Many strategies can be incorporated into an 
auction’s design to support the integration of 
VRE. The choice of strategy and design elements 
should be tailored to specific circumstances 
such as the structure of the power market and 
the level of development of the sector, among 
other factors. While auctions without any form of 
temporal, locational or technology price signals, 
among others, do not pose significant challenges 
to the integration of VRE at low shares, a failure 
to adapt the auction design to future system 
needs may lead to additional long-term costs 
and systematic integration challenges. As a final 
note, auction design alone cannot provide a 
complete solution to the challenge of integrating 
high shares of VRE. That will require structural 
changes in the configuration of the power system 
(IRENA, forthcoming-a).
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In the latter case, the cost of take-or-pay 
payments to generators should be weighed 
against the cost of ensuring the grid 
infrastructure needed to accommodate the 
full potential of renewable energy assets. The 
solution is context-specific and depends on the 
long-term planning of the system.  
Recent years have seen a shift toward 
remuneration mechanisms that allocate greater 
risk to generators, including curtailment risk. 
Assigning the curtailment risks to generators 
may encourage the selection of less congested 
sites, although forecasted curtailment 
is typically factored in financial models, 
potentially resulting in higher bid prices. Price-
based strategies can expose developers to the 
risk of very low (or negative) prices thereby 
penalising them for excessive generation in 
periods of low demand. 
Subjecting renewable generators to spot prices 
may encourage them to curtail their production 
when the price of energy is below zero. In 
Finland, Namibia and Sri Lanka, for example, 
generation not delivered due to curtailment 
is not accounted for in the remuneration of 
generators. Assigning the curtailment risk 
to generators may deter financiers that are 
sensitive to perceived risks. 
One approach that minimises the impact of 
risk of curtailment in price-based strategies is 
through the adoption of a feed-in premium, 
whereby the premium offered on top of the 
market price could be suspended during hours 
when the price falls below a certain threshold, 
signalling that additional power is not needed.
Another option to allocate curtailment risk 
is through a product-based strategy. The 
auctioneer specifies the time periods during 
which electricity must be delivered. Given this 
information, developers can find innovative 
solutions to avoid curtailment that may happen 
in the periods when energy is not requested. 
Developers may choose, for example, to 
couple the generating technology together 
with storage. 
When assigning curtailment risks to the 
generators, a common feature is to set an 
annual curtailment threshold above which the 
generator is compensated for curtailed energy. 
In Portugal, where the flexibility of the power 
system is guaranteed by hydropower plants and 
interconnectors, legislation restricts curtailment 
of renewable energy generation except in the 
case of technical problems. In those cases, wind 
producers take on the risk of the initial 50 hours 
and are compensated for losses that exceed 50 
hours at full capacity (USAID, 2015; WindEurope, 
2016). In Japan, in contrast, utilities can curtail 
wind and solar generation for 30 days without 
compensation or even for an unlimited time if 
the capacity newly added to the grid exceeds a 
centrally defined limit (Kimura, 2017). 
Developers’ concern of unlimited curtailment 
risk can slow renewables deployment down.
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4SUPPORTING A JUST AND INCLUSIVE ENERGY TRANSITION 
1  IRENA recognises the role of competitive prices in the fair 
and inclusive transition – for example, in their effect on the 
affordability of electricity. However, this chapter focuses on 
the broader benefits to be gained through the development 
of a renewable energy sector domestically.
The energy transition has the potential 
to positively impact the global economy 
and welfare, and create new employment 
opportunities which may affect communities, 
households and an estimated 58 million 
workers employed – directly or indirectly – in 
the global energy sector in the year 2050 
(IRENA forthcoming-b). Policies favouring rapid 
deployment of renewable energy have at times 
side-stepped the social dimensions, which 
should figure alongside technical, economic 
and political factors in determining how the 
energy transition unfolds. The notion of a just 
and inclusive transition implies an equitable 
allocation of opportunities to raise the chances 
that positive outcomes are broadly shared (e.g., 
new employment, domestic industries), that 
adverse implications are limited (i.e., the loss 
of jobs in disappearing sectors), and that any 
misalignments between positive and negative 
dynamics are proactively addressed. If the 
transition to a renewable energy based system 
is to fulfil its potential, policies must take into 
account that an evolving energy sector is part 
of the broader socio-economic system (IRENA 
forthcoming-b).
From a competitive perspective, auctions can 
yield an economically efficient allocation of 
resources, but their outcomes may be less than 
optimal from other perspectives, depending on 
country-specific policies and objectives.1  For 
example, they may not produce a diversified 
landscape of actors or generate the shared 
benefits envisioned for a just and inclusive 
transition (Fell, 2017). Such outcomes are 
particularly likely when the pursuit of such 
benefits is not integrated into auction design. 
Indeed, auctions focused purely on price may 
result in geographical clustering, the crowding 
out of small and medium-sized project 
developers, the centralisation of market power, 
and the potential exclusion of communities from 
decision-making processes (Fell, 2017; del Río 
and Linares, 2014). Fortunately, many design 
options are available to policymakers seeking 
to reconcile transition-related objectives with 
broader development goals. 
This chapter analyses how auctions can adapt 
to address issues around a just and inclusive 
energy transition. It evaluates design elements 
intended to include small and new players, foster 
the development of local industries, create local 
jobs, contribute to subnational development and 
engage communities. These design elements, 
effective as they may be, are only part of a 
broader policy framework to ensure a more just 
and inclusive energy transition. This framework 
promotes renewables deployment as a catalyst 
of economic, inclusive and sustainable growth 
and it rests on three transformative sets of 
policies: deployment, enabling and integrating 
policies (Box 4.1).
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BOX 4.1  A BROAD POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR A JUST AND INCLUSIVE ENERGY TRANSITION
Auctions designed to contribute to a just and inclusive energy transition are only effective if they 
are introduced in co-ordination with the following enabling policies (Figure 4.1): 1) industrial policies 
that aim to leverage and enhance domestic capabilities (e.g., through requiring business incubation 
initiatives, support for research and development, supplier development programmes, support for 
small and medium enterprises, and promotion of key industry clusters); 2) education and skills policies 
that help build/augment technical capacity and technological learning (i.e.,, a focus on the science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields) and build know-how in several non-technical 
professions critical to renewable energy; 3) labour market and social protection policies including 
those that promote employment services (e.g., matching jobs with qualified applicants, facilitating 
on- and off-job training), measures to facilitate labour mobility, and social protection measures where 
needed; and 4) financial policies aimed at mobilising revenue streams through carbon pricing and other 
measures, including green bonds, and devising revenue recycling schemes to ensure a just transition. 
These enabling policies are part of a broader framework that includes integrating measures targeted at 
integrating renewables in daily lives. Prime examples are behavioural policies or measures to enhance 
system flexibility (IRENA, IEA and REN21, 2018; IRENA, forthcoming-b).











2  This report does not aim to establish a small player criterion for auctions. It does, however, recognise the edge that large players 
have over small companies and communities.
4.1 INCLUSION OF SMALL/NEW PLAYERS 
Renewable energy auctions remain an efficient 
and effective pathway to attract large-scale 
investors and achieve low prices. At the same 
time, high transaction costs associated with the 
administrative procedures required to take part 
in an auction (e.g., qualification requirements) 
can raise barriers for small and new players and 
could lead to growing market concentration. 
In fact, among the weaknesses of auctions is their 
tendency to favour large players that have greater 
capacity – financial and reputational (i.e., related 
to experience) – to compete. In general, even 
when small or new players manage to overcome 
the administrative burdens to enter the auction, 
they are disadvantaged compared to larger 
players that can bid lower prices by leveraging 
larger portfolios or broader financing options. 
Consequently, small-scale actors are likely to 
perceive and experience auction frameworks 
as discriminatory and restrictive (Fell, 2017). 
Although it is recognised that large multinational 
players bring benefits such as technology 
transfer and higher project completion rates, the 
engagement of small-scale actors in the energy 
transition is an important way to maximise 
inclusiveness and socio-economic benefits. 
Smaller actors are likely to be more attentive to 
opportunities for localised hiring and sourcing of 
inputs than players who serve markets worldwide 
from a limited number of production or service 
hubs. In emerging economies, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) are responsible for up to 
45% of employment and 33% of GDP, respectively 
(IFC, 2010). To that end, some countries are 
making efforts to promote the participation in 
auctions of small companies and so-called energy 
communities, which are discussed below. 
Renewable energy auctions are flexible in design 
and can accommodate elements to encourage 
the participation of new and small players. This 
section begins with a definition of the players 
that are considered small and new. It then 
analyses the design elements that can support 
their participation in auctions, pertaining to the 
categories of auction demand, qualification 
requirements, winner selection in addition to 
risk allocation and sellers’ remuneration. 
Definition of small and new players
New players are defined as recent entrants 
to the market, while the definition of small 
players varies from country to country.2  Small 
companies are usually categorised by the 
number of employees. In the United States, 
firms with less than 500 workers can be 
categorised as small businesses (depending 
on the industry, the number can be as high 
as 1,500). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development categorises SMEs 
as firms with fewer than 250 workers and breaks 
its definition down further into micro enterprises 
(fewer than 10 workers), small enterprises 
(10 to 49 workers) and medium-sized enterprises 
(50 to 249 workers). Other indicators used to 
categorise companies by size include sales, 
annual revenues and profits, and assets, among 
others. In Mexico, micro-enterprises are those 
with fewer than 10 employees and annual 
sales below MXN 4 million (~USD 210,500); 
small companies have less than 30 employees 
and annual sales of MXN 100 million (~USD 
5.3 million), at the most (SE, 2019). The small 
enterprises’ definition in China includes firms 
with ten times more employees than in Mexico, 
but half of the annual sales (CNY 20 million; 
~USD 2.8 million) (MIIT, 2012).
Community ownership (CO) structures 
allow small-scale actors such as households, 
individuals and businesses to unite in investing, 
developing and operating energy assets. By 
sharing costs, CO models enable participants 
to own assets with lower levels of investment. 
CO projects tend to be small: around 50 kW 
to 10 MW. While energy generation is their 
most common purpose, CO initiatives can also 
deploy energy storage, energy efficiency, and 
distribution, as well as district heating and 
cooling systems. 
More generally, a CO project is characterised 
by local stakeholders owning most of the 
project, voting rights and control resting with 
a community-based organisation, or most 
of the project’s socio-economic benefits 
being distributed locally (IRENA Coalition for 
Action, 2018).  
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There are presently over 4,000 CO initiatives 
globally, primarily in Australia, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States (REN21, 2016; Interreg 
Europe, 2018). The legal models vary depending 
on each country context, but the most popular 
are cooperatives, partnerships and associations 
(Table 4.1).
An inclusive auction focuses on providing a 
level playing field for all participants. This may 
be done for example, by offering exceptions to 
small players to reduce the up-front costs of 
preparing for the auction or by compensating 
their projects beyond their pricing offers as 
in Germany (see Box 4.3). Loosening pre-
qualification requirements may have negative 
consequences, however, such as increasing the 
risk that a project may not be built. Taking this 
trade-off into account, design elements that can 
support the participation of newly established 
or small companies and communities may take 
various forms, as discussed below.
Auction demand 
In the design category of auction demand, a 
share of the total volume auctioned can be 
set aside for small and new players. Limiting 
project size may also increase their chances, 
in cases where they do not have the capacity 
to develop large projects. The Japanese solar 
PV auction is one case in point (Box 4.2). 
Large developers are generally not keen on 
competing for small projects, leaving the way 
open for small actors, as demonstrated by 
South Africa’s Small Projects IPP Procurement 
Programme, introduced in 2013 (IRENA, 2018a). 
The solar auctions in the Indian state of Punjab 
have used both: a share of the total volume 
auctioned dedicated to small/new players and 
an upper limit on project size. A 2011 auction 
had an upper limit of 20 MW, which was later 
increased to 100 MW for the 2014 auction. In 
2013, a portion of the demand (50 MW) was 
reserved for relatively small-scale projects 
(<5MW) for which only newly established 
companies could compete. The remaining 
250 MW was reserved for well-established 
companies with project sizes between 5 and 




Co-operatives are jointly owned by their members to achieve common 
economic, social or cultural goals based on the democratic principle 
of “one member, one vote”.
PARTNERSHIPS 
Individual partners own shares in the partnership. The key objective of 
the partnership firm is to generate profits for the partners, in addition to 
any other benefits of the project. Unlike co-operatives, partnerships may 
not operate on the basis of “one member, one vote”. Nor do partnership 
firms rely solely on volunteers, as co-operatives do. They may employ 
full-time staff to provide expertise needed for specific projects. 
NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
A non-profit is formed by investments from its members, who are 
responsible for financing the organisation but receive no profits. Profits 
are re-invested in projects focused on community development.
COMMUNITY TRUSTS/
FOUNDATIONS 
Trusts and foundations use the returns from investments in community 
projects for specific local purposes. These benefits are also shared 
with people who are not able to invest directly in the projects. 
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS 
A form of non-profit, associations offer housing to low-income 
families and individuals.
TABLE 4.1  COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP LEGAL MODELS
Source: IRENA, forthcoming-c.
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BOX 4.2   INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF SMALL PLAYERS 
IN THE 2019 SOLAR AUCTION IN JAPAN 
Japan had four rounds of solar PV auctions by 2019. In the last round, changes were made related 
to minimum project size and the ceiling price. The first three solar PV auctions had a minimum 
project size requirement of 2 MW, which was reduced to 500 kW in 2019, with plans for a further 
reduction to 250 kW in the future (Kageyama, 2018). The (undisclosed) ceiling price of JPY 14/kWh 
(USD 132/MWh)a was higher than expected at JPY 13 and 13.5/kWh (BNEF, 2019a). Between the third 
and fourth rounds, the auction saw a three-fold increase in the number of bids registered, indicating an 
increased interest from market players, and a nine-fold increase in the number of bids awarded (Bellini, 
2019b, 2019c and BNEF, 2019a). As shown in Figure 4.2, the majority of projects awarded are below the 
previous 2 MW size limit. 
 
 
Interestingly, the increased participation of small and new players did not prevent prices from falling 
between rounds three and four. The average price decreased from JPY 15.2/kWh (USD 135/MWh)b in 
the third auction to just below JPY 13/kWh (USD 122/MWh) in the fourth. In fact, as Figure 4.2 shows, 
the majority of the projects below 2 MW bid lower than the four projects above 2 MW, implying that 
economies of scale do not seem to play a major role in the Japanese context: the lowest bids – as 
low as JPY 10.5/kWh (USD 99/MWh) – were all for projects below 2 MW. Similarly, many winners are 
not established market players, suggesting that experience is not a determining factor in winning an 
auction. It should be noted that undersubscription persisted in the fourth round from previous rounds. 
This outcome may be attributed to difficulties in securing land and obtaining grid-connection permits, 
mostly impacting large-scale projects. Moreover, solar PV projects above 40 MW are subject to stricter 
environmental assessment rules. This could be one of the reasons large-scale projects do not benefit 
from economies of scale when it comes to bid prices in Japan.
a 1 USD = 106 JPY in September 2019. b 1 USD = 112 JPY in December 2018.
The arrangement of the auction can also 
incentivise or discourage the participation of 
small-scale actors. Generally, developers face 
a higher degree of competition in technology-
neutral auctions, given the large pool of 
projects that are eligible and the fierce price 
competition introduced by some technologies 
(IRENA and CEM, 2015). Therefore, technology-
specific auctions, which limit the pool of 
eligible projects and can be tailored to address 
technology-specific challenges, can encourage 
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Sources: GIO, 2019 and BNEF, 2019a.
Figure 4.2  Project size and bid price of awarded projects in the fourth solar auction in Japan
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BOX 4.3   CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING INCENTIVES FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT  
IN GERMANY’S WIND AUCTIONS
In Germany, community ownership (CO) projects proliferated as a result of preferential rules in 
wind auctions following the country’s renewable energy law. Under these preferential rules, citizen 
wind projects had up to two years after winning a bid to obtain a building permit, unlike other 
bidders, which had to present the permit at the moment of bid submission. It also split their bid bond into 
two payments: EUR 15/kW (USD 16.95/kW)a at bid submission and EUR 15/kW after obtaining the building 
permit; extended the project implementation period by two years (to a four-year implementation period); 
and awarded bids based on uniform pricing as per the highest offer, instead of pay-as-bid. 
As a result of the more favourable conditions, the first three rounds until November 2017 awarded over 
90% of the total auction volume of 2,890 MW to CO projects. In fact, most of the COs participating in 
the auctions were formed just before the 30 June deadline set in the Renewable Energy Resource Act, 
and with a small number of members. Notwithstanding, Germany’s experience with exceptions for CO 
wind projects prove that designing incentives for community engagement can be challenging. 
First, as of June 2019, only 167 MW of the 2,688 MW that were awarded to citizen wind parks had 
obtained a building permit, reflecting the general permitting challenges faced. Second, the requirements 
for a project to qualify as community-ownedb were perceived as vague, at times allowing stakeholders 
that would otherwise not be eligible to take advantage of the preferential rules. In particular, the 
requirement referring to 51% voting rights in the hands of residents allowed for external capital 
contributions and thus for the involvement of established developers in the auctions.
Ultimately, most of the projects presented as community-owned were developed by just three 
players, one of which participated in as many as 60 awarded projects with a total volume of 1 GW. The 
preferential treatment thus came to be perceived as distorting the auctions, to an extent that the lenient 
bidding requirements were abolished after three rounds. Thereafter, the share of CO projects in auctions 
declined dramatically from more than 90% in 2017 to less than 16% at the end of 2018. The diversity of 
bidders also decreased in the 2018 auctions.
While having only a handful of developers involved in energy communities may not be conducive to 
market decentralisation, such an arrangement can be beneficial for both COs and developers. Although 
CO projects can be initiated by citizens, they are typically planned and implemented by developers 
who have the required expertise. A survey of the German experience showed that 75% of COs chose 
voluntarily to partner with a developer. In turn, the developers indicated that their incentive in partnering 
with COs lay mainly in reduced administrative burdens. 
The building permit exemption for citizen wind parks is suspended until June 2020. This could open the 
discussion of whether alternative means to promote community engagement might be more successful. 
Alas, the suspension is expected to be extended.
Sources: Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 2017; Bundesnetzagentur, 2017; 
Erneuerbare Energien, 2017; GWEA, 2017; Klessmann and Tiedemann, 2017; Tenk, 2018; Clearingstelle EEG-
KWKG, 2019;  Fachagentur Windenergie an Land, 2019;  Grashof et al., 2019 and WWEA, 2019. 
Germany’s wind auctions are a case in point; 
they were more successful at attracting small 
wind firms (Box 4.3) than were the technology-
neutral auctions (referred to as joint auctions) 
that were not able to attract any wind projects. 
More specifically, site- and project-specific 
auctions may be more attractive to small players 
because they require less documentation as 
part of their qualification requirements. 
a 1 USD = 0.884 EUR in May 2016. 
b  The requirements included: 1) having at least 10 persons as voting shareholders, 2) residents in the project 
district holding a minimum of 51% of the voting rights, and 3) no single shareholder holding more than 10% 
of the voting rights.
70
Qualification requirements
Qualification requirements are introduced to 
ensure a higher degree of commitment (IRENA 
and CEM, 2015). At the same time, overly strict 
requirements (whether material or financial) 
may bar small and new actors from participating 
(Fell, 2017). Site-specific documentation such 
as building and environmental permits may 
represent an obstacle for small and new actors, 
which are more prone to participate in auctions 
in which these requirements are relaxed. The 
first three rounds of Germany’s wind auctions 
are one example (Box 4.3). Some auctions 
have included community engagement as a 
bidding requirement but without encouraging 
community-owned projects to bid. The 
Australian state of Victoria is one example of 
this approach (Box 4.4). 
Requirements to submit evidence of past 
experience and the financial capability to 
shoulder the project, reasonable as they may be, 
also put small and new actors at a disadvantage. 
In some contexts, it may be enough to require 
bidders to submit evidence of their current 
technical capacity to execute a given project 
to allow them to compete in the auction. 
In other words, a shift from bidder-centric 
criteria, based purely on experience or financial 
capacity, to project-centric pre-qualification 
criteria can facilitate the participation of small 
and new players. In this case, quality control 
requirements based on the offered project 
(for example, proofs of building consent, grid 
access, or land acquisition) would be prioritised 
over bidders’ past experience.
BOX 4.4  COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 
Proof of community engagement was part of the qualification requirements for the state 
of Victoria’s 2017 renewable energy auction scheme. The requirement was designed 
to encourage initiatives that empower communities. Qualifying evidence could include 
social risk analysis, community engagement strategies, benefit sharing programs, reporting, 
monitoring and evaluation plans, or letters of support. Yet at the end of the auction, none of 
the six awarded project developers were small enterprises or community power initiatives. 
Because community initiatives were only starting to take off at the time of the auction, and because the 
auction was technology-neutral, community projects were not in a position to compete against larger 
and more established players. In fact, high up-front costs for proposal preparation, along with the inability 
to exploit economies of scale, hindered the participation of communities and other small-scale actors. 
Thus, the state government of Victoria had to employ other support schemes, such as grant funding 
(Renewable Communities Program), to promote and support community energy power initiatives. 
Alternatively, pairing Victoria’s original objectives with some of the auction demand elements 
discussed in this chapter could also foster community energy projects deployment. 
Source: Victoria State Government, 2019.
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3  USD 51.14/MWh and USD 25.64/CEC in the first auction; USD 40.01 and USD 20.00/CEC in the second. The USD/(MWh+CEC) ceiling was 
kept constant for the third auction. There were slight changes in the USD/MWh and USD/CEC amounts that balanced out in the end.
4 A more detailed discussion of the effect of auctions and project finance can be found in AURES II (2019).
Winner selection
Among the design elements falling under the 
category of winner selection, criteria that go 
beyond price may help attract smaller players, 
as they are usually not capable of engaging in 
bidding wars with larger players. Small-scale 
developers may obtain higher scores for high 
percentages of community control and co-
operation, diversity in the project development 
consortium, and partnerships with local 
organisations. Furthermore, projects may earn 
points for contributions to a community benefit 
fund, efforts to strengthen local education and 
awareness raising, among others. In the South 
African Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), 
qualified bids are evaluated based on price (70%) 
and contributions to economic development 
(30%). The economic development criteria 
consider black and local shareholders in the 
company, in addition to procurement from small, 
medium and micro enterprises (IRENA, 2018a).
The inclusion of small and new players can also 
be promoted by limits on the number of projects 
or total volume that can be awarded to a single 
player. Colombia’s first auction in 2019 used a 
measure of market concentration to detect high 
concentrations of bids from a limited number 
of players (see Box 1.7). The measured value 
was almost three times higher than the ex ante 
criterion to be met, implying that just one bidder 
represented 88% of the market share, and a 
second bidder the remaining 12%. No award was 
made (UPME, 2019).
Ceiling prices above which bids are not 
considered may exclude small and new players 
by preventing them from participating in the 
auction, even if, once other design elements 
are considered, they might have a chance of 
prevailing. In Mexico, disclosed ceiling prices for 
the first, second and third auctions were as low as 
USD 76.68/(MWh+clean energy certificate (CEC)) 
and USD 60.01/(MWh+CEC)3 (IRENA, 2017a). The 
low ceiling price may have discouraged small 
players from participating, which may be one of 
the reasons why the auctions were dominated 
by large and international players better able to 
compete, such as Acciona, Électricité de France 
(EDF), Enel, Engie, Jinko Solar, SunPower and 
X-Elio Energy.
Risk allocation and sellers’ remuneration. 
Under the category of risk allocation and sellers’ 
remuneration, a requirement of (excessive) 
financial guarantees – i.e., commitment bonds 
– may be only a minor barrier for large and 
established developers, but a very challenging 
one for smaller actors, particularly since financial 
guarantees are often financed through equity..4 
Given the limited financial capacity of small 
companies and community power initiatives, 
it may be necessary to reduce the amount of 
the deposits necessary to secure such bonds, 
or to develop ways in which less-solvent actors 
can manage this burden. In Germany, the bid 
bond at the initial bidding stage was reduced 
from EUR 30/kW (USD 33.9/kW) to EUR 15/kW 
(USD 16.95/kW) for communities – the other 
EUR 15/kW coming due once the building permit 
was obtained. Regarding project completion 
time, the German wind auctions also allow 
communities a longer project implementation 
period (see Box 4.3). However, such a choice can 
have negative impacts on completion rates if no 
alternative penalty system is in place.
Small and new players also tend to have 
smaller profit margins than their larger 
counterparts and rely greatly on transparent 
and fair remuneration schemes. To that end, 
preferential rule schemes could benefit small-
scale projects, particularly when marginal 
pricing is introduced. In those, bidders could 
receive remuneration higher than their bid 
price. For example, the community wind 
projects in Germany are granted a price equal 
to the highest awarded bid in the auction in 
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BOX 4.5  REORIENTING ECONOMIES DEPENDENT UPON FOSSIL FUELS
A just transition can address the positive and negative aspects of structural change by:
•  Pursuing pro-active planning and investments to drive economic diversification in support of the 
energy transition;
•  Identifying local economic capacities and seeking ways to leverage them in support of 
renewable energy development;
•  Foreseeing evolving skills needs in the renewable energy sector and matching them with 
available skills in the local economy;
•  Aligning, to the extent feasible, relevant expertise and skills from the fossil fuel sector (e.g., using 
offshore oil and gas industry expertise in offshore wind development) and re-training and re-
skilling existing labour in the fossil fuel sector (e.g., coal miners) to integrate them into the 
renewable energy sector; 
• Developing active labour market policies to help individuals who lose their jobs find new livelihoods;
•  Introducing adequate measures to manage the transition for fossil-fuel-dependent communities, 
including social protection measures. 
Past economic adjustment processes suggest that re-orienting fossil-fuel-dependent regions is likely 
to take time and is not always certain to succeed. Acquiring new skills can be a resource-intensive 
process. Further, new job creation in the renewable energy sector will not necessarily be neatly aligned, 
temporally or geographically, with fossil fuel job loss – hence the need for appropriate social protection 
measures for affected communities. Governments also may choose to develop public work programmes 
to bridge the period required for revitalising local and regional economies.
Sources: IRENA,forthcoming-b; World Bank, 2018; World Bank, ESMAP, and SERIS, 2019.
which they participate (the uniform-pricing-
principle), in contrast to other players who 
(if successful) receive only their own bid price 
(pay-as-bid) (see Box 4.3). 
Uniform pricing enabled citizen wind parks 
to offer lower bids in the expectation that 
ordinary bidders with higher bid levels would 
set the clearing price level. Moreover, citizen 
wind projects have also been allowed to base 
their bids on future wind turbines with better 
yields, while other bidders had to base their 
bids on current models (the turbine model 
must be stated in the building permit). 
In sum, auction design elements are flexible 
and can enhance the participation of small and 
new actors. While the actors may not be able 
to exploit economies of scale, they are drivers 
of growth, employment and development in 
many economies. Facilitating the participation 
of local communities and small and new 
players in auctions can foster the development 
of local supply chains and industries, as 
discussed below.
4.2  DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL 
INDUSTRIES 
Auctions can be designed to serve broader socio-
economic development objectives in addition to 
the deployment of renewable energy capacity. The 
secondary objective most commonly sought is 
that of fostering local development through new 
industries and supply chains. This is perceived as 
especially important at a time when structural 
changes, such as those promised by the energy 
transition, are disrupting traditional sectors, with 
implications for the economy and communities 
(Box 4.5). In addition to policies discussed in 
Box 4.1, nascent industries can be supported 
by stimulating demand for locally sourced 
equipment and services. To that end, developers 
of large projects are often required or encouraged 
(through incentives) to use a minimum threshold 
of local goods and services (UNCTAD, 2014). 
Local content requirements (LCRs) can be 
introduced as qualification requirements to 
participate in the auction or as one of the criteria 
for the selection of winners. But LCRs often raise 
a legal concern. 
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Qualification requirements
LCRs can be introduced in auction qualification 
requirements, by restricting participation to 
developers who comply to a predefined minimum 
threshold of local content (Steinhilber and 
Rosenlund, 2016). Such requirements have been 
seen in Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom, among many others. They have had a 
mixed outcome, depending on policy design, local 
context and implementation (Box 4.6). 
Winner selection
Auctions can support local industries through 
their criteria for winner selection. Multi-
criteria auctions can attribute higher scores to 
participants willing to draw on local value chains. 
China’s LCR in onshore wind auctions began at 
50% in 2003, before being raised to 70% in 2005. 
It was abolished in 2009, but grants under the 
“Special Fund for Wind Power Manufacturing” 
that were contingent on LCRs continued until 
2011. The LCR – coupled with favourable market 
conditions, such as large volumes auctioned and 
substantial public financial support – helped 
to develop the wind turbine manufacturing 
industry. Few foreign companies were able 
to compete in wind auctions, given the price 
competitiveness of local equipment (IRENA, 
2013). The subsequent removal of LCRs enabled 
the importation of products of higher quality and 
increased foreign investment and technology 
transfer (OECD, 2015). 
As previously mentioned, South Africa’s REIPPPP 
is a multi-criteria auction, using both price (70% 
of the score) and economic development (30% 
of the score) to determine the winning bid. The 
auction’s economic development criteria reflect 
specific national and governmental priorities. 
These include, for instance, broad-based black 
economic empowerment codes as measurable 
criteria for the selection of winners (see Table 2.4).
Auction demand
Finally, local products can be supported by 
reserving a specific volume of auction demand 
for projects with certain levels of local content. In 
India, separate auctions were conducted in 2013 
for projects that committed to meet a given level 
of local content (see IRENA and CEM, 2015). 
Lessons learned for supporting  
local industries through auction design
If well designed, LCRs can be an important 
industrial policy tool to provide a conducive 
environment for the development of a nascent 
domestic renewable energy industry, albeit 
often at a higher price, at least at initial stages. 
Their anticipated positive effects are more likely 
to manifest in cases where they are coupled with 
sufficiently large and stable market volumes, 
where industrial sectors are already established, 
and when accompanied by long-term planning. 
They are most effective when included as part 
of a broad mix of policies related to trade, 
labour and strengthening of local industries 
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In Brazil, a local content requirement (LCR) for wind projects – one involving eligibility for subsidised 
loans; not for the right to bid – led to the successful development of local wind supply chains. But 
a cancellation of wind auctions in 2016, followed by a change in turbine size requirement (to 3 MW 
from 2 MW in previous rounds), posed challenges for local manufacturers (Spatuzza, 2018).
In Saudi Arabia, the solar PV auction in 2017 had a moderate LCR of 30%. Upon its completion in 
2019, the Sakaka PV independent power producer (IPP) registered over 30% of contractual local 
content during the construction and development phases. It has also committed to a 100% local 
employment rate within the first year of operation, 90% of the workforce comprised by the youth of Al 
Jouf region where the project is located (Bellini, 2019d). 
In South Africa, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
had LCR thresholds that started at 45% for solar PV and 40% for other technologies, with 
targets reaching 65% over the rounds (IRENA, 2018a). Commitments for local content for all 
procured projects were approximated at USD 4.7 billion (ZAR 67.1 billion)a, amounting to 45% of total 
project value. This boosted local manufacturing: imports of solar PV and wind turbine components 
declined and a small export industry started to develop (IRENA, forthcoming-c). However, an unrelated 
and unexpected development —a three-year delay in signing power purchase agreements from past 
rounds— resulted in most of those factories either closing down or reducing operations (SAWEA, 2019).
Turkey has established a 65% LCR criterion for the auctions in its Renewable Energy Resource 
Areas (YEKA). In addition, the winning bidder for solar PV is required to build a solar panel 
manufacturing facility in Turkey with a capacity of at least 500 MW within two years after 
contract date and must establish a research and development (R&D) facility and employ a minimum 
of 100 permanent technical personnel. For onshore wind, the winning bidder must commit to the 
establishment of an R&D facility (Sarı et al., 2018). 
In the United Kingdom’s contract for difference (CfD) support scheme, offshore wind projects 
with a capacity of 300 MW or more are required to provide a supply chain plan that specifies 
mechanisms for the promotion of local innovation, competition and skill development. Currently, 
only about a third of the supply chain is localised, but the government seeks to increase this share to 60% 
(Pantry, 2019). This scheme is not an LCR, but rather an assessment of the local impact of the project.
In Malaysia’s Large-Scale Solar auction, foreign ownership cannot exceed 49%. The bidder 
must be a local company with Malaysian equity of at least 51%, or a consortium of legal entities 
including a minimum of one local company. The Malaysian equity in the consortium must also 
be at least 51% (Suruhanjaya Tenaga Energy Commission, 2019a).
In Argentina, foreign technology imports are permitted only where no local alternatives 
exist. For projects in which at least 60% of the materials are sourced locally, tax certificate 
regimes exist. 
a 1 USD= 14.08 ZAR in mid-2020
BOX 4.6  LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
(IRENA, 2014). In the absence of measures to 
support building local capacities, LCRs may 
result in reduced competition, bottlenecks, 
more expensive and less efficient inputs, higher 
prices for end users, and an increased number 
of incomplete projects (IRENA, 2019b; del Río, 
2017; Leigland and Eberhard, 2018). 
Local industries thrive best in areas where 
there is more than one developer, a situation 
that helps to produce diversification and 
specialisation of labour. In short, LCRs for a 
single round of auctions are not ideal to support 
the development of local industries. Support 
for local industry needs to be strategically 
integrated into a large and continuous vision 
for the implementation of renewable energy 
projects (IRENA, forthcoming-d). 
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 5  It should be noted, however, that a country may choose a longer-term development objective and devote resources to build an  
industry even if the benefits that accrue to the economy are not immediate. Historically, this was the case of most current  
industrialized nations (see for example Ha Joon Chang, 2009). 
Increasing the depth, length and diversity of 
renewable energy supply chains is also crucial for 
maximising the benefits of the energy transition 
(IRENA, forthcoming-b). It is generally believed 
that the first step is to assess the readiness 
of the local market for the implementation of 
LCRs. Before they are established, the needs 
for material and human resources presented by 
various renewable energy technologies must be 
well understood.5 
A sound assessment of existing domestic 
resources and capabilities will allow maximising 
domestic value creation by leveraging and 
enhancing local industries (see Box 4.7). This 
assessment can look into all segments of the 
value chain, since local job creation in project 
development, installation and, especially, 
operations and maintenance (O&M) can be 
more sustainable than in other segments and 
less vulnerable to variations in annual market 
size (OECD, 2015).
Finally, where renewable energy is publicly 
misperceived as expensive or expected to crowd 
out competing industries, visibly widening 
opportunities for local economic development, 
including employment, may increase the social 
acceptance of the auction scheme.
4.3 LOCAL JOB CREATION
Job creation is a key policy objective of a just and 
inclusive energy transformation. As more and 
more countries manufacture, trade and install 
renewable energy technologies, the sector has 
grown to employ 11 million people worldwide. 
This number could exceed 40 million by 2050 
under the IRENA transformation pathway to 
scale up renewables (IRENA, forthcoming-b). 
Maximising employment creation is closely 
linked to the concept of local content, in that 
the localisation of segments of the value chain 
generates employment. O&M of production 
facilities is the segment most readily localised, 
and construction and installation activities 
also lend themselves for local job creation. 
By comparison, manufacturing of equipment 
and complex services require much greater 
effort –and can be successful. If the low-carbon 
transition is to be just and inclusive, emerging 
employment opportunities should be accessible 
to all, including those affected by the transition.
Potential and distribution of jobs  
created along with the skills needed
Renewable energy auctions, among other 
deployment policies, can bring new employment 
opportunities. In Brazil, the awarded projects 
from auctions have generated an estimated 1.3 
million jobs over the last 15 years (Viana, 2019). 
In Argentina, the RenovAr programme (a total 
volume of 2.5 GW onshore wind, 1.7 GW solar 
PV, and 268 MW of hydro, biomass and biogas 
awarded) led to the employment of 9,614 people 
in the sector as of March 2019. Wind energy 
accounted for over 50% of the total, with 5,343 
jobs, while solar energy accounted for 2,555 
(Ministerio de Energía, 2019). 
The distribution of jobs created depends 
on the segments of the value chain being 
localised. Because a solar PV or onshore wind 
plant normally operates for 20 years, the O&M 
phase provides more long-term opportunities 
for employment than the construction or 
manufacturing phase. Box 4.8 examines the 
distribution of jobs by segment of the value chain 
for solar PV, onshore wind and offshore wind. 
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BOX 4.7  IRENA’S LEVERAGING LOCAL CAPACITY REPORT SERIES 
IRENA’s series of reports on Leveraging Local Capacity examines the material and human resource 
requirements for developing robust industries in solar PV, onshore wind and offshore wind (IRENA, 
2017b, 2017c, 2018e). The main materials required by each of these renewable energy technologies are 
shown in Figure 4.3. The labour requirements are described in Box 4.8.
To maximise value creation from a domestic wind industry, for example, capacities in industries such 
as concrete, steel, polymers and fiberglass need to be leveraged. This includes providing expertise, as 
well as the raw materials and intermediary products needed to manufacture wind components such as 
blades and towers. For a typical 50 MW onshore wind facility, almost 23,000 tonnes of concrete are 
needed for the foundations, and nearly 6,000 tonnes of steel and iron for the turbines and foundations. 
The requirements for offshore wind are similar.
Manufacturing the main components of a wind turbine requires specialised equipment, as well as the 
welding, lifting and painting machines used in other industries, such as construction and aeronautics. 
The foundations also require the use of specialised equipment including rolling, drilling and welding 
machinery. Special vessels and cranes are used to move these big structures. Examining these and 
further requirements provides insights on the industrial capabilities that can be leveraged and enables 
policymakers to set appropriate country-specific local content requirements.
Figure 4.3   Materials required for a 1 MW solar PV plant, a 50 MW onshore wind plant  



















































Copper 149 115 tonnes






insulation 27 066 tonnes
Polyproylene 66 15 tonnes











Source: IRENA, 2017b, 2017c, 2018e.
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The work force needs certain skills to allow for 
sustainable growth (Lucas, Pinnington and 
Cabeza, 2018). The skills required to build, 
operate and maintain a renewable energy project 
are varied; O&M requires mostly highly skilled 
workers. Box 4.9 presents an overview of the 
types of jobs required in each segment of the 
value chain, along with the qualifications needed.
To ensure that the low-carbon transition is 
as just and inclusive as possible, the positive 
effects of emerging employment opportunities 
must be spread equitably among those affected 
by the transition. Auctions can be designed to 
strengthen the social and economic value of 
renewables. 
This includes measures to ensure benefits for 
specific disadvantaged stakeholders, social 
groups or minorities, through job creation or 
other means. Some of the options are reviewed 
below, by category of auction design. 
Qualification requirements. 
An auction’s qualification requirements can be 
configured to require that project proposals 
meet quotas or minimum thresholds keyed to 
the demographic or ethnic characteristics of the 
work force. In the Turkish YEKA auctions, for 
example, 80% of the engineers employed by the 
awarded onshore and offshore wind projects 
must be Turkish (Sarı et al., 2018).
BOX 4.8   DISTRIBUTION OF HUMAN RESOURCES ALONG THE VALUE CHAIN  
FOR SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE WIND PROJECTS
A typical 50 MW solar PV project requires some 230,000 person-days to plan, manufacture, install, 
operate, maintain and decommission. The greatest labour requirements are in O&M (56%), followed by 
procurement and manufacturing (22%) and construction and installation (17%). 
Similarly, for the development of a 50 MW onshore wind project, a total of 144,000 person-days is 
needed. Here again, labour requirements are highest in O&M (43% of the total), followed by construction 
and installation (30%) and manufacturing (17%). 
For offshore wind, the bulk of the labour requirements (totalling 2.1 million person-days for a 500 MW 
farm) are in manufacturing and procurement.
Figure 4.4   Distribution of human resources along the value chain for 50 MW PV project,  
50 MW onshore wind and 500 MW offshore wind
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Source: IRENA, 2017b, 2017c, 2018e.
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Renewable energy technologies offer employment opportunities along all segments of the value chain. 
The occupations involved require a wide range of skills, training and experience. 
Of the total labour requirements for a 50 MW solar PV plant, the single largest category of occupations 
is construction workers and technicians (44%), followed by factory workers (14%) and engineers 
(13%). For a 50 MW onshore wind project, the share for construction workers and technicians is 
lower than in solar (29%); those categories are followed by operators (20%) and engineers (16%). For 
both technologies, more than half of the occupations offered are low- to medium-skilled, especially 
in the construction and installation phases, making them easy to source locally. Within renewable 
energy technologies, occupational shares also vary by segment of the value chain. Reports in IRENA’s 
Leveraging Local Capacity series provide details (IRENA, 2017b, 2017c, 2018e).
Figure 4.5  Distribution of total labour requirements for a 50 MW solar and wind project
BOX 4.9   TYPES OF JOBS CREATED AND SKILLS REQUIRED  
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In South Africa, these requirements entail 
thresholds for employees holding South African 
citizenship, for skilled and unskilled black 
citizens, and for residents of local communities 
(see Table 2.4). It is estimated that, through 
four auction rounds, more than 100,000 
job-years would have been created for local 
citizens: almost 85,000 for black citizens and 
almost 58,000 job-years for members of local 
communities, with some overlap (Eberhard and 
Naude, 2017). As for the job-years created so far 
for South African citizens, the number increased 
from around 17,800 at the end of 2014 to around 
36,500 by early 2019. The construction phase 
accounted for 85% of the employment created, 
while O&M was responsible for the remaining 
15%. A total of 27 signed projects in 2019 are 
expected to provide an additional 54,362 job-
years (IRENA, forthcoming-d). 
Women have yet to benefit from this programme, 
as they only represent 8% of total employment 
created to date (Republic of South Africa, 2019). 
Women in general remain underrepresented in 
the renewable energy sector, particularly in the 
construction and O&M segments of the value 
chain (IRENA, 2019c).
Local employment quotas cannot be effective 
unless the workforce itself has the skills and 
knowledge needed to support the development 
of the sector. Among the examples of auction 
design elements that incorporate a focus on 
training and education is Denmark’s auction 
for the Horns Rev 3 offshore wind farm, which 
required bidders to provide a certain number 
of traineeships in the construction of the farm 
(Wendering et al., 2015). 
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Auction demand
A systematic scheme can promote longer-
term job opportunities. The communication 
of reliable long-term auction schedules and 
volumes signals market opportunities and 
can induce longer term job creation through a 
pipeline of projects. In Uganda, staggering the 
development of projects instead of deploying 
them simultaneously, as originally intended, 
extended the length of employment. Having 
overcome a learning curve, costs (both in 
terms of time and resources) were reduced for 
contractors on later projects, who were able to 
rely on workers who had gained experience on 
earlier projects. Even though the outcome was 
a less diverse workforce, the opportunities for 
more productive and meaningful work increased, 
providing a chance for workers to further 
develop their skills (IRENA, forthcoming-d).
Winner selection
Auctions can also be designed such that the 
degree of job creation and levels of demographic 
or ethnic consideration can be evaluated and 
ranked together with bid prices as part of the 
selection of winners. In South Africa’s REIPPPP 
auctions, projects exceeding target values for 
employment receive a bonus in the winner 
selection (see Table 2.4). 
Lessons learned for maximising job creation 
through auction design
Quantitative employment targets in auctions 
should be accompanied by qualitative 
dimensions, such as the sustainability of the 
newly created jobs, accessibility for all genders 
and social groups, and the significance of 
the jobs for those employed. South Africa’s 
Department of Energy has reported that job 
creation targets were not only achieved, but 
surpassed, with national skills levels exceeding 
developers’ expectations (DOE, 2018). However, 
most of the unskilled labour provided by black 
citizens was short-term, and training, education 
and development needs may not have been 
prioritised (McDaid, 2016). 
Ultimately, short-term, low-paid, unskilled jobs 
are not a lasting solution to poverty nor a path to 
sustainable development. Particularly in Africa, 
local labour predominates in unskilled positions. 
In Senegal and Uganda, skilled construction 
activities for renewable energy projects were 
largely carried out by expatriates, while the 
local community held mostly unskilled positions 
(IRENA, forthcoming-d). While this model 
may be ubiquitous and possibly unavoidable 
in the early stages of the sector development, 
policies and measures are needed to build local 
capacities as the sector evolves. 
The challenge of job creation thus goes far 
beyond identifying the competencies needed 
by renewable energy project developers (Baker 
and Wlokas, 2015). Foreign project developers 
may find themselves lacking the on-the-ground 
networks or community liaisons they need to 
build a stable workforce (WWF South Africa, 
2015). Ultimately, sustainable employment 
opportunities can be created only when a 
growing industry is able to absorb and retain 
the newly created and evolving workforce. This 
requires a broader set of policies, including 
measures for education and skills development 
(see Figure 4.1).
Skills development requires long-term 
planning. Bottom-up education and training 
programmes that address fundamental skills 
gaps can take up to 10 years or more to 
yield results. Alternatively, transferable skills 
in other industries can be identified, and 
workers with such skills retrained according 
to the needs of the renewable energy sector. 
Even in that case, however, it can be difficult 
to attract  and retain skilled workers in rural 
areas where large renewable energy projects 
are often developed. Indeed, employees often 
prefer temporary contracts that allow them 
to travel back and forth between work and 
home (IRENA, forthcoming-d). Nevertheless, 
rural and remote areas can benefit greatly 
from economic activities related to renewable 
energy deployment. 
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4.4  SUBNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
AND COMMUNITY BENEFITS
Renewable energy deployment can be a strong 
driver for job creation and other positive socio-
economic outcomes, but the geographical 
distribution of renewable capacity is to a 
large extent determined by the location of the 
underlying resources, clustering in regions rich 
in them. Although the macro-economic effects 
of low-carbon transitions are almost universally 
seen as positive, the regional concentration 
of projects can leave some less-endowed 
stakeholders heavily disadvantaged. 
Benefits of the geographical distribution of 
renewable energy projects 
Influencing the geographical distribution of 
renewable energy projects can bring value to 
disadvantaged regions and maximise transition 
benefits for communities. But renewable energy 
projects may struggle to obtain public acceptance 
where they are perceived to entail high costs 
– including disruptions from construction and 
noisy operation – and the main benefactors live 
outside the community (Wustenhagen, Wolsink 
and Burer, 2007). 
Moreover, the use of land for large-scale 
renewable energy projects may displace 
pre-existing economic activities and force 
the resettlement of local citizens, leading to 
negative social and economic impacts (Yenneti, 
Day and Golubchikov, 2016; Mathur, 2011). In 
addition, renewable energy projects may be 
located near rural communities that lack access 
to modern energy services. 
Such regions, which will generally have high 
rates of poverty and inequality, usually expect 
more from a project than it can deliver. This is 
why engaging communities and maximising 
benefits on the local level are crucial for project 
sustainability and can contribute to a just and 
inclusive transition. 
Also, renewable energy projects that ensure 
community participation convey procedural 
fairness and result in planning processes that 
are perceived as more transparent (Firestone 
et al., 2018). Steps like these can enhance the 
social acceptance of renewable energy projects 
while also yielding economic and social benefits 
for the community (Box 4.10). 
BOX 4.10  ENHANCING SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE THROUGH COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
Inadequate community involvement can slow or halt the implementation of renewable energy projects, 
as was the case, for example, with wind projects that were terminated in Mexico and Kenya (Business 
and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2018). But community involvement can also increase social 
acceptance and minimise a not-in-my-back-yard effect. 
Under the community engagement modality, generators engage with local communities through 
consultation and dialogue before developing their projects (DELWP, 2017). Dialogue, inclusive planning 
and the collaborative policy development are all necessary for a just low-carbon energy transition, even 
when projects are not developed by the community itself (Smith, 2017).
Communities may also take an equity stake in projects, for example, in response to policies designed 
to maximise socio-economic benefits or requirements for a social license to operate (IRENA, 2019d). 
This is the case in Denmark, for example, where neighbours of near-shore wind projects must be given 
the opportunity to invest in the project. Alternatively, when citizens entirely take over control and 
ownership of a project to independently develop renewable energy, the engagement of citizens takes 
the form of community ownership initiatives (see Box 4.2).
Community power initiatives have proven their significance in settings as varied as Germany (Musall 
and Kuik, 2011) and Japan (Maruyama, Nishikido and Iida, 2007). On-site participatory planning 
with indigenous communities in Mexico (Huesca-Pérez, Sheinbaum-Pardo and Köppel, 2016) and in 
the Latin America and the Caribbean region generally (REN21, 2017) has also shown promise. More 
commonly, assessment of local stakeholder engagement is a requirement for environmental and social-
impact approval of projects (see Box 4.12). 
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As detailed in the paragraphs that follow, 
elements of auction design can facilitate the 
development of renewable energy projects in 
regions with sub-optimal resource endowments. 
It can also encourage the participation of 
host communities so as to maximise benefits, 
improve regional development, and increase 
social acceptance – combining to enhance the 
equity and inclusiveness of the low-carbon 
energy transition.
Auction demand
Regional development can be pursued through 
design elements falling within the auction 
demand category. By limiting the participant 
pool and selecting technologies in which a 
given region has a comparative advantage, 
technology-specific auctions can increase 
the chances that projects will be awarded in 
regions that would otherwise not be able to 
compete. Likewise, by conducting zone-, site-, 
or project-specific auctions, the auctioneer can 
pre-select the sites and regions that best suit 
policy objectives. 
The Noor solar complex in Morocco 
is a case in point, presenting opportunities 
for job creation and regional development in 
the remote area of Ouarzazate (Box 4.11).
Qualification requirements
Site-specific qualification requirements, particularly 
proof of land-use rights, can promote community 
benefits when grounded in solid documentation 
that is binding on auction participants. Indeed, 
land access and acquisition processes offer 
local communities leverage to participate in 
and benefit from renewable energy projects. 
Communities may be concerned about conflicts 
between energy production and other economic 
activities. However, this can be mitigated 
through location constraints that focus on land 
use (IRENA and CEM, 2015). 
Requirements that projects yield socio-
economic benefits where they are built can also 
support regional and community development. 
In such cases, developers must demonstrate that 
their projects will have beneficial spillovers in a 
given region. In Australia, project developers 
are required to submit evidence to support 
community engagement and benefit sharing. 
For this purpose, the Victoria state government 
has developed a community engagement 
and benefit sharing guideline that includes a 
social risk analysis, a community engagement 
strategy, a benefit sharing program, and letters 
of support, as well as reporting, monitoring and 
evaluation plans (see Box 4.4). 
 BOX 4.11   NOOR-OUARZAZATE SOLAR COMPLEX IN MOROCCO PROVIDES BENEFITS  
TO THE REGION 
The auction for the Noor-Ouarzazate solar complex was designed to generate electricity from 
concentrated solar power (CSP) while contributing to the development of a domestic industry 
and creating economic opportunities for local communities. Populations in neighbouring 
villages are among the main beneficiaries of the project. The local communities made choices that 
benefited everyone, including women and children. 
For example, instead of cash compensation for the land lost, which would benefit only male landowners, 
the community opted for investments in basic amenities and social services for all, such as drainage 
and irrigation channels, drinking water facilities, community centres, and mobile health caravans. Some 
projects, such as a dormitory for female students and sport and camp programs for children, directly 
benefit women. The complex has also offered employment opportunities to women in Morocco, whose 
participation in the labour force is among the lowest in the world. 
However, women still face challenges in finding jobs because of adverse gender norms in rural areas and 
inadequate qualifications. Indeed, they represent only 4% of the workforce at the CSP facility. Provisions for 
a safe and positive work environment for women made it possible for them to work in a range of positions 
within the complex, from traditional activities such as catering, cleaning, and administration to technical 
roles in quality control and health and safety, and even highly skilled positions such as topographer and 
welder. Without the provisions, their participation in the workforce would have been lower.
Source: ESMAP, 2018.
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In South Africa, REIPPPP projects have been 
required to have either a community trust or 
a company that represents local communities.6 
As project shareholders, communities earn 
dividends which are expected to be invested 
in community development initiatives. To date, 
REIPPPP has committed USD 3.6 billion to 
local shareholding, representing a net income 
for community organisations of about USD 1.5 
billion (IRENA, forthcoming-d). In El Salvador, 
the 2014 tender for 100 MW of solar and wind 
power required developers to invest 3% of 
their revenue in social projects in the adjacent 
communities (REN21, 2017). 
In Namibia, the national utility, NamPower, has 
focused on including “previously disadvantaged 
Namibians” in auctions. The Equitable 
Economic Empowerment Policy includes 
as a condition for obtaining a generation 
license, 30% ownership and shareholding by 
the disadvantaged, with special emphasis on 
women and disabled individuals. Other criteria 
required included management positions for 
disadvantaged Namibians; spending on skills 
development, entrepreneurship development, 
and community investments; and local hiring 
from communal and underdeveloped regions 
(IRENA, forthcoming-d). 
In Mexico, developers must obtain a social 
impact permit before building their plants. This 
permit has become a bottleneck in deployment 
of awarded projects (Box 4.12).
Winner selection
Winner selection criteria can also be adjusted to 
enhance regional development and community 
benefits. Through a multi-criteria evaluation, 
projects in desired locations can be awarded 
additional points and thus have a higher chance 
of winning. In Malaysia’s Large-Scale Solar 
PV auction, plans to use land for economic 
activities in addition to solar generation (e.g., 
agricultural activities) can yield merit points 
to the bidder (Suruhanjaya Tenaga Energy 
Commission, 2019b). In Germany’s solar 
PV auction, ground-mounted projects were 
incentivised to deploy in industrial zones rather 
than to use land with alternative or potential 
agricultural uses. This was done by capping the 
number of sites that could be built on arable 
land. Once the cap is met, the construction of 
ground-mounted systems is supported only 
on brownfield sites, along train tracks and 
highways, or in non-arable areas. 
BOX 4.12  MEXICO’S SOCIAL IMPACT PERMIT 
Mexico’s structural energy reform (2013-2014) requires every new energy project to conduct 
a social impact assessment. The assessment must include measures to mitigate negative 
impacts and to maximise positive ones (Chacón, 2016). The national Secretariat of Energy 
(SENER) is responsible for approving and issuing the permit, which takes around one year, chiefly 
because the resources dedicated to the process are limited. 
Because of this delay, the permit has become a bottleneck to timely development of projects 
(Guadarrama, 2018). The lack of clarity around the framework for social impact permits has also had 
negative repercussions. For instance, consultations with indigenous communities for wind projects 
in the state of Oaxaca have been neglected. The development of renewable energy projects in other 
regions has been accompanied by socio-economic tensions, as most of the project sites lie within 
indigenous territories (del Río, 2017). SENER will have to establish clearer criteria for sound and binding 
social impact assessments. 
The social impact permit was considered as a qualification requirement in the fourth auction round, 
instead of a post award requirement (Guadarrama, 2018), but the auction was ultimately cancelled 
(see Box 2.3).
6  While corporate project developers comply with the policy requirement to involve communities, they often form the entities that 
represent local communities on their behalf  (WWF South Africa, 2015). The requirement is being phased out in future rounds, as it 
has been found not to be representative of the communities and has in some cases led to community conflicts.
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Sellers’ remuneration and risk allocation 
Concerning sellers’ remuneration, regions 
with lower levels of resource endowments 
can be compensated through higher adjusted 
payments based on a pre-established 
reference. This is known as a “reference yield 
model”. Project developers bid the price 
at which they estimate they can compete; 
however, for locations with higher resource 
endowments (i.e., above the reference yield), 
a lower price is paid, and vice versa. Germany 
has facilitated the development of wind 
projects in regions with lower wind resource 
endowments by implementing this strategy. 
The objective is not to build projects with sub-
optimal resources, but to level the playing field 
for sites with lower wind speeds to compete 
with those with higher speeds, while also 
compensating for the transmission constraints 
between north and south. 
Germany’s experience shows that the reference 
yield model does not limit supply and can 
potentially reduce grid and congestion costs. That 
said, the effectiveness of the approach depends 
on the diligent setting of parameters, such that 
good projects remain competitive and contracts 
are not awarded solely on the basis of location-
specific adjustments (Steinhilber and Rosenlund, 
2016). In sum, the move to renewables does not 
automatically ensure that marginalised regions 
and communities will benefit from the energy 
transition without dedicated policy action 
(IRENA, forthcoming-d). The design of renewable 
energy auctions can encourage the participation 
of communities to maximise benefits, improve 
regional development and enhance the equity 
and inclusiveness of the low-carbon energy 
transition. In addition, it can facilitate the 
development of renewable energy projects in 
regions with lower resource endowments. 
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS ON ENSURING A JUST TRANSITION
The deployment of renewable energy presents 
ample opportunities to achieve broader 
economic and social objectives. To date, 
however, deployments have too often side-
stepped such questions. Fortunately, auctions 
offer the potential to foster the development 
of local industries, create jobs, include small 
and new players, engage communities, and 
contribute to subnational development.
Small-scale actors, including communities, are 
drivers of growth, employment and development 
in many countries, and the energy sector can and 
should encourage their participation. Auction 
design can do so by reducing transaction 
and up-front costs or by compensating small 
developers’ projects beyond their pricing offers. 
Mobilising them through auctions contributes 
to the development of local supply chains and 
industries.
Local content requirements are often adopted 
to support nascent and domestic renewable 
energy industries and to maximise local value 
creation by stimulating demand for locally 
sourced equipment and services. Developers of 
large projects can be required or encouraged 
to employ a minimum threshold of local goods 
and services. Increasing the depth, length and 
diversity of renewable energy supply chains is 
one of the crucial factors for maximising the 
benefits from the energy transition. An initial 
step is to understand the material and human 
resource requirements of different renewable 
technologies, to assess those requirements in 
the context of existing domestic resources and 
capabilities, and to identify ways to maximise 
domestic value creation by leveraging and 
enhancing local industries.
New employment opportunities are among the 
benefits that renewable energy projects and 
auctions can promote. 
Incentives for local employment requires that 
the workforce itself possesses the skills and 
knowledge needed to support the sector’s 
development. Related education and training 
policies must, therefore, prepare the enabling 
conditions. In addition, the newly created 
jobs must be equitably distributed within the 
population –in terms of gender, ethnic minorities 
and marginalised groups– and must be 
sustainable and significant for those employed. 
Opportunities for employment can also benefit 
populations living in underdeveloped and 
remote areas. 
A concentration of projects in resource-rich 
regions can disadvantage other regions and 
stakeholders. A more even regional distribution 
can help spread the socio-economic benefits 
of renewable energy projects, while also 
facilitating grid integration (see Chapter 3). A 
variety of auction design elements can promote 
community participation and social acceptance, 
improve regional development, and enhance 
the equity and inclusiveness of the low-carbon 
energy transition. Yet these design elements, 
effective as they may be, must figure within a 
broader policy framework designed to ensure a 
just and inclusive energy transition. 
Finally, the trade-off between achieving 
socio-economic objectives and procuring 
electricity at low prices cannot be avoided. In 
the pursuit of socio-economic development, 
a main challenge for policymakers is to 
align deployment policies with enabling and 
integrating polices (see Figure 4.1). 
Failure to exploit synergies between the energy 
sector and the broader economy can result in a 
lost opportunity to maximise the benefits of the 
energy transition (IRENA, forthcoming-b).
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As renewable energy becomes more 
mainstream, the policies driving its deployment 
and integration are evolving rapidly. This 
reflects multiple factors, including changing 
market conditions, new technical and socio-
economic challenges, and the need to ensure 
a just transition. Through the increasing use of 
auctions, policy makers have sought to procure 
renewable electricity cost-effectively while also 
fulfilling other, often country-specific, social and 
economic aims. 
Remarkable progress has occurred in the field 
of renewable energy auctions in recent years.
A total of 106 countries had adopted competitive 
procurement for renewable-based electricity by 
the end of 2018, up from 8 in 2005. In 2017 and 
2018 alone, 55 countries adopted auctions, a 
third of those for the first time. Competitive cost 
reduction and record-low prices were achieved 
in countries that prioritised deployment at the 
lowest price, mainly for solar PV and wind (both 
onshore and offshore) power supply. 
The global price average for solar PV fell 77% 
between 2010 and 2018, reaching USD 58.7/MWh, 
while onshore wind declined 36% to USD 47/MWh. 
Other countries focused their auction designs 
on other goals, such as integrating solar and 
wind power (i.e., VRE), ensuring timely project 
completion, and ensuring a just and inclusive 
energy transition. 
Many auction strategies can support VRE 
integration, based on varying degrees of 
central planning. 
Under the project-based strategy, the desired 
technological characteristics, project size, 
location  and other parameters are pre-
determined to fit system needs. Quantity and 
adjustment-based strategies identify system 
constraints and set limits (e.g., on size or 
location) or apply penalties and incentives to 
maintain smooth system operation. 
A price-based strategy typically relies on price 
signals to identify the best VRE production 
profile, while a product-based strategy focuses 
on auctioning system-friendly energy, capacity, 
services, and other power-market products. 
The choice of auction strategy and design 
elements in each case needs to reflect specific 
circumstances, such as the existing market 
structure, level of sector development and 
other factors. 
Projects must come online on time and perform 
as planned. Successful delivery in terms of 
capacity, energy, and socio-economic benefits, 
are prerequisites to meet renewable energy 
targets, as well as to achieve wider sustainable 
development goals. 
This can be done through auction design 
elements such as qualification requirements 
and compliance rules but careful consideration 
needs to go into how these impact the different 
auction stages. For example, while elaborate 
qualification requirements can minimise 
underperformance at the construction and 
operation stages, they may deter participants 
at the bidding stage and impact competition. 
Responsibilities and risks must be allocated 
among multiple stakeholders depending on 
the context. Balanced risk mitigation through 
auction design could be explored further in 
future studies. This topic becomes increasingly 
relevant with more newcomers to auctions, 
and higher levels of risks that can be political 
and regulatory and/or related to off-take, 
transmission, currency, etc. 
Beyond auction design, project performance 
also depends on the subsequent enabling 
environment for renewables, from robust 
institutions and ease of issuing licences and 
permits, to facilitating grid connection and 




Renewable energy auctions can foster local 
industries, create jobs, encourage small and 
new participants, engage communities and 
contribute to sub-national as well as national 
development. 
Reduced up-front costs and additional 
compensation can encourage the participation 
of small and new players, which are drivers of 
growth, employment and development in many 
countries. Mobilising such players through 
auctions enables wider competition and 
strengthens local supply chains and industries. 
Those can also be supported through local 
content requirements and the selection of 
developers with higher shares of local spending. 
Local job creation is another objective, but 
one that requires the availability of skills 
and knowledge among the local workforce. 
Education and training policies must create 
the conditions for renewable energy uptake. To 
ensure a durable transition, newly created jobs 
must be fairly distributed, in terms of gender 
and ethnic minorities and marginalised groups 
– and must be sustainable and significant for 
those employed. 
Opportunities for employment can also 
benefit populations living in underdeveloped 
and remote areas and a more even regional 
distribution can help spread the socio-economic 
benefits of renewable energy projects. Auction 
design can promote community participation 
and social acceptance, improve regional 
development, and enhance the equity and 
inclusiveness of the low-carbon energy 
transition. Yet these design elements, effective 
as they may be, must figure within a broader 
policy framework designed to ensure a just and 
inclusive energy transition. 
The trade-off between achieving socio-
economic objectives and procuring electricity 
at low prices cannot be avoided. A major 
challenge for policy makers is to align renewable 
energy deployment with other policies and 
socio-economic goals. Failure to exploit 
synergies between the energy sector and the 
broader economy, meanwhile, can mean a lost 
opportunity to maximise the benefits of the 
energy transition. 
To ensure success, auctions can be tailored to each 
country’s technical, administrative and political 
capabilities and deployment and development 
objectives. Smooth co-ordination among all 
stakeholders is vital throughout the process.
Long-term electricity procurement, including 
through auctions, forms a key pillar of this 
transition to a sustainable energy future.
Auction design alone cannot overcome all the 
challenges involved in large-scale renewable 
energy integration. Each power system requires 
comprehensive structural changes to maximise 
the value, and optimise the use of solar, wind 
and other renewables. 
Yet sound auction design can help to adjust 
current power system structures, introduce 
higher shares of renewables and lay the 
groundwork for the sustainable, renewable-
based power systems of the future.  Further 
IRENA work on auctions will provide strategies 
to support such systemic evolution.
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ANNEX 95
Afghanistan: Since September 2017, Afghanistan 
has been organising auctions following the 
engineering, design, procurement, and construction 
of renewable plants (EPC). Between September 
2017 and December 2018, seven project-specific 
auctions of this type were held, and three projects 
were awarded: one 10 MW solar hybrid project and 
two other similar projects totalling 45 MW (Bellini, 
2017c). By the end of 2018, a call for expression 
of interest was launched for a total 2 GW of grid-
connected solar parks across the country (400 MW 
in each of five selected provinces) (Petrova, 2018b).
Albania: In August 2018, an auction was called 
to build a 50 MW solar photovoltaic (PV) plant 
under a project-specific scheme. The winning offer 
involved a price of EUR 59.9/MWh (USD 68/MWh)1 
and a commitment to build an additional 50 MW 
of capacity that will sell electricity at market prices 
(Jovanović, 2018b).
Algeria: In May 2017, the Algerian Ministry of 
Energy announced the country’s first renewable 
energy auction with the goal of contracting 4 GW of 
solar capacity (Climatescope, 2018f). In November 
2018, the Algerian government issued a tender 
for the deployment of 150 MW of solar capacity 
(Bellini, 2018b).
Argentina: In 2017, the Argentine government 
awarded 2,042 MW of projects under Round 2 of the 
RenovAr program. The awards included 993 MW of 
wind capacity at an average price of USD 41/MWh 
and 816 MW of solar at an average price of USD 43/
MWh, as well as 143 MW of biomass at an average 
price of USD 107.5/MWh, 69 MW of biogas at an 
average price of USD 153/MWh, and 21 MW of small 
hydro at an average price of USD 98.9/MWh (Yaneva, 
Tisheva and Tsanova, 2018).
Armenia: In May 2017, the government published 
a tender to contract a 55 MW solar park under 
the project-specific scheme. Five bidders were 
shortlisted for the final phase. The winning bid was 
awarded at USD 41.9/MWh in May 2018 (Petrova, 
2018c).
Australia: The state of Victoria first renewable 
energy auction was held in 2018. In it, 673 MW of 
onshore wind and 255 MW of solar PV capacity were 
contracted (928 MW in total) (Maisch, 2018). The state 
of South Australia held an auction for concentrated 
solar power (CSP) in 2017 in which 150 MW was 
awarded at a price of AUD 78/MWh (USD 61/MWh)2 
(Kraemer, 2017). Later in 2018, an auction was held 
for a 100 MW storage facility adjacent to a large wind 
farm. Tesla and Neoen won the contract for USD 50 
million and deployed the Hornsdale Power Reserve’s 
100MW/129MWh battery energy storage system 
(Wahlquist, 2018).
Bahrain: In February 2019, Bahrain awarded 100 MW 
of solar PV at an average price of BHD  14.7/MWh 
(USD 38.9/MWh)3 (BNEF, 2019).
 1  Note: 1 USD = 0.879906 EUR in November 2018.
²  When neither the exchange rate nor the date are specified, 
these can be found in the cited reference.
3  Note: 1 USD = 0.378 BHD in February 2019. 
Bangladesh: Bangladesh launched an auction in 
March 2017 that awarded 258 MW of PV projects 
at an average price of BDT 10,880/MWh (USD 136/
MWh4) (Shumkov, 2017). In August 2018, another 
auction was launched for 200 MW of PV projects to 
be developed in four locations; that auction is still 
underway (Petrova, 2018a).
Bolivia: In early 2018, Bolivia awarded Spain’s TSK a 
contract to build (but not operate) the 50 MW Oruro 
Solar Park (TSK, 2018). 
Botswana: Botswana launched its first auction 
in May 2017 to contract 100 MW of solar capacity 
consisting of two 50 MW facilities. The auction was 
originally planned for joint ventures between the 
government and the selected private investors, but 
the model adopted was redefined to the independent 
power producer (IPP), with investors fully owning 
and operating the plants (Bellini, 2019b). 
Brazil: In four auctions held between 2017 and 2018, 
Brazil awarded 2,828 MW of wind capacity, 1,823 
MW of solar, 650 MW of small hydro, and 292 MW 
of biomass (BNEF, 2019). The A4 technology-neutral 
auction in 2017 was dominated by solar PV (791 MW 
out of the total of capacity assigned, 64 MW to wind, 
25 MW to biomass and 12 MW to hydro). In the A6 
technology-neutral auction in October 2019, only 
530 MW of the 2.98 GW of capacity contracted was 
awarded to solar, at an average price of USD 20.52/
MWh, more than 1 GW was awarded to wind, 734 
MW went to gas-fired power, 445 MW to hydro and 
229 MW to biomass (Molina and Bellini, 2019). 
Canada: In the first round of the province of Alberta’s 
auctioning program, 600 MW of wind capacity were 
contracted at an average price of CAD 37/MWh 
(USD  29/MWh)5 in December 2017. In December 
2018, during the second and third rounds, a total of 
763 MW of wind generation (363 MW in the second 
round and 400 MW in the third) were awarded with 
an average price of CAD 38.69/MWh (USD 28.76/
MWh)6 and CAD 40.14/MWh (USD 29.84/MWh), 
respectively (AESO, n.d.).
Chile: Chile’s latest technology-neutral auction, 
held in November 2017, awarded 2,200 GWh - 
equivalent to approximately 600 MW of renewable 
capacity (equivalent to the estimated annual energy 
demand). The final award price was USD 32.5/MWh 
(Bellini, 2017a).
China: China held a total 10 auctions under its Top 
Runner program in 2017 and 2018, awarding contracts 
to 5 GW of solar projects at an average price of 
CNY 427/MWh (USD  64.6/MWh) (Climatescope, 
2018a). In December 2018, an onshore wind auction 
in Ningxia region awarded 1.9 GW of wind projects 
at an average price of CNY 451.5/MWh (USD  65.5/
MWh)7. In July 2019, China awarded 22.8 GW of solar 
PV at an average price of CNY 446.4/MWh (USD 
64.9/MWh)8 (BNEF, 2019).
⁴  Note: 1 USD = 80 BDT in March 2017.
⁵  Note: 1 USD = 1.275719 CAD in December 2017.
⁶  Note: 1 USD = 1.345234 CAD in December 2018.
7  Note: 1 USD = 6.892 CNY in December 2018.
⁸  Note: 1 USD = 6.879 in July, 2019. 
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Chinese Taipei: In June 2018, Chinese Taipei 
launched an auction in which 1,664 MW of offshore 
wind capacity were contracted at an average price 
of TWD 2386.3/MWh (USD 79.1/MWh) (BNEF, 2019; 
Tisheva, 2018).
Colombia: In October 2019, Colombia awarded 
1.3 GW of solar and wind energy, following the 
cancellation of the first renewable energy auction 
in February that year. The average price for the 
8 signed contracts (5 wind and 3 solar) was COP 
95,650/MWh (USD 28/MWh) (Kenning, 2019c).
Denmark: The country’s first solar-wind auction was 
launched in September 2018. The results, announced 
in December 2018, were the contracting of a total of 
269 MW: 165 MW of wind and 104 MW of solar PV 
capacity at a weighted average feed-in premium (FiP) 
(fixed on top of the market price) of DKK 22.8/MWh 
(USD  3.47/MWh)9 (Bellini, 2018c). A second round 
was held in 2019 where solar and wind competed. 
A ceiling on the FiP to be paid to successful bidders 
was set at DKK 60/MWh, more than halving the 
previous round’s ceiling price of DKK 130/MWh. In 
mid-November 2018, Denmark also awarded 19 MW 
of solar PV capacity at an average price of DKK 
129.7/MWh (USD 20.4/MWh) (BNEF, 2019) in the 
technology-specific small-scale PV auction. In late 
2019, the country was preparing to auction an 800 
MW offshore wind project (Kleist, 2019).
Egypt: In 2017, a first auction for the development of 
solar parks was held. It took the form of a technology-
exclusive bidding round designed to award 600 MW 
of solar capacity (Climatescope, 2018g). In August 
2018, an additional project-specific auction was 
launched to contract the 200 MW Kom Ombo solar 
PV project. The winning bid was awarded at USD 27.5/
MWh (Enterprise, 2019).
El Salvador: In January 2017, El Salvador awarded 50 MW 
of wind at an average price of USD 98.78/MWh and 120 
MW of solar capacity at an average price of USD 49.55/
MWh (Climatescope, 2018j).
Ethiopia: In June 2017, Ethiopia awarded 100 MW of 
solar PV. In October 2017, a site-specific auction was 
launched to contract two 125 MW solar plants with a 
combined capacity of 250 MW (Climatescope, 2018h).  
Finland: Finland held a technology-neutral 
renewable energy auction in November 2018 allowing 
competition among various renewable energy 
sources. In total, 26 proposals were submitted, all of 
which were for wind power production. Only seven 
projects were awarded, with an average price of EUR 
2.49/MWh (USD 2.81/MWh)10. Under the auction 
terms, winners were awarded the tariff plus a feed-
in premium, the exact amount of which will depend 
on whether the average three-month market price of 
electricity is equal to, lower than, or higher than EUR 
30/MWh (Mäkitalo, 2019).
9   Note: 1 USD = 6.562453 DKK in December 2018
10  Note: 1 USD = 0.885152 EUR in March 2019
France: France launched its ground-mounted solar PV 
programme in August 2016, with plans to auction 3 GW 
in six 500 MW phases in 2017, 2018 and 2019. The first 
auction results were disclosed in March 2017, with 535 
MW awarded at an average price of EUR 62.5/MWh 
(USD 66.8/MWh)11 (Kenning, 2017b). The results of 
the second auction were published in July 2017, with 
508 MW awarded at an average price of EUR 63.9/
MWh (USD 73.65/MWh)12 (Kenning, 2017c). The third 
auction, the results of which were revealed in February 
2018, awarded 508 MW at an average price of EUR 
61.6/MWh (USD 76/MWh)13 (Shumkov, 2018). The 
fourth auction awarded 720 MW in August 2018 at an 
average price of EUR 58.2/MWh (USD 67.15/MWh)14 
(Bellini, 2018d). The fifth awarded 855 MW in March 
2019 at an average price of EUR 62.7/MWh (USD 
70.83/MWh)15 (Martín, 2019b). In March 2018, France 
awarded 22 onshore wind projects totalling 508.4 MW 
in its first onshore wind auction, with an average price 
of EUR 65.40/MWh (USD 80.63/MWh)16 (Dodd, 2018). 
In September 2018, the country awarded 118 MW in a 
second onshore wind auction, with an average price 
of EUR 68.7/MWh (USD 79.9/MWh). After a third 
onshore wind auction in April 2019, 516 MW were 
awarded at an average price of EUR 63/MWh (USD 
73.3/MWh) (BNEF, 2019). In June 2019, the country 
awarded 500 MW in the first offshore wind auction 
in Dunkirk at an average price of EUR 44/MWh (USD 
49.7/MWh) (BNEF, 2019; Brnic, 2018).
Germany: In November 2018, the Federal Network 
Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) awarded 201  MW of 
solar PV to 36 projects at an average price of EUR 
57.2/MWh (USD 65/MWh)17 (Hill, 2018). This was 
followed by three solar auctions: In February 2019, 
80 contracts totalling 465 MW were awarded at an 
average price of EUR 48/MWh (USD 54.5/MWh)18 
(Hill, 2019a). In March 2019, 121 contracts totalling 
505 MW were awarded at an average price of EUR 
65/MWh (USD 73.4/MWh)19 (Hill, 2019b). In April 
2019, 210 MW were awarded at an average price of 
EUR 56.6/MWh (USD 63.6/MWh)20 (Hill, 2019c). For 
onshore wind, more than 6 GW were auctioned in 
2017 and 2018, out of which more than 5 GW were 
awarded at an average price of EUR 52.4/MWh. In 
2019, five rounds were held. In February, 67 contracts 
totalling 476 MW were awarded at an average of 
EUR 61/MWh (USD 69.2/MWh). In May, 270 MW 
were awarded at an average of EUR 61.5/MWh (USD 
68.9/MWh)21. In August, 208 MW were awarded at 
an average of EUR 62.3/MWh (USD 69.5/MWh)22. In 
September, 176 MW were awarded at an average of 
EUR 62.1/MWh (USD 68.5/MWh)23. And in October, 
204 MW were awarded at an average of EUR 62.2/
MWH (USD 68.9/MWh)24 (BNEF, 2019). 
11  Note: 1 USD = 0.9351 EUR in March 2017
12  Note: 1 USD = 0.867527 EUR in July 2017
13  Note: 1 USD = 0.810022 EUR in February 2018
14  Note: 1 USD = 0.866686 EUR in August 2018
15  Note: 1 USD = 0.885152 EUR in March 2019
16  Note: 1 USD = 0.811046 EUR in March 2018
17  Note: 1 USD = 0.879906 EUR in November 2018
18   Note: 1 USD = 0.880959 EUR in February 2019
19  Note: 1 USD = 0.885152 EUR in March 2019
20  Note: 1 USD = 0.890132 EUR in April 2019
21  Note: 1 USD = 0.893524 EUR in May 2019
22  Note: 1 USD = 0.897508 EUR in August 2019
23  Note: 1 USD = 0.907199 EUR in September 2019
24  Note: 1 USD = 0.903815 EUR in October 2019
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Greece: In July 2018, Greece launched its first 
auction for renewable capacity, organised into three 
rounds. The first round, solar-specific, was for plants 
of less than 1 MW; it resulted in awards of 53.5 MW at 
an average price of USD 92/MWh (EUR 77.95/MWh). 
The second round, also solar-specific for plants 
between 1 MW and 20 MW, awarded 53 MW at an 
average price of EUR 67/MWh (USD 79/MWh). The 
third round, specific to wind plants between 3 MW 
and 50 MW, awarded 171 MW at an average price of 
EUR 70/MWh (USD 82.6/MWh) (BNEF, 2019; Tsagas, 
2018). In December 2018, Greece awarded 62 MW 
of solar PV at an average price of EUR 66.6/MWh 
(USD 78.6/MWh) and 222 MW of onshore wind at an 
average price of EUR 58.6/MWh (USD 69.15/MWh). 
In May 2019, the country held its first technology-
neutral auction, which resulted in the award of 
370 MW of renewables at an average price of EUR 
57/MWh (USD 64.4/MWh) (BNEF, 2019). In its latest 
auction in July 2019, Greece awarded 143 MW of solar 
PV at an average price of EUR 62.8/MWh (USD 70.6/
MWh)25 and 180 MW of wind at an average price of 
EUR 67.3/MWh (USD 75.7/MWh) (Tsagas, 2019a).
India: In 2018, auctions for solar PV (and wind) rose 
dramatically from prior years, accompanied by lower 
bid prices. In July 2018, a price of INR 2.44/kWh 
(USD 35.42/MWh) was registered in the 600 MW 
solar auction held by the Solar Energy Corporation of 
India (MNRE, 2018), but subsequent auctions in 2018 
yielded relatively higher prices. 
Indonesia: In June 2017, Indonesia held an auction 
to contract 168 MW of solar capacity in the Sumatra 
region. The auction attracted 116 bids from interested 
companies (Petrova, 2017). 
Israel: Israel’s first and second renewable energy 
auctions under the country’s renewable plan were 
held in March and July 2017. Both were technology-
exclusive. The first awarded 235 MW of solar PV at an 
average price of ILS 199.00/MWh (USD 55.34/MWh); 
the second, 105 MW of solar PV at an average price 
of ILS 197.80/MWh (USD 54.9/MWh) (BNEF, 2019). 
Japan: In October 2017, the first tender for solar 
projects (2 MW or greater) was held, contracting 
only 141 MW (out of 500 MW targeted) at an 
average price of JPY 18,628/MWh (USD 165/MWh)26 
(Solarplaza, 2018). The country’s second solar 
auction in September 2018 contracted no projects, 
because no bid came in below the ceiling price set 
in advance (Argus Media, 2019). A third solar auction 
held in December 2018 contracted 196.6 MW at an 
average price of JPY 15,024/MWh (USD 134/MWh)27 
(Bellini, 2019a). In parallel, auctions for offshore wind 
have been gaining traction in the country, with 229 
MW (Japan’s largest offshore wind project to date) 
contracted in January 2017 (IPP Journal, 2017). In 
December 2018, Japan held its first biomass auction; it 
resulted in the award of 35 MW of biomass projects at 
an average price of USD 174/MWh (BNEF, 2019).
25  Note: 1 USD = 0.888913 EUR in July 2019
26  Note: 1 USD = 112.9 JPY in October 2017.
27  Note: 1 USD = 112.12 JPY in December 2018.
   Jordan: In September 2018, Jordan awarded 150 
MW of solar PV at an average price of USD 28/MWh 
(BNEF, 2019). Prior to that, 50 MW of wind capacity 
were auctioned in the third round of Jordan’s 
renewable auction held in December 2016; the results 
have yet to be announced (PV Magazine, 2018).
Kazakhstan: Twenty auctions held by the 
government in 2018 aimed to award 1 GW of 
installed capacity in tranches keyed to renewable 
energy technologies, zones and size categories. 
The auctions that took place awarded 858 MW of 
capacity, consisting of 270 MW of solar, 500 MW of 
wind, 82 MW of hydropower and 5 MW of biomass-
fired generation split among 36 projects proposed 
by 30 companies. The lowest tariff submitted for 
solar projects was KZT18/kWh (USD 48.5/MWh); 
the lowest for wind and hydropower projects were 
KZT 17.39/kWh (USD 46.9/MWh) and KZT 12.8/kWh 
(USD 34.5/MWh). The lowest tariff submitted for a 
biomass-fired generation project was KZT 32.15/kWh 
(USD 86.7/MWh) (IPP Journal, 2018).
Kuwait: In June 2018, the Kuwait National Petroleum 
Company launched a site-specific auction to build the 1.2 
GW Dibdibah solar-power plant. A total of 17 companies 
were prequalified in the first stage of the auction, but no 
results have been announced (Gupta, 2018). 
Lebanon: Lebanon held one solar auction early this 
year for a capacity of 180 MW divided among 12 
plants (each 15 MW). Of this, only 45 MW has been 
awarded; the rest are under negotiation (Tsagas, 
2019b). Lebanon also held two auctions for wind 
projects in July 2017 and April 2018. The July auction 
has been awarded; the contracted price, after several 
rounds of negotiations, dropped from more than USD 
140/MWh to USD 104.5/MWh for the first three years 
and USD 96/MWh for the remaining 17 years of the 
contract. The second April 2018 auction, launched 
through an expression of interest, received 42 offers.
Luxembourg: The country’s first auction, held in 
February 2018, called for solar projects with capacity 
exceeding 500 kW (Seeger, 2018).
Madagascar: The third African country to join the 
World Bank’s Scaling Solar program held its first 
renewable energy tender in January 2018 to contract 
a 25 MW solar plant. Six companies qualified to 
submit commercial bids (Scaling Solar, 2018).
Malaysia: Malaysia’s February 2017 auction awarded a total 
563 MW of solar projects at an average price of RM 429/
MWh (USD 96.6/MWh)28. The government revised the 
original demand of 460 MW in response to the high number 
of bids received (Climatescope, 2018b; Kenning, 2017a).
Malta: The country’s first tender, held in October 
2017, contracted 12.9 MW of solar capacity at an 
average price of USD 153.25/MWh. The second, held 
in August, contracted 18 MW of solar capacity at an 
average price of USD 159.6/MWh. A third tender is 
expected in 2020 to meet the government target of 
50 MW of solar capacity through 2021 (BNEF, 2019).
28  Note: 1 USD = 4.44 RM in February 2017.
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Mexico: In Mexico’s third long-term clean energy 
auction, held in November 2017, a total of 2.5 TWh 
of onshore wind was contracted at an average price 
of USD 18.6/(MWh+Clean Energy Certificates) and 3 
TWh of solar PV at an average price of USD 20.8/
(MWh+CEC) (BNEF, 2019; PwC, 2018; Mora, 2017). 
Another auction, planned for 2018, was indefinitely 
delayed by the regulator (Bellini and Zarco, 2018).
In Montenegro, a tender was launched for the 
construction of a 250 MW solar power plant in the 
southernmost part of the country. The winning 
consortium offered the best terms for newly created 
jobs, technical capacity, financing and participation 
of domestic companies (Jovanović, 2018a).
Morocco: In Morocco, the Noor Power Station in 
Ouarzazate was auctioned in four rounds. The first 
three rounds, for CSP, totalled 510 MW. The 160 MW 
Noor I and 200 MW Noor II projects use parabolic-
trough technology with storage capacity of three and 
seven hours, respectively. Noor III, a 150 MW solar 
tower, has seven hours of storage capacity. These 
were followed by a fourth round for 72 MW of solar 
PV. In May 2019, Morocco auctioned the world’s first 
advanced hybrid of CSP and PV. The 800 MW CSP-PV 
Noor Midelt is designed to provide dispatchable solar 
energy during the day and until five hours after sunset 
for a record-low peak-hour tariff of MAD 0.68/kWh (71 
USD/MWh) (Kraemer, 2019).
Namibia: In early 2017, a site-specific auction for a 37 
MW solar PV power plant was awarded at a price of 
USD 63.2/MWh (Climatescope, 2018i). 
Netherlands: In March 2017, October 2017 and April 
2018, the Netherlands’s SDE+ scheme awarded a 
total 1,780 MW of wind capacity, 5,963 MW of solar 
capacity, 243.8 MW of biomass projects, and 200 
MW of geothermal plants (Bellini, 2017b; 2018e; 
2018f). In March 2018, the Dutch authorities awarded 
to the Swedish power company Vattenfall a contract 
to build two 350 MW offshore wind farms in the 
Netherlands which, upon completion in 2022, will 
be the first offshore wind farms to be built without 
subsidies (Weston, 2018).
Oman: In March 2018, Oman Power and Water 
Procurement Company (OPWP) awarded the 
Ibri II solar power project (500 MWp) to a group 
consisting of ACWA Power and Kuwait’s Gulf 
Investment Corporation and Alternative Energy 
Projects Company ((Shumkov, 2019). The winning 
price had not been disclosed at the time of publication. 
Pakistan: In a solar PV auction held in 2018, 50 MW 
of solar PV capacity was tendered; contracts have 
yet to be awarded (BNEF, 2019).
Philippines: In February 2018, the Philippines held a 
technology-specific auction and awarded 150 MW of 
onshore wind at an average price of PHP 3,500/MWh 
(USD  67.5/MWh)29 (Lectura, 2018). In its first solar 
auction, 50 MW of solar PV were awarded at a price 
of PHP 2,339/MWh (USD 43.9/MWh)30 (Bellini, 2018a).
29  Note: 1 USD = 51.875 PHP in February 2018. 
30  Note: 1 USD = 53.28 PHP in August 2018.    
Poland: In January 2017, Poland awarded 70 MW of 
solar PV and 8 MW of onshore wind at an average 
price of USD 86/MWh in its first renewable energy 
auction (BNEF, 2019). In November 2018, an auction 
was held for both solar PV and onshore wind 
projects in excess of 1 MW capacity; 31 bids have 
been awarded at an average price of PLN 195.16/
MWh (USD 51.57/MWh)31 (Murphy, 2018).
Qatar: In May 2018, an auction was launched for a 
500 MW solar power plant to be developed near Al 
Kharsaah. In October 2018, Qatar announced that it had 
prequalified 16 bidders for the tender (Bellini, 2018g). 
Russia: Russia’s technology-neutral auctions of 2017 
and 2018 yielded contracts for more than 2.5 GW of 
wind capacity, 669 MW of solar PV, and 90 MW of 
hydropower (Tisheva, 2017; Climatescope, 2018k). 
Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia’s first renewable energy 
auction in February 2017 awarded a 300  MW solar 
project at a price of SAR 87.81/MWh (USD 23.4/MWh)32 
(ACWA Power, 2019). In April 2017, a second tender for 
a 400 MW wind project was awarded at a price of SAR 
79.85/MWh (USD 21.3/MWh)33  (Masdar, 2019). In 2019, 
Saudi Arabia launched a 1.5 GW solar PV auction and 
invited developers to submit expressions of interest 
for seven PV projects under the second round of the 
kingdom’s National Renewable Energy Programme 
(NREP) (Roscoe, 2019).
Senegal: Senegal awarded two projects under the 
Scaling Solar Program. The two 30 MW projects will 
sell electricity to Senegal’s power regulator (CRSE) at 
EUR 38/MWh (USD 42/MWh) and EUR 40/MWh (USD 
44/MWh) (IFC, 2018; Martín, 2019a).
Singapore: Singapore has carried out three auctions 
under the SolarNova program, which aims to achieve 
350 MW of rooftop solar capacity in government 
buildings. A total of 76 MW was awarded in 
December 2015, 40 MW in June 2017, and an 
additional 50 MW at the end of 2017 (Beetz, 2015) 
(Photon, 2016) (Bhambhani, 2018).
Sri Lanka: Since 2017, Sri Lanka has held several 
renewable energy auctions, culminating in the 
contracting of 100 MW of wind capacity and 90 MW 
of solar PV capacity that have been tendered and 
awaiting award. An additional 10 MW of solar PV 
capacity was tendered and awarded at an average 
price of LKR 124.9/MWh (USD 76.8/MWh) (BNEF, 
2019; Climatescope, 2018c; Climatescope, 2018d).
Slovenia is now the auction frontrunner in the Western 
Balkans. In accordance with the European State Aid 
Guidelines, the country adopted competitive auctions 
in 2016. The three auction rounds held since then have 
attracted close to 300 MW worth of renewable energy 
and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) projects. The 
2018 auction round awarded 129 MW to 41 projects, 
including 109 MW for 13 wind projects. The average 
price of winning bids fell from USD 86.36/MWh to 
USD 75/MWh in three years.
31  Note: 1 USD = 3.784039 PLN in November 2018
32  Note: 1 USD = 3.750321 SAR in February 2018
33  Note: 1 USD = 3.74905 SAR in January 2019
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Spain: In two auction rounds in May and July 2017, 
Spain awarded a total 3,910 MW of solar power and 
4,107 MW of wind power at an average price of EUR 43/
MWh (USD 49.6/MWh) and EUR 25.4/MWh (USD 29.3/
MWh), respectively (BNEF, 2019; Climate Action, 2017).
Thailand: In October 2017, Thailand held its first 
technology-neutral hybrid auction, which encourages 
the use of energy storage to supplement renewable 
energy generation. A total capacity of 300 MW of 
renewable energy (biomass, biogas, and refuse-
derived fuel, in addition to solar, wind, and small hydro 
combined with storage batteries) were awarded. Of 
the 17 winning projects, 14 used biomass, totalling 
almost 260 MW, with prices ranging from USD 60 to 
110/MWh (Climatescope, 2018e; Leds, 2018).
Tunisia: The country’s first auction, awarded in May 
2018, resulted in the contracting of 64 MW of solar PV 
capacity. Two more auctions, awarded in 2019, resulted 
in the contracting of 60 MW of solar PV and 120 MW 
of wind (Dodd, 2019; Kenning, 2019a). 
Turkey: Since 2017, the government has conducted 
five major auctions. The first, in March 2017, awarded 
1 GW of solar capacity at an average price of USD 
69.9/MWh (Hürriyet Daily News, 2017). The second, 
held in June 2017, was a pre-license auction in 
which 710 MW of onshore wind was awarded at 
an average price of USD 11.5/MWh (BNEF, 2019; 
Balkan Green Energy News, 2017). The third, in 
August 2017, awarded 1 GW of onshore capacity at 
an average price of USD 34.8/MWh (Daily Sabah, 
2019). The fourth, in December 2017, was a pre-
license auction in which 2,110 MW of onshore wind 
was awarded at an average price of USD 50.8/MWh 
(BNEF, 2019; Balkan Green Energy News, 2018). A fifth 
auction in June 2019 awarded 1 GW of onshore wind 
at an average price of USD 39.4/MWh (BNEF, 2019).
United Arab Emirates: The fourth phase of the 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park auction 
in Dubai was originally for 700 MW concentrated solar 
power (CSP) consisting of 600 MW from a parabolic 
basin complex and 100 MW from a concentrated 
solar tower, with thermal storage capacity of 15 
hours. It was awarded at 73 USD/MWh.  The project 
was later amended to add 250 MW of solar PV 
awarded at USD 24/MWh, increasing the total 
capacity to 950 MW.  In 2019, DEWA launched 
a 900 MW solar PV auction, issuing a request for 
qualification for developers under the fifth phase of 
the same initiative (DEWA, 2019). 
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom launched 
its second auction for Contracts for Difference in 
September 2017, allowing for competition between 
renewable technologies. The auction culminated in 
the contracting of 3.196 GW of offshore wind (860 
MW to be delivered in 2020/2021 and 2336 MW 
to be delivered in 2022/2023) at average prices of 
GBP 74.7/MWh (USD 98/MWh)34 for the 2020/2021 
delivery and GBP 57.5/MWh (USD 75.4/MWh) for the 
2022/2023 delivery. In addition, 86 MW of biomass 
(waste to energy, to be delivered in 2020/2021) 
and 64 MW of biomass (advanced conversion 
technologies, of which 32 MW is to be delivered 
in 2020/2021 and 32 MW in 2022/2023) were also 
awarded at average prices of GBP 74.7/MWh (USD 
98/MWh) for the 2020/2021 delivery and GBP 40/
MWh (USD  52.4/MWh) for the 2022/2023 delivery 
(BNEF, 2019; Hill, 2017). 
United States: In November 2017, a site-specific 
auction in the state of Georgia awarded 510  MW at 
an average price of USD 36/MWh of solar capacity 
(Roselund, 2017). In December 2017, another site-
specific auction was held for a 100 MW solar PV 
project in the state of Massachusetts (JD Supra, 
2017). In May 2018, Massachusetts also launched a 
technology-specific offshore wind auction which 
culminated in the award of an 800 MW project under 
a power purchase agreement at a price of USD 74/
MWh for the first phase (400 MW) and USD 65/MWh 
for the second phase (400 MW) (BNEF,2019).
Zambia: Under the first round of the Solar Scale 
Programme, Zambia awarded 88 MW of solar PV 
capacity (Kenning, 2019b). The country also awarded 
120 MW of solar PV capacity under the GET FiT 
Zambia programme in April 2019, setting a record-
low price for Sub-Saharan Africa. The lowest bid of 
3.999 US cents per kWh is the first under the four-
cent mark. The six winning bids were awarded in 
pairs to three successful bidders (20 MW each, for 
a total of 120 MW) at an average price of USD 44.1/
MWh (Parnell, 2019).
34  Note: 1 USD = 0.75113 GBP in September 2017
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